Judgment - Definition - Law Dictionary Home Dictionary Definition judgment

Definition :

Judgment [fr. judgment, Fr.], judicial determination; decision of a Court.

Under the former practice of the superior Courts, this term was usually applied only to the Common Law Courts, the term 'decree' being in general use in the Court of Chancery. The expression 'Judg-ment,' however, is now used generally except in matrimonial causes, the term 'judgment' including 'decree' [(English) Jud. Act, 1925, s. 225, replacing Jud. Act,1873, s. 100].

The several species of judgments are either:-

(a) Interlocutory, given in the course of a cause, upon some plea, proceeding, or default, which is only intermediate, and does not finally determine or complete the action. See INQUIRY; SUMMONSES; and ORDERS; and the various titles of the subjects of such judgments as MANDAMUS; INJUNC-TION, etc.

(b) Final, putting an end to the action by an award of redress to one party, or discharge of the other, as the case may be.

By the (English) C.L.P. Act,1852, s. 120, a plaintiff or defendant having obtained a verdict in a cause tried out of term, was entitled to issue execution in fourteen days, unless the judge who tried the cause, or some other judge, or the Court, ordered execution to issue earlier or later, with or without terms; but by the present Rules of the Supreme Court execution may issue forthwith on judgment, unless stayed. See EXECUTION; and as to registration of Judgments, Chit. Stat., tit. 'Judgment and Execution' and 'Land Charges'; and see ESTOPPEL; CONTRACTS OF RECORD; ELEC-TION; FOREIGN JUDGMENT.

The word 'judgment' is also used to denote the reasons given by the court for its decision.

An order for transfer of a suit made under clause 13 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court is not a 'judgment' within the meaning of cl. 15 of the Letters Patent and no appeal lies therefrom under the Letters Patent, as it neither affects the merits of the controversy between the parties in the suit itself, nor does it terminate or dispose of the suit on any ground, Asrumati Debi v. Rupendra Deb Raikot, AIR 1953 SC 198: (1953) SCR 1159.

An order of committal which terminates the pro-ceeding so far as the inquiring Court is concerned is a 'judgment' within the meaning of s. 494 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey, AIR 1957 SC 389: (1957) SCR 279. (S. 494 of Cr PC, 1898).

The word 'judgment' under s. 66(5) of the Act is the decision of the High Court of the question of law referred to it and the grounds on which such decision is based, Petlad Turkey Red Dye Works Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, AIR 1963 SC 1484: (1963) Supp 1 SCR 871. [Income Tax Act, 1922, s. 66(5)]

A judgment is an affirmation of a relation between a particular predicate and a particular subject. So, in law, it is the affirmation by the law of the legal consequences attending a proved or admitted state of facts. It is always a declaration that a liability, recognised as within the jural sphere, does or does not exist. A judgment, as the culmination of the action, declares the existence of the right, recognises the commission of the injury, or negatives the allegation of one or the other, Gurdit Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 1791 (1794): (1974) 2 SCC 260: (1974) 3 SCR 896.

In finding out whether the order is a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent it has to be found out that the order affects the merits of the action between the parties by determining some right or liability. The right or liability is to be found out by the Court. The nature of the order will have to be examined in order to ascertation whether there has been a determination of any right or liability, Shanti Kumar R. Canji v. Home Insurance Co. of New York, AIR 1974 SC 1719 (1722): (1974) 2 SCC 387: (1975) 1 SCR 550. [Letters Patent (Bom), Cl. 15]

The expression 'judgment' in the context may be understood to mean the judgment which may be ultimately pronounced if the case were to be committed to a Court of Session, Rajender Kumar Jain v. State through Special Police Establishment, AIR 1980 SC 1510 (1514): (1980) 3 SCC 435: (1980) 3 SCR 982.

It includes decree, order, sentence or determination of any Court, Tribunal, Judge or Judicial Officer. [Supreme Court Rules, 1966, R. 2 (1) (k)]

It means the statement given by the Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. [Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, s. 2 (9)]

That by the word 'judgment' is meant an order in a trial terminating in the conviction or acquittal of the accused, Thikka Surya Rao v. Sirangu Sathiraju, AIR 1948 Mad 510.

