Kolkata Court March 1896 Judgments
Browse smarter
Open an 18-section brief on any judgment
Structured AI Brief in seconds on any result - plus Semantic Search when you need meaning, not just keywords.
- AI Brief & Ask
- Semantic AI Search
- Devil's Bench
Credentials emailed - log in to pick up where you left off.
In Re: Mary Hemming
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Mar-31-1896
Reported in: (1896)ILR23Cal579
Sale, J.1. This is an application under the Succession Act. The petitioner prays for letters of administration debonis non, with liberty to dispose of the house in respect of which the grant of letters of administration is sought to be obtained. I am prepared to grant letters of administration to the applicant. On such grant being made the property will vest in the applicant, and he will have power to dispose of it in such manner as be may think fit.' This is a power given expressly by Section 269 of the Succession Act. The fullest power of disposal being thus given by the Act itself, nothing further is required, Why, then, should the petitioner ask for the Court's permission to do what he will under the law have full power to do? Indeed, the Act does not give the Court jurisdiction, when granting probate or letters of administration under its provisions, to include in such grant authority to dispose of property in respect of which the grant is made....
Raghunundun Misser Vs. Kallydut Misser
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Mar-31-1896
Reported in: (1896)ILR23Cal690
Trevelyan and Beverley, JJ.1. The only question which arises in this case is whether an application for leave to bid is an application to the Court to take a step in aid of execution within the meaning of Article 179 of the Limitation Act. This question has before been considered by other Benches of this Court. In the case cited to us, Toree Mahomed v. Mahomed Mabood I.L.R. 9 Cal. 730, which has been acted upon by the lower Court in this case, the learned Judges, Mr. Justice MacDonell and Mr. Justice Tottenham, distinctly say at the top of page 732 that an application of this kind 'would not give a fresh starting point.' It is perfectly true that it may not have been necessary for them to have gone so far as to express an opinion upon that question in that particular case, still it was a question which seems to have been argued before them, and their decision on this point might well arise from the circumstances of the case. This decision has been cited with approval in another case, A...
Juggut Chunder Chowdhry Vs. Golack Chunder Ghose and ors.
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Mar-24-1896
Reported in: (1896)ILR23Cal522
Macpherson and Hill, JJ.1. It is argued that the appointment of the manager having been made by the consent of parties and without the observance of the procedure prescribed in Sections 93 and 95 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the appointment was not really made by the District Judge under Section 95, but derived its validity solely from the consent of the parties, and continued only so long as the state of things under which the consent was given existed; consequently, that the petitioner was not bound by the order appointing the manager; and that the order of the Judge, which in effect, continued the management and authorized the manager to collect the rent realisable by the petitioner in respect of this putni interest, was wrong and. without jurisdiction.2. We see no force in these contentions. It is clear that there was a proper application to the District Judge under Section 93 by some of the co-owners for the appointment of a common manager, and that notice was served on all the co-o...
Dhani Ram Mahta Vs. Luchmeswar Singh and Murlilal Mahta
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Mar-24-1896
Reported in: (1896)ILR23Cal639
Trevelyan and Beverley, JJ.1. The only question in this case is whether it is competent to the appellant in these execution proceedings to oppose the application for execution on the ground that the person, who is said to have consented to the decree on his behalf, had no authority to consent to it. In our opinion this is a question which could not be raised in execution. We entirely agree with the view expressed by the Madras High Court in the case of Sndindra v. Budan I.L.R. 9 Mad. 80 Mr. Justice Hutchins, at page 83, points out that under section '244 the questions to be decided in execution are questions relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. A question whether the decree was obtained by fraud or collusion is not one which relates to the execution of the decree, but which affects its very subsistence and validity. This case is in many respects similar. An application in execution assumes the validity of the decree sought to be executed. If it is compete...
Jogendra Kishore Roy Chowdhry Vs. Brojendra Kishore Roy Chowdhry and B ...
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Mar-23-1896
Reported in: (1896)ILR23Cal731
W. Comer Petheram, C.J., Macpherson, Trevelyan, Ghose and Rampini, JJ.1. This reference arises out of a special appeal, and under the rules of the Court it is necessary that this Bench, in addition to answering the question referred, should dispose of the special appeal.2. The Subordinate Judge, who heard the first appeal, states the facts of the case as follows:This was a suit to recover possession of a plot of land by declaration of the appellant's title thereto, the appellant claiming the said land as appertaining to a hat called Naraingunge, alias Lakhigunge, situate in his zemindary No. 78. It appears that there was a proceeding with regard to the land under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code between the appellant on the one side and the defendant No. 1, Bisseswari Debi Chowdhurani, on the other, and the Deputy Magistrate of the Sub-Division of Netrokona passed an order on the 9th of April 1888 retaining Bisseswari Debi in possession of the land.3. The plaint in the presen...
