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Yanger Jamir T. and anr. Vs. Nagaland Plantation Crop Development Corpn. Ltd. and ors.

Yanger Jamir T. and anr. vs Nagaland Plantation Crop Development Corpn. Ltd. and ors.

Disposition Appeal dismissed Court Guwahati Decided Jun 13, 1996
~7 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/135943

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Citation
Court
Guwahati High Court
Judge
Decided On
Case Number
W.A. No. 28/1994
Subject
;Labour and Industrial
Disposition
Appeal dismissed

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- - Union of India (1995-I-LLJ-431) as well as the decision of this Court in the case of D. 6. We have carefully applied our mind to the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the parties and we find that the law that has been laid down by the Apex Court is that ordinarily when an order of termination or dismi...

Key legal issue
;Labour and Industrial
Outcome / disposition
Appeal dismissed
Acts & sections
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Sections 11A

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Yanger Jamir T. and anr.

Advocate Y.K. Phukan, Adv.

Respondent

Nagaland Plantation Crop Development Corpn. Ltd. and ors.

Advocate P. Khataniar, Govt. Adv.

Legal References

Acts
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Sections 11A

Excerpt

- - union of india (1995-i-llj-431) as well as the decision of this court in the case of d. 6. we have carefully applied our mind to the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the parties and we find that the law that has been laid down by the apex court is that ordinarily when an order of termination or dismissal is set aside by the court or tribunal, the relief of back wages is granted to the employee but in exceptional circumstances, the court may also refuse to grant such relief of back wages to an employee even after setting aside the order of dismissal or termination or may grant only part of the back wages. but there may be exceptional circumstances which make it impossible or wholly inequitable vis-a-vis the employer and workman to direct reinstatement with full back wages. the workmen concerned might have secured better or other employment elsewhere and so on. in such and other exceptional cases, the court may mould the relief, but ordinarily the relief to be awarded must be reinstatement with full back wages. that relief must be awarded where no special impediment in the way of the awarding the relief is clearly shown. we are of the opinion that the ground given by the learned single judge for not granting the relief of back wages to the appellants fell within the exceptional circumstances as i explained by the apex court in the aforesaid i judgment and the learned single judge exercised his discretion in a sound and reasonable manner by denying the relief of back wages to the appellants......with effect from may 10, 1988 by a month's notice issued by the chairman of the corporation on april 6, 1988. the appellants challenged the said notice of termination in civil rule no. 1238/ 88 which was renumbered in the kohima bench of this court as civil rule no. 68(k)89 and by judgment dated september 30, 1991 of this court, the said notice of termination dated april 6, 1988 was set aside and the corporation was directed to reinstate the appellants in service. pursuant to the said judgment dated septemebr 30, 1991 of this court, the two appellants were reinstated in service with effect from january 16, 1991 by order dated january 12, 1991 of the managing director of the corporation. since the appellants were not given the benefits of service from the date of termination till their reinstatement, they filed another civil rule being civil rule no. 59 (k) 92 praying, inter alia, that the respondents be directed to reinstate the appellants with effect from may 10, 1988 and to grant all consequential service benefits including seniority, pay, allowance, arrear, etc. the aforesaid civil rule no.59(k)92 was disposed of by the learned single judge by the impugned judgment dated february 24, 1993 directing the respondents to reinstate the appellants with effect from may 10, 1988 to january 15, 1992 for the purpose of pay fixation, pension, seniority etc., but were not allowed back wages for the said period. this, appeal is against the said judgment of the learned single judge in so far as it has refused the relief of back wages. 4. at the hearing of this appeal, dr. y.k. phukan, learned counsel for the appellants, submitted that ordinarily when an order of termination is set aside by the court and the employer is directed to reinstate the employee in service, the court allows back wages from the date of termination of service till his reinstatement and there is no reason as to why the learned single judge ought to have departed from the aforesaid principle and.....

Full Judgment

Patnaik, J.

1. This is an appeal against the judgment dated February 24, 1993 of the learned single Judge in Civil Rule No. 15(K)92 of the Kohima Bench of this Court.

2-3. The facts briefly are that on February 3, 1982, the two appellants were appointed as Assistant Plantation Managers under the Nagaland Plantation Crops Development Corporation Limited (for short 'the Corporation'). But their services were sought to be terminated with effect from May 10, 1988 by a month's notice issued by the Chairman of the Corporation on April 6, 1988. The appellants challenged the said notice of termination in Civil Rule No. 1238/ 88 which was renumbered in the Kohima Bench of this Court as Civil Rule No. 68(K)89 and by judgment dated September 30, 1991 of this Court, the said notice of termination dated April 6, 1988 was set aside and the Corporation was directed to reinstate the appellants in service. Pursuant to the said judgment dated Septemebr 30, 1991 of this Court, the two appellants were reinstated in service with effect from January 16, 1991 by order dated January 12, 1991 of the Managing Director of the Corporation. Since the appellants were not given the benefits of service from the

date of termination till their reinstatement, they filed another Civil Rule being Civil Rule No. 59 (K) 92 praying, inter alia, that the respondents be directed to reinstate the appellants with effect from May 10, 1988 and to grant all consequential service benefits including seniority, pay, allowance, arrear, etc. The aforesaid Civil Rule No.59(K)92 was disposed of by the learned single Judge by the impugned judgment dated February 24, 1993 directing the respondents to reinstate the appellants with effect from May 10, 1988 to January 15, 1992 for the purpose of pay fixation, pension, seniority etc., but were not allowed back wages for the said period. This, appeal is against the said judgment of the learned single Judge in so far as it has refused the relief of back wages.