The word 'judgment' is not defined in the Code. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd Edn., Vol. 9, paragraphs 260 to 264, it has been stated that judgment in criminal proceedings is indicated to include the final order in a trial terminating in a conviction or acquittal of the accused, G.H. Bhatia v. Bholumal Dharmdas, AIR 1959 AP 254 (255).

Every interlocutory order would be judgments which decide matters of moment and which work serious injustice to the party concerned, Gurmauj Saran Baluja v. Joyce C. Salim, AIR 1990 Del 13.

That the word 'judgment' in Article 133 has been used in the sense of a decision finally determining the rights of the parties in the proceeding and not as defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, Inda Devi v. Board of Revenue, AIR 1957 All 116. (Constitution of India Art. 133).

It means a final determination of the right or liability, forming the subject-matter of controversy before the court, Southern Roadways (P) Ltd. v. P. Mathurai Veeraswami, AIR 1964 Mad 194 (196) (FB).

Article 226 of the Constitution is an independent proceeding in which the question of the right of the Income-tax Officer to proceed with the assessment on the basis of the notice that had been issued, and is alleged to have been served, has been raised and determined, Gopiram Agarwalla v. First Additional of Income-tax Officer, AIR 1959 Cal 420 (422).

That an order under s. 145(6), Criminal Procedure Code whether passed 'ex parte' or after hearing the parties is not a 'judgment' within the meaning of s. 369, Criminal Procedure Code, Krushna Mohan v. Sudhakar Das, AIR 1953 Ori 281.

It is used 'to indicate the termination of the case by an order of conviction or acquittal of the accused', and to this by virtue of s. 367(6), Criminal Procedure Code must be added orders under ss. 118 or 123(3), orders which bear the character of a conviction, Shambhu v. State, AIR 1956 All 633 (634).

The judgment in Rule 5 Chapter VIII of the Rules means a final order. The suit is still pending. The order passed by court cannot be consider as judgment, Madhoban Das v. Mannoo Mal, AIR 1956 All 672.

A 'judgment' means the expression of the opinion of the court arrived at after a due consideration of the evidence and all the arguments, Ramautar Thakur v. State of Bihar, AIR 1957 Pat 33 (35). (Criminal PC, 1898, s. 367)

An interlocutory order under s. 18 of the High Court Ordinance, not a judgment, State v. Hindo Open Sugar Mills, AIR 1974 Raj 110.

The term 'judgment' in the Letters Patent of the High Court means in civil cases a decree and not a judgment in the ordinary sense, Sevak Jeranchod Bhogilal v. Dalore Temple Committee, AIR 1925 PC 155.

It is true that a decree follows a judgment but that does not mean that the decree and the judgment are synonymous terms. The word 'judgment' in the Letters Patent does not have the same meaning which is given to the word 'judgment' by the Code of Civil Procedure, Mt. Daroupadi Debi v. S.K. Dutt, AIR 1957 All 48.

The order dismissing the notice of motion taken out by the plaintiff does not, therefore, determine or affect any right of the plaintiff. It is, therefore, not a judgment within the meaning of clause 15, Gyangirji Narsinggirji Math v. Raja Dhanrajgirji Raja Narsingh Girji, AIR 1967 Bom 94.

Mere refusal to give interim relief in a litigation where ultimately the relief claimed maybe granted would not amount to a judgment within the meaning of clause 15, Smt. Putla Rustomji Messman v. Gul Mani, AIR 1978 Bom 48.

Refusing appointment of a receiver and grant of an ad interim injunction, Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania, AIR 1981 SC 1786: (1981) 4 SCC 8.

Refusing to allow the amendment, a judgment in terms of clause 15 of the Letters Patent, Prasant Chandra Sen v. United Commercial Bank, AIR 1982 Cal 555.

An end to the suit or proceeding, the adjudication is indisputably a 'judgment' within the meaning of this clause, Begum Aftab Zamani v. Shri Lal Chand Khanna, AIR 1969 Del 85.

