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Radhakrishna Setty Vs. Land Tribunal, Somwarpet Taluk and anr.

Radhakrishna Setty vs Land Tribunal, Somwarpet Taluk and anr.

Type Court Judgment Court Karnataka Decided Aug 22, 1977
~4 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/375157

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Citation
Court
Karnataka High Court
Judge
Decided On
Case Number
Writ Appeal No. 52 of 1976
Subject
Property

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [Ram Mohan Reddy, J] Quantum of compensation Bodily injury - Held, Bodily injury is to be treated as deprivation entitling the claimant to damages, the amount of which varies according to the gravity of the injury. Deprivation due to injuries brings with it...

Key legal issue
Property
Acts & sections
Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1962 - Sections 48A; Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 - Sections 133; Constitution of India - Articles 226 and 227

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Radhakrishna Setty

Advocate K.S Gourishankar, Adv.

Respondent

Land Tribunal, Somwarpet Taluk and anr.

Advocate M.P. Chandrakantraj Urs., Govt. Adv.

Legal References

Acts
Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1962 - Sections 48A; Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 - Sections 133; Constitution of India - Articles 226 and 227
Reported In
AIR1978Kant7; ILR1977KAR1236; 1977(2)KarLJ281

Excerpt

.....to denial of justice. the joys of life will have gone from the appellant, he cannot perhaps ride a bicycle and if he can kick a football, cannot catch one and deprived of the usual forms of recreation which appeal to the ordinary healthy man. the impairment to the right upper arm causing disability of 35% naturally interferes with normal conduct of life or prevents sexual relation, warranting substantial damage on that ground. in fact, the appellant, young and energetic with great ambitions and expectations in life wanting to earn more money, due to the impairment, has occasioned loss of an enjoyable or interesting career too. the disfigurement in the form of a scar as notice by the doctor in his testimony is more serious when the appellant becomes very conscious of the disfigurement and avoids social occasions. the elbow joint in the upper limb in a human frame is of utmost importance, not that the other bones constituting the frame are not. with the partial permanent injury to the upper limb of the appellant, he will have to endure the disability for the rest of his life. in the result, the compensation was enhanced to rs.3,40,420/- with interest at 6% p.a. (rs.50,000/- towards loss of amenities of life, happiness, frustration; rs.35,000/- towards loss of marriage prospects; rs.15,000/- towards conveyance, attendant charges, food and nourishment; rs.50,000/- towards pain, shock , suffering and two fractures to the right upper arm; rs.97,920/- towards loss of future earning due to disability; rs.16,000/- towards loss of earning during laid off period; rs.15,000/- towards future medical expenses; rs.25,000/- towards loss of expectation of life and rs.36,500/- towards medical expenses). - the order of the tribunal which has been fully set out by us is clearly not a speaking order......record of rights from which a statutory presumption under section 133 of the karnataka land revenue act arises. it was stated before us that the name of the appellant is shown in the record of rights as the person cultivating the land. when there is a statutory presumption arising from the fact that the name of the appellant is entered in the record of rights as the person cultivating the land, the tribunal has to give reasons for holding that the statutory presumption has been rebutted by other evidence on record. the evidence on record before the tribunal consisting of oral evidence has not been discussed. the mere subjective satisfaction of the tribunal that the applicant before it is a tenant is not sufficient to sustain its decision. what is required of the tribunal is an objective consideration of the evidence on record and therefore the tribunal has to give reasons for its conclusions. the scope of the enquiry before the tribunal under the act has been laid down by this court in more than one decision. when the order of the tribunal is not a speaking order, it amounts to no adjudication at all. such an order is a void order. this court, when such an order is challenged under article 226 or 227 of the constitution, cannot give its own reasons to support the order, which, in effect, would mean that this court is taking upon itself the functions of the land tribunal. the learned single judge ought to have quashed the impugned order on the sole ground that it is not a speaking order without going into the merits of the case. 4. therefore, we allow this appealand reversing the order of the learned single judge, quash the impugnedorder dated 17-9-1975 made in caseno. lrm vii 13/3/74-75 on the file ofthe first respondent and remit thematter to the tribunal for adjudication afresh after affording both theparties reasonable opportunity of being heard. parties to bear their owncosts. ordered accordingly. 5. appeal allowed.