4. At the hearing of this appeal, Dr. Y.K. Phukan, learned counsel for the appellants, submitted that ordinarily when an order of termination is set aside by the Court and the employer is directed to reinstate the employee in service, the Court allows back wages from the date of termination of service till his reinstatement and there is no reason as to why the learned single Judge ought to have departed from the aforesaid principle and refused the relief of back wages to the appellants. Dr. Phukan brought to our notice the provisions of Article 43A of the Constitution in which a directive has been given to the State to secure participation of the workers in the management of industry and submitted that after the introduction of the said Art. 43-A in the Constitution, the Apex Court has taken a view that the workers cannot be denied the benefits of back wages in case their services were terminated illegally. In support of his submissions, Dr. Phukan relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat Steel Tubes Limited v. Its Majdoor Sabha, (1980-I-LLJ-137), Surendra Kumar v. Industrial Tribunal, (1981-I-LLJ-386), P. Kasilingam v. PSG College of Technology, (1981-I-LLJ-358), Sant Raj v. O.P. Singla, (1985-II-LLJ-19) Shephard v. Union of India (1988-I-LLJ-162), Central Co-operative Consumers Stores Limited v. Labour Court H.P. (1993-II-LLJ-563) and Indrani Bai v. Union of India (1995-I-LLJ-431) as well as the decision of this Court in the case of D.K.Saha v. Union of India reported in 1993 Supp (1) Gauhati 340 and the unreported judgment dated August 1, 1995 of this Court in Civil Rule No.2490/94.

5. Mr. P. Khataniar, learned counsel for the respondents, in reply, contended that in the earlier Civil Rule No.68(K)89, the Court while setting aside the impugned notice of termination dated April 6, 1988 did not direct payment of back wages. Further, it would be evident from the impugned judgment of the learned single Judge that as the Corporation had been wound up and the State of Nagaland was facing financial constraint, the learned single Judge did not grant the relief of back wages to the appellants. The learned single Judge had, therefore, taken into consideration the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and denied the relief of back wages. He cited the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of R.L.Sarma v. Managing Committee (Dr. Hariram Coeducation) H.S. School, in which on account of financial difficulties pleaded by the respondents, the Court did not think it proper to compel the management to pay full back wages to an employee illegally dismissed from service after setting aside the order of dismissal passed by the Managing Committee of the School.

6. We have carefully applied our mind to the

decisions cited by the learned counsel for the

parties and we find that the law that has been

laid down by the Apex Court is that ordinarily

when an order of termination or dismissal is set

aside by the Court or Tribunal, the relief of back

wages is granted to the employee but in

exceptional circumstances, the Court may also

refuse to grant such relief of back wages to an

employee even after setting aside the order of

dismissal or termination or may grant only part

of the back wages. The law on the subject as

has been explained by Chinnappa Reddy J. in

the case of Surendra Kumar v. Industrial

Tribunal, (Supra) at p. 389 is as follows :

'Plain common sense dictates that removal of an order terminating the services of

workmen must ordinarily lead to the

reinstatement of the services of the workmen.

It is as if the order has never been, and so it

must ordinarily lead to back wages too. But

there may be exceptional circumstances

-which make it impossible or wholly

inequitable vis-a-vis the employer and

workman to direct reinstatement with full

back wages. For instance, the industry

might have closed down or might be in

severe financial doldrums; the workmen

concerned might have secured better or

other employment elsewhere and so on. In

such situations, there is a vestige of

discretion left in the Court to make

appropriate consequential orders. The

Court may deny the relief of reinstatement

where reinstatement is impossible because the

industry has closed down. The Court may

deny relief of award of full back wages where

that would place an impossible burden on the

employer. In such and other exceptional

cases, the Court may mould the relief, but

ordinarily the relief to be awarded must be

reinstatement with full back wages. That relief

must be awarded where 'no special

impediment in the way of the awarding the

relief is clearly shown. True, occasional

hardship may be caused to an employer but

we must remember that, more often than not,

comparatively far greater hardship is certain

to be caused to the workmen if the relief is

denied than to the employer if the relief is

granted.'

7. In the instant case, we find that the reason given by the learned single Judge in the impugned judgment for refusing to grant the relief of the back wages is that the Corporation has been wound up with effect from April 1, 1992 on account of financial crisis and the appellants were absorbed in service under the Government of Nagaland which was faced with financial constraint. We are of the opinion that the ground given by the learned single Judge for not granting the relief of back wages to the appellants fell

within the exceptional circumstances as I explained by the Apex Court in the aforesaid I judgment and the learned single Judge exercised his discretion in a sound and reasonable manner by denying the relief of back wages to the appellants.

In the result, we find no merit in this appeal and accordingly dismiss the same. But considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.

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