An order of a Single Judge that the election petition is properly constituted and is not liable to be dismissed on ground of non-joinder of the person against whom allegations of corrupt practice are made in the petition, is not a 'judgment' appealable under Clause 15, Indulal Kanaiyalal Yagnik v. Prasannadas D. Patwari, AIR 1972 Guj 92.

The order passed by the trial Judge in the present case does not finally adjudicate upon the right or liability of a party, it is merely a step towards obtaining a final adjudication in the suit, and, therefore, in court opinion is not a judgment, Krishen Lal v. Jagdish Dutt Badyal, AIR 1962 J&K 47.

Impleaded as a party to the writ petition. It does not amount to judgment under clause 12 of the Letters Patent, Karam Singh v. State of J&K, AIR 1977 J&K 29.

An order for transfer of a suit made under clause 13. Letters Patent, is not a judgment. Neither affects the merits of the controversy between the parties in the suit itself, nor does it terminate or dispose of the suit on any ground. ss. 22 and 23 of the Code apply only to cases where the plaintiff has the option to sue in two or more Courts. Under ss. 22 and 23, High Court can transfer a suit pending in a subordinate Court to a Court subordinate to another High Court, Jagatguru Shri Shankaracharya Jyotish Peethadhiswar Shri Swami Swaroopanand Saraswati v. Ramji Tripathi, AIR 1979 MP 50.

Neither affects the merits of the controversy between the parties in the appeal itself nor does it terminate or dispose of the appeal on any ground, therefore, the order in question is not a judgment, Chalavada Venkata Subbarao and Co v. Grandhi Sree Amulu, AIR 1965 AP 16.

In order to constitute a 'judgment' within the ambit of clause 15 of the Letters Patent it is not essential that it should wholly put an end to the litigation, and it need not possess the attributes of a final order. Any adjudication, which puts an end to a suit or proceeding so far as the Court before which the suit or proceeding is pending is concerned, or the order which affects the merits of the controversy between the parties, is a 'judgment', Kuppa Viswapathi v. Kuppa Venkata Krishna Sastry, AIR 1963 AP 9.

Allowing the second appeal and remanding the case for re-hearing is a judgment within the meaning of clause 10 of the Letters Patent, Tapesar Raut v. Ram Jatan, AIR 1962 Pat 60.

The word 'judgment' as used in Clause 10 of the Letters Patent does at least include those orders which finally determine a dispute between the parties, Nand Prasad v. Arjun Prasad, AIR 1959 Pat 293.

Mere putting the parties to some terms during the pendency of a litigation before the High Court without any determination of a right or liability affecting the merits of the issues is merely an order which cannot be raised to the pedestal of judgment, Faqir Chand v. Financial Commissioner, AIR 1978 P&H 269.

