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F. Abdul Khader Vs. Karnataka State Road Transport Corpn. and anr.

F. Abdul Khader vs Karnataka State Road Transport Corpn. and anr.

Type Court Judgment Court Karnataka Decided Nov 15, 1994
~5 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/376002

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Citation
Court
Karnataka High Court
Judge
Decided On
Case Number
W.P. No. 8470/1988
Subject
Labour and Industrial

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- LABOUR & SERVICES Section 4(6): [S. Abdul Nazeer, J] Statutory liability of the employer to pay gratuity - Held, The Act is enacted for introducing a scheme for payment of gratuity for certain industrial and commercial establishments as a measure of social security. It is a beneficent piece of social legislation...

Key legal issue
Labour and Industrial

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

F. Abdul Khader

Respondent

Karnataka State Road Transport Corpn. and anr.

Legal References

Reported In
1995(2)KarLJ371

Excerpt

- labour & services section 4(6): [s. abdul nazeer, j] statutory liability of the employer to pay gratuity - held, the act is enacted for introducing a scheme for payment of gratuity for certain industrial and commercial establishments as a measure of social security. it is a beneficent piece of social legislation expressly drafted in the interest of employees for payment of statutory gratuity to them. gratuity is a retirement benefit for long and continuous service as a provision for old age. it is earned as a matter of right subject to fulfilling the conditions therefor. section 4 of the act prescribes the statutory liability of the employer to pay gratuity and the right of the employee to seek it whenever it becomes payable. it is only under sub-section (6) of section 4 that the gratuity can be withheld if the employee whose services come to an end due to termination, on account of damages or loss caused to the property of the employer and that the gratuity can be forfeited to the extent of damage or loss so caused. in the p0resent case, the order of termination of the delinquent officer for his alleged misconduct has been set aside by high court. the finding of the disciplinary authority that the delinquent officer has committed the misconduct has been set aside. it is perhaps for this reason, the bank has not passed an order of forfeiture of the gratuity. in the circumstances, the bank is not justified in withholding the gratuity of the deceased employee payable to his heirs section 4(6) :[s.abdul nazeer,j] forfeiture of gratuity in the present case, the order of termination of the delinquent officer for his alleged misconduct has been set aside by high court - the finding of the disciplinary authority that the delinquent officer has committed the misconduct has been set aside - it is perhaps for this reason, the bank has not passed an order of forfeiture of the gratuity - in the circumstances, the bank is not justified in withholding the gratuity of..........corporation with effect from april 1, 1973 should be awarded his deemed seniority with effect from october 25, 1961 which was his original date of employment or august 19, 1967 which is the date from which he was re-employed by the corporation. the facts of this case are rather unusual insofar as the petitioner was removed from the services of the corporation more than once and finally, on an order of dismissal that had been passed against him, the deputy general manager by order dated august 19, 1967 directed that he be given a fresh chance of appointment as it was obvious to the authority that even if the petitioner should lose the benefit for the period of service already put in, that he should not be permanently punished. accordingly, with effect from october 4, 1967, the petitioner was offered re-employment, but the corporation's counsel points out to me that until he was regularised in the year 1973, he was working as a badli conductor and that it is for this reason that the corporation has not computed this period for purposes of seniority. 2. the facts of this case are rather unusual. the petitioner's counsel submits that the petitioner has been in the continuous employment of the corporation after the order for re-appointment was passed, since october 4, 1967, and that thereafter, in the seniority list published for the first time in the year 1987 he was wrongly relegated to a lower position as though he was appointed in the year 1973. with regard to the contention that the employment was of a casual nature, it is submitted that the petitioner was not a fresh employee and that in view of the order of reappointment, it must be construed that his reappointment was commenced with effect from that date. 3. this position is seriously contested by the learned counsel for the corporation on the basis of the record which indicates that he did not occupy a regular post until the year 1973. as far as this argument is concerned, having regard to the order passed by.....

Full Judgment

ORDER

1. Heard learned counsel on both sides. The controversy in this petition can be considerably narrowed down insofar as it centres around the question as to whether the petitioner who has been granted his seniority by the Corporation with effect from April 1, 1973 should be awarded his deemed seniority with effect from October 25, 1961 which was his original date of employment or August 19, 1967 which is the date from which he was re-employed by the Corporation. The facts of this case are rather unusual insofar as the petitioner was removed from the services of the Corporation more than once and finally, on an order of dismissal that had been passed against him, the Deputy General Manager by order dated August 19, 1967 directed that he be given a fresh chance of appointment as it was obvious to the authority that even if the petitioner should lose the benefit for the period of service already put in, that he should not be permanently punished. Accordingly, with effect from October 4, 1967, the petitioner was offered re-employment, but the Corporation's counsel points out to me that until he was regularised in the year 1973, he was working as a badli conductor and that it is for this reason that the Corporation has not computed this period for purposes of seniority.

2. The facts of this case are rather unusual. The petitioner's counsel submits that the petitioner has been in the continuous employment of the Corporation after the order for re-appointment was passed, since October 4, 1967, and that thereafter, in the seniority list published for the first time in the year 1987 he was wrongly relegated to a lower position as though he was appointed in the year 1973. With regard to the contention that the employment was of a casual nature, it is submitted that the petitioner was not a fresh employee and that in view of the order of reappointment, it must be construed that his reappointment was commenced with effect from that date.

3. This position is seriously contested by the learned counsel for the Corporation on the basis of the record which indicates that he did not occupy a regular post until the year 1973. As far as this argument is concerned, having regard to the order passed by the General Manager directing re-employment and the fact that the petitioner was a past employee of that very Corporation, to my mind, for purposes of computing length of tenure of service on which basis, the seniority is computed, the petitioner will have to be given the seniority with effect from October 4, 1967. This case is distinguishable from that of fresh employees and will have to be viewed in the light of the wordings of the past orders and not in the light of the wordings of any subsequent orders that may have been passed.

4. The Corporation's learned counsel submitted that there is gross delay in approaching this Court. As far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, a justification pleaded on behalf of the petitioner is that until the ad hoc seniority list was published in 1987 that the petitioner had no notice of the fact that his seniority was computed from 1973. It is difficult to accept this plea because even if the Corporation was acting wrongly, it was in the year 1974 that the petitioner was informed that his services have been regularised with effect from April 1, 1973. Having regard to the fact that the petitioner has approached this Court at a highly belated stage, he has made amends by not seeking for past reliefs by way of this petition.

5. Learned counsel for the Corporation further submitted that the petitioner is estopped in law from challenging the terms and conditions on which he was re-employed in the year 1967 and that once having accepted the appointment letter, as a with conductor he is precluded from challenging the terms thereafter. As far as this argument is concerned, I need to record that the petitioner will be entitled to claim his legal entitlements having regard to the position in which he was placed and his status, the plea of estoppel cannot be pressed against him.

6. The petition accordingly succeeds. The petitioner would be entitled to claim his seniority with effect from August 19, 1967 which is the date on which he in fact commenced his re-employment with the Corporation. The limited relief that the petitioner would be entitled to is that the respondent-Corporation shall, within a period of two months from today restore the petitioner to his rightful place in the seniority list on the basis of his date of appointment being June 19, 1967. The relief's that the petitioner would be entitled shall only be prospective insofar as if on the basis of the petitioner's seniority with effect from June 19, 1967 he qualifies for the next higher post as is similar to other persons of that seniority, then the petitioner shall be entitled to the same and shall also be entitled to the higher emoluments. It is clarified, however, that for purposes of terminal benefits, the petitioner's seniority shall be treated as having commenced from June 19, 1967. Rule absolute to this extent. No order as to costs.

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