A. Caspersz, (Official Receiver) Vs. Kishori Lal Roy Chowdhri and ors.
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Mar-20-1896
Reported in: (1896)ILR23Cal922
Hobhouse, J.1. The original plaintiff in this suit was and the appellant is the Official Receiver of the estate of the Ghosal family, who are owners of 8 annas of the mauza Dakhin Kroke. The substantial defendants are seven in number. The first two (numbered as 3, because one of them fills two characters) are owners of 5 1/2 annas of the same mauza. Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 7 were sued as servants or officers of the first two. There are other formal defendants, owners of the other shares, who are not parties to this appeal. The complaint is that the first two defendants by the hands of their officers cut trees in the forest belonging to the mauza, and the plaintiff prays for a declaration of his right, an injunction, and further relief.2. The first two defendants allege that they did not cause any trees to be cut. Defendants 4 and 5 deny cutting the trees, and allege that the plaintiff cut them. No. 7 raises the same defence, and adds that he was possessed of a shikhmi or sub-tenure in the mau...
Raj Kumari Debi and anr. Vs. Bama Sundari Debi
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Mar-19-1896
Reported in: (1896)ILR23Cal610
Rampini, J.1. This rule was issued to show cause (1) why the proceedings now pending against the petitioner Raj Kumari before the Magistrate should not be quashed, upon the ground that on the facts disclosed in the opposite party's complaint the case does not fall within Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, or (2) why the proceedings should not be stayed, until the decision of the suit now pending between the two parties in the Civil Court.2. The first of these grounds clearly fails, The complaint of the opposite party Bama Sundari undoubtedly charges the petitioner with conduct, which prima facie amounts to the offence of defamation. It charges the petitioner with having defamed the opposite party (1) by means of oral statements made to other persons; and (2) by having presented a petition to the District Registrar of Assurances, representing that a deed of release purporting to have been executed by her in favour of Bama Sundari was a forgery; and that Bam a Sundari had at the time ...
W. Crisp Vs. Adlard and ors.
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Mar-18-1896
Reported in: (1896)ILR23Cal956
W. Comer Petheram, C.J. and Rampini, J.1. I think that this appeal must be allowed, and for several reasons.2. In the first place, it is, I think, extremely doubtful whether this arbitration clause applies to disputes which may arise between the old partners after the partnership has come to an end.3. But however that may be, I am very clearly of opinion that the refusal to arbitrate must be before the action is brought in order that it and the arbitration clause may constitute a defence to an action on the agreement. To hold otherwise would be to hold that one party to such an agreement might force the other to bring an action by refusing to go to arbitration, and then, after the action had been commenced, change his mind and defend it successfully, on the ground that it could not proceed in consequence of the arbitration clause, though the plaintiff had a good cause of action when he brought his suit.4. Order XXIV, Rule I, under the English Judicature Act, applies, I think, to defenc...
In Re: an Attorney
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Mar-15-1896
Reported in: (1896)ILR23Cal576
Sale, J.1. The practice which prevails in England and to which Counsel has called my attention, namely, that of not publishing the name of the attorney, until the charges have been proved, has my entire sympathy. The present case affords an instance of the very great hardship which can be inflicted upon an attorney, when that course is not adopted....
In Re: Abdool Aziz
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Mar-15-1896
Reported in: (1896)ILR23Cal577
Ameer Ali and Sale, JJ.1. It appears that the house respecting which the question as to payment of probate duty has arisen forms the subject-matter of a suit, which was instituted by the testator with the object of obtaining possession thereof, but during the pendency of which he died. He has left a will, by which he gives the property to the petitioner who is named as executor. The executor has applied for probate, stating that the testator has left no other assets, and prays that he may be exempted from the payment of probate duty, until after the decision of the suit in his favour. The testator had a mere right of action in respect of the house, which he was seeking to enforce. The value of such a right it is, of course, impossible to determine. That right he devised to the applicant.2. As this is a case unprovided for under the Act, we may fairly take the value of the property for the purposes of the present application as not exceeding Rs. 1,000....
- ‹ Prev
- 2
- Next ›
- Last »