Ratna Bai Vs. N. Narayani

Ratna Bai vs N. Narayani

Disposition Petition dismissed Court Karnataka Decided Jun 06, 1972

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Citation: sooperkanoon.com/375710
Court: Karnataka High Court
Judge: V.S. Malimath, J.
Decided On: Jun 06, 1972
Case Number: Civil Revn. Petn. No. 390 of 1972
Subject: Tenancy
Disposition: Petition dismissed

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947.[C.A. No. 14/1947]. Section 33(3): [Subhash B. Adi, J] Scope and ambit of enquiry under Held, The scope of the enquiry by the authority under Section 33(3) of the Act is not to re-appreciate the evidence. Whether the evidence is sufficient or not, is a matter which has to be adjudica...

Key legal issue: Tenancy
Outcome / disposition: Petition dismissed
Acts & sections: Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961 - Sections 21(2); Civil Procedur Code , 1908 - Sections 148 and 151

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Ratna Bai

Advocate Tukaram S. Pai, Adv.

Respondent

N. Narayani

Advocate H.G. Hande, Adv.

Legal References

Acts: Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961 - Sections 21(2); Civil Procedur Code , 1908 - Sections 148 and 151
Reported In: AIR1973Kant174; AIR1973Mys174; (1972)2MysLJ185

Excerpt

- industrial disputes act, 1947.[c.a. no. 14/1947]. section 33(3): [subhash b. adi, j] scope and ambit of enquiry under held, the scope of the enquiry by the authority under section 33(3) of the act is not to re-appreciate the evidence. whether the evidence is sufficient or not, is a matter which has to be adjudicated by the tribunal in a dispute and not by exercising power under section 33(3) of the act. the question of victimization or unfair labour practice can also be considered by the authority, however, in the present case, the authority re-appreciating the entire evidence has come to the conclusion that, necessary witnesses, who ought to have been examined, have not been examined and the evidence available on record is insufficient to grant permission. that is not a scope of the enquiry under section 33(3) of the act. the scope of enquiry under section 33 is to find out whether a prima facie case is made out against the workman or not and to consider whether prima facie it can go into the question as to whether there is total lack of evidence or no legal evidence particularly when the enquiry is held as fair and proper. while exercising power, the tribunal should have considered these aspects. since the approach of the tribunal in re-appreciating the evidence for the purpose of considering an application under section 33(3) (b) of the act being contrary to the scope of the enquiry under the said provision, the impugned order is liable to be quashed. - the revision petition has, therefore, to be dismissed, even though i am satisfied on the facts of this case about the bona fides of the tenant......the payment of the said amount within one month from the date of order of the court. the period of one month within which the amount has to be paid is. therefore, statutorily fixed. when the period is fixed by statute the provisions of section 148 and section 151 of the code of civil procedure cannot be invoked for extending the time for payment or making deposit. as section 148 of the code regulates the power of the court to extend the time regarding payment of rent etc. it is not possible to invoke section 151 of the code. section 151 of the code cannot be invoked as the topic of enlargement of time is specifically covered by section 148. the court below was, therefore, right in taking the view that it had no competency to extend the time for making payment of the rent directed to be deposited or paid under section 21 (2) of the act either under section 148 or section 151 of the code of civil procedure. the revision petition has, therefore, to be dismissed, even though i am satisfied on the facts of this case about the bona fides of the tenant.4. having regard to the circumstances of the case. i consider it reasonable and proper to grant six months' time from today to the tenant to vacate the premises. no costs.

Full Judgment

ORDER

V.S. Malimath, J.

1. This is a tenant's revision petition against the order passed by the Principal Munsiff, Mangalore in H. R. C. No. 63 of 1971 on I. A. No. II. The Respondent landlord made an application for eviction under Section 21 (1)(a) of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961, on the ground of non-payment of rent for the period 1-11-1969 to 20-2-1971. After the tenant was served with the notice of the suit, she admitted the claim of the landlord as regards arrears of rent The Court, therefore, made an order on the 20th August, 1971 under Section 21 (2) of the Act. A month's time was given to the tenant to pay all the arrears of rent. That period expired on the 20th September. 1971. On the 8th Oct. 1971, the tenant filed interim application No. II for extension of time for depositing the arrears of rent till the 15th October 1971. It was explained in the said application that the tenant is an old lady of 60 years and that her son who was looking after her affairs was seriously ill and was admitted to hospital and it is therefore that it was not possible for them to comply with the order of the court and to pay arrears of rent within the prescribed time. It was, therefore, prayed that the time may be extended for making deposit.

2. The lower Court came to the conclusion that it has no competence to extend the time statutorily fixed by Section 21 (2) of the Act. Hence, this revision petition by the tenant.

3. Section 21 (2) which has been substituted by Mysore Act 14 of 1969, reads as follows:--

'No order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made on the ground specified in Clause (a) of the proviso to Sub-section (1), if the tenant--

(i) complies with the provisions of Section 29.

(ii) Satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for the default to pay or tender the rent within the period referred to in the said clause (a): and

(iii) pays to the landlord or deposits in the court such further amount, as may be determined by the court to be due along with a sum not exceeding ten per cent of the rent thereof as may be fixed by the Court, within one month from the date of the order of the Court.'

We are concerned with Sub-clause (iii) of Clause (2) of Section 21 of the Act. The said sub-clause requires the Court to determine the rent and an amount not exceeding ten per cent of the rent that the tenant is required to pay. Once the said amount is determined as being the amount which the tenant is required to pay. the clause enjoins the tenant to make the payment of the said amount within one month from the date of order of the court. The period of one month within which the amount has to be paid is. therefore, statutorily fixed. When the period is fixed by statute the provisions of Section 148 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be invoked for extending the time for payment or making deposit. As Section 148 of the Code regulates the power of the Court to extend the time regarding payment of rent etc. it is not possible to invoke Section 151 of the Code. Section 151 of the Code cannot be invoked as the topic of enlargement of time is specifically covered by Section 148. The Court below was, therefore, right in taking the view that it had no competency to extend the time for making payment of the rent directed to be deposited or paid under Section 21 (2) of the Act either under Section 148 or Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The revision petition has, therefore, to be dismissed, even though I am satisfied on the facts of this case about the bona fides of the tenant.

4. Having regard to the circumstances of the case. I consider it reasonable and proper to grant six months' time from today to the tenant to vacate the premises. No costs.

Same Court & Year Karnataka · 1972 Same Parties Ratna Bai vs N. Narayani Same Subject Tenancy Same Judge V.S. Malimath, J. Acts & Sections Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961 - Sections 21(2); Civil Procedu...

Tenancy