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Tirthdas Ghanshamdas Bajaj Vs. Sadhusingh Udhasingh

Tirthdas Ghanshamdas Bajaj vs Sadhusingh Udhasingh

Type Court Judgment Court Mumbai Decided Nov 13, 1922
~2 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/345850

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Citation
Court
Mumbai
Judge
Decided On
Case Number
O.C.J. Suit No. 4810 of 1921
Subject
Property

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

Indian Registration Act (XVI of 1908), Section 17, Clause 2(V) - Agreement to mortgage admissible in evidence without registration-Agreement creating charge on immoveable property not admissible without registration.; An agreement to execute a legal mortgage of immoveable property is admissible in evidence without r...

Key legal issue
Property

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Tirthdas Ghanshamdas Bajaj

Respondent

Sadhusingh Udhasingh

Legal References

Reported In
(1923)25BOMLR313; 73Ind.Cas.296

Excerpt

.....before it is admissible in evidence.; the bengal banking corporation v. mackertich (1884) i.l.r. 10 cal. 315 followed. - section 3: [s.b. mhase, d.s. bhosale & a.s. oka, jj] offences of atrocities - complaint under held, merely because the caste of the accused is not mentioned in the fir stating whether he belongs to scheduled caste or scheduled tribe, it cannot be a ground for quashing the complaint. after ascertaining the facts during he course of investigation it is always open to the investigating officer to record tht the accused either belongs to or does not belongs to schedule caste or scheduled tribe. after final opinion is formed, it is open to the court to either accept the same or take cognizance. even if the charge sheet is filed at the time of consideration of the charge, it si open to the accused to bring to the notice of the court that the materials do not show that the accused does not belong to scheduled caste or scheduled tribe. even if charge is framed at the time of trial materials can be placed to show that the accused either belongs to or does not belong to scheduled caste or scheduled tribe. even if charge is frame d at the time of trial materials can be placed to show that the accused either belongs to or does not belong to scheduled caste or scheduled tribe. it is not a requirement und4r section 3 of the atrocities act that the complainant should disclose the caste of the accused in the complaint. in other words, if there is no mention of the caste of the accused in the fir, that cannot be a ground for either not registering the offence under section 3 of the act or for quashing such complaint - .4. as regards the agreement, i am satisfied that it cannot be used for the purpose of holding that there is a charge on the property mentioned therein.shah j.1. this suit has been heard ex parte as a short cause.2. as i felt some difficulty in granting reliefs (b) and (c) claimed in the plaint, i heard further arguments both on the question of jurisdiction and as to the effect of the agreement of december 10, 1918 to execute a mortgage.3. as regards the question of jurisdiction i do not feel any difficulty now. i have dealt with this question in the judgment delivered in jasraj v. akubai (1922) o.c.j. .4. as regards the agreement, i am satisfied that it cannot be used for the purpose of holding that there is a charge on the property mentioned therein. as an agreement to effect a mortgage it would be admissible in evidence : but if it is relied upon as justifying a declaration as to charge as distinguished from a mortgage, it seems to me that it ceases to be a document merely creating a right to obtain another document, but becomes in effect a document operating to create a charge in future 'when the declaration sought is made'.5. i have considered the argument urged by mr. setalvad that the document does not operate to create a charge; but that the charge is the result of such an agreement by operation of law. i am unable to accept the contention. if that is the effect of the document it operates to create such an interest, and would require to be registered. i need not deal with this question at any length. the ratio decidendi in bengal banking corporation v. mackertich i.l.r. (1884) cal. 315 appears to me to afford a complete answer to the plaintiffs' contention on this point.6. i am, therefore, unable to allow any relief to the plaintiffs except the personal relief claimed in prayer (a): interest on judgment at six per cent, per annum.7. there will be a decree in the plaintiffs' favour in terms of prayer (a) in the plaint: the plaintiffs will not get the costs of the further hearing on november 9.

Full Judgment

Shah J.

1. This suit has been heard ex parte as a short cause.

2. As I felt some difficulty in granting reliefs (b) and (c) claimed in the plaint, I heard further arguments both on the question of jurisdiction and as to the effect of the agreement of December 10, 1918 to execute a mortgage.

3. As regards the question of jurisdiction I do not feel any difficulty now. I have dealt with this question in the judgment delivered in Jasraj v. Akubai (1922) O.C.J. .

4. As regards the agreement, I am satisfied that it cannot be used for the purpose of holding that there is a charge on the property mentioned therein. As an agreement to effect a mortgage it would be admissible in evidence : but if it is relied upon as justifying a declaration as to charge as distinguished from a mortgage, it seems to me that it ceases to be a document merely creating a right to obtain another document, but becomes in effect a document operating to create a charge in future 'when the declaration sought is made'.

5. I have considered the argument urged by Mr. Setalvad that the document does not operate to create a charge; but that the charge is the result of such an agreement by operation of law. I am unable to accept the contention. If that is the effect of the document it operates to create such an interest, and would require to be registered. I need not deal with this question at any length. The ratio decidendi in Bengal Banking Corporation v. Mackertich I.L.R. (1884) Cal. 315 appears to me to afford a complete answer to the plaintiffs' contention on this point.

6. I am, therefore, unable to allow any relief to the plaintiffs except the personal relief claimed in prayer (a): interest on judgment at six per cent, per annum.

7. There will be a decree in the plaintiffs' favour in terms of prayer (a) in the plaint: the plaintiffs will not get the Costs of the further hearing on November 9.

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