The word 'judgment' has undoubtedly a concept of finality in a broader and not a narrower sense. In other words, a judgment can be of three kinds: (1) A final judgment. - A judgment which decides all the questions or issues in controversy so far as the Trial Judge is concerned and leaves nothing else to be decided. This would mean that by virtue of the judgment, the suit or action brought by the plaintiff is dismissed or decreed in part or in full. Such an order passed by the Trial Judge indisputably and unquestionably is a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent and even amounts to a decree so that an appeal would lie from such a judgment to a Division Bench. (2) A preliminary judgment. - This kind of a judgment may take two forms - (a) where the Trial Judge by an order dismisses the suit without going into the merits of the suit but only on a preliminary objection raised by the defendant or the party opposing on the ground that the suit is not maintainable. Here also, as the suit is finally decided one way or the other, the order passed by the Trial Judge would be a judgment finally deciding the cause so far as the Trial Judge is concerned and therefore appealable to the larger Bench. (b) Another shape which a preliminary judgment may take is that where the Trial Judge passes an order after hearing the preliminary objections raised by the defendant relating to maintainability of the suit, e.g., bar of jurisdiction, res judicata, a manifest defect in the suit, absence of notice under s. 80 and the like, and these objections are decided by the Trial Judge against the defendant, the suit is not terminated but continues and has to be tried on merits but the order of the Trial Judge rejecting the objections doubtless adversely affects a valuable right of the defendant who, if his objections are valid, is entitled to get the suit dismissed on preliminary grounds. Thus, such an order even though it keeps the suit alive, undoubtedly decides an important aspect of the trial which affects a vital right of the defendant and must, therefore, be construed to be judgment so as to be appealable to a larger Bench. (3) Intermediary or interlocutory judgment. Most of the interlocutory orders which contain the quality of finality are clearly specified in clauses (a) to (w) of Order 43 Rule 1 and have already been held by us to be judgments within the meaning of the Letters Patent and, therefore, appealable. There may also be interlocutory orders which are not covered by Order 43 Rule 1 but which also possess the characteristics and trappings of finality in that, the orders may adversely affect a valuable right of the party or decide an important aspect of the trial in an ancillary proceeding. Before such an order can be a judgment the adverse effect on the party concerned must be direct and immediate rather than indirect or remote. For instance, where the Trial Judge in a suit under Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure refuses the defendant leave to defend the suit, the order directly affects the defendant because he loses a valuable right to defend the suit and his remedy is confined only to contest the plaintiff's case on his own evidence without being given a chance to rebut that evidence. As such an order vitally affects a valuable right of the defendant it will undoubtedly be treated as a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent so as to be appealable to a larger Bench. Take the converse case in a similar suit where the Trial Judge allows the defendant to defend the suit in which case although the plaintiff is adversely affected but the damage or prejudice caused to him is not direct or immediate but of a minimal nature and rather too remote because the plaintiff still possesses his full right to show that the defence is false and succeed in the suit. Thus, such an order passed by the Trial Judge would not amount to a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent but will be purely an interlocutory order. Similarly, suppose the Trial Judge passes an order setting aside an ex parte decree against the defendant, which is not appealable under any of the clauses of Order 43 Rule 1 though an order rejecting an application to set aside the decree passed ex parte falls within Order 43 Rule 1 clause (d) and is appealable, the serious question that arises is whether or not the order first mentioned is a judgment within the meaning of Letters Patent. The fact, however, remains that the order setting aside the ex parte decree puts the defendant to a great advantage and works serious injustice to the plaintiff because as a consequence of the order, the plaintiff has now to contest the suit and is deprived of the fruits of the decree passed in his favour. In these circumstances, therefore, the order passed by the Trial Judge setting aside the ex parte decree vitally affects the valuable rights of the plaintiff and hence amounts to an interlocutory judgment and is therefore, appealable to a larger Bench, Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania, AIR 1981 SC 1786: (1981) 4 SCC 8: (1982) 1 SCR 187.

A judgment is the final decision of the Court intimated to the parties and to the world at large by formal 'pronouncement' or 'delivery' in open court. It is a judical act which must be performed in a judicial way, Surendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 194 (196); 1954 SCR 330. (Criminal PC, 1898, ss. 366 and 369)

Judgment means the statement given by the Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. [Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, s. 2(9)]

Judgment, is order or sentence given by a judge or law Court, Webster American Dictionary, p. 1036.

Is the sentence of the law pronounced by the court upon the matter contained in the record, A Dictionary of Law, Willium C. Anderson, 1889, p. 576.

Is a decision finally determining the right of the parties in the proceeding, Kuppusswami v. King, AIR 1949 FC 1.

Is a judgment must be a decision pronounced by a court in cause which it hears on the merits, Hans Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 947.

Means 'the result of judging; the decision or con-clusion reached, as after consideration or delibera-tion, Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary (Inter-national Edn., Vol. I (1984); see also Union of India v. Jain and Associates, (2001) 3 SCC 277.

As referring to a final judgment after any appeals have been determined, rather than the judgment at first instance of the trial judge; or one could confine the operation of the sub-section to actions for contribution subsequently brought, so excluding further proceedings by way of appeal in the original action, Moy v. Pettman Smith (a firm), (2005) 1 WLR 581.