Full Judgment

G.K. Govinda Bhat, C.J.

1. This appeal is directed against the order of Venkataramiah, J., D/- 8-12-1975 made in Writ Petn. No. 5741 of 1975 rejecting the appellant's writ petition at the preliminary hearing stage.

2. The appellant is the landlord owning 3 acres of agricultural land in Koodlur village, Somwarpet Taluk, in Survey Nos. 19/1 and 19/2. The second respondent alleging that he is the tenant of the said land filed an application under Section 48A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act for grant of occupancy right. The said application was opposed by the appellant on the ground that the second-respondent is not a tenant of the said land and the appellant is personally cultivating the land. The par ties beside examining themselves, have examined some witnesses on either side. The Tribunal granted the application of the second-respondentconfirming occupancy rights in respect of 3 acres of land in Survey Nos. 19/1 and 19/2 of Koodlur Village. The order of the Tribunalreads thus:

'Order dated 17-9-75.

Case called: The applicant and the landlord present. Depositions of the appellant recorded. He says that he was cultivating the land from the last seven years by paying half share. But the landlord denies and says that the applicant was cultivating the land on cooli basis. The landlord further says that he had obtained signature to an application by the applicant agreeing to withdraw the application. The Tribunal feels that the applicant is cultivating the lands on wara basis. The Tribunal therefore determines that the applicant is ordinary tenant and further confirms the occupancy of 3.00 acres in Sy. Nos. 19/1 and 19/2 of Koodlur Village. Sd/-Asst. Commr. & Chairman,Land Reforms TribunalSomwarpet.'

The above order was challenged by the appellant before this Court in W. P. No. 5741 of 1975 which came up for preliminary hearing before Venkataramiah, J. who appears to have looked into some documents produced in the writ petition and made an order rejecting the writ petition and upholding the order of the Tribunal.

3. The second respondent has not appeared before us despite notice. The first-respondent, Land Tribunal is represented before us by Sri M. P. Chandrakantraj Urs, Senior High Court Government Advocate, and he has made available the records of the case before the Land Tribunal. The order of the Tribunal which has been fully set out by us is clearly not a speaking order. It makes no reference to the entries in the Record of Rights from which a statutory presumption under Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act arises. It was stated before us that the name of the appellant is shown in the Record of Rights as the person cultivating the land. When there is a statutory presumption arising from the fact that the name of the appellant is entered in the Record of Rights as the person cultivating the land, the Tribunal has to give reasons for holding that the statutory presumption has been rebutted by other evidence on record. The evidence on record before the Tribunal consisting of oral evidence has not been discussed. The mere subjective satisfaction of the Tribunal that the applicant before it is a tenant is not sufficient to sustain its decision. What is required of the Tribunal is an objective consideration of the evidence on record and therefore the Tribunal has to give reasons for its conclusions. The scope of the enquiry before the Tribunal under the Act has been laid down by this Court in more than one decision. When the order of the Tribunal is not a speaking order, it amounts to no adjudication at all. Such an order is a void order. This Court, when such an order is challenged under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, cannot give its own reasons to support the order, which, in effect, would mean that this Court is taking upon itself the functions of the Land Tribunal. The learned single Judge ought to have quashed the impugned order on the sole ground that it is not a speaking order without going into the merits of the case.

4. Therefore, we allow this appealand reversing the order of the learned single Judge, quash the impugnedorder dated 17-9-1975 made in caseNo. LRM VII 13/3/74-75 on the file ofthe first respondent and remit thematter to the Tribunal for adjudication afresh after affording both theparties reasonable opportunity of being heard. Parties to bear their owncosts. Ordered accordingly.

5. Appeal allowed.

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