Kolkata Court February 1886 Judgments
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J.N. Malchus Vs. Broughton and anr.
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Feb-27-1886
Reported in: (1886)ILR13Cal193
Wilson, J.1. This appeal raises a question as to the construction of the will of one Nicholas Isaac Malchus. The 5th Clause of that will says:I direct my executor to invest the sum of Company's Rupees seven thousand in the purchase of Company's Papers and to stand possessed thereof in trust by means of the income of the sum to provide a fund for or towards the education of two or more boys at Saint Paul's School, Calcutta, to be from time to time nominated for that purpose by the trustee for the time being of this my will, such boys to be natives of Calcutta, of poor and indigent parents or fatherless children of Armenian or other Christian religion, and such income to be paid to the Governors, Trustees or Managers of the school for the time being for the purpose of such education, and I direct that no boy shall be eligible for admission to the benefit of this provision at an earlier age than seven or at a later age than twelve, nor shall he continue the enjoyment thereof after he shal...
Gopal Chandra Lahiri Vs. Solomon
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Feb-26-1886
Reported in: (1886)ILR13Cal62
Richard Garth, C.J.1. This is an appeal against an order of Mr. Justice Norris granting an application for review. The facts are somewhat peculiar.2. The suit was brought by the plaintiff against the defendant Bibi Solomon to recover a portion of certain property which the plaintiff claimed as having been conveyed to him by one Khajah Abdul Azeez, the brother of the defendant, under a conveyance dated the 9th of March 1883.3. Mr. Phillips, who appeared for the plaintiff at the trial, opened the plaintiff's case, and claimed the property in question as having been conveyed to his client by that deed. The deed itself was produced and proved in the usual way, and as the counsel for the defendant raised no objection to the conveyance, it was taken as read.4. The written statement raised the question as to the bond fides of the deed, as also whether Bibi Solomon's estate passed by it but the only defence apparently which was put forward by the defendant's counsel, was that the deed was frau...
In Re: R. Brown, an Insolvent
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Feb-24-1886
Reported in: (1885)ILR12Cal629
Wilson, J1. Who (after setting out the facts and stating that it was unnecessary to consider the facts of Mrs. Vardon's claim except, so far, if at all, as they affected the position of Dwarkanath Mitter) continued.--In order to see whether on the 6th August the goods were in the possession, order or disposition of Brown as reputed owner with the consent of the true owner, it is necessary, first, to consider how things stood down to the 1st August.2. The provisions of the deed as to possession are difficult to understand, for the reason that they are to a large extent obviously dealing rather with words than with things. The only things that seem clear are, that until default the mortgagor was to have the free use of the goods on the premises; but that the mortgagee was to have a durwan on the premises who should, in some sense, have the custody of the goods, which custody must at least, we think, have extended to preventing the removal of the goods, if the mortgagor attempted such a t...
Sahai Nand Vs. Mungniram Marwari and ors.
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Feb-22-1886
Reported in: (1885)ILR12Cal542
Tottenham and Norris, JJ.1. The Subordinate Judge appears to have based his judgment upon the case of Chunee Mal Johury v. Brojo Nath Roy Chowdhry I.L.R. 8 Cal. 967 where it was held that the making of the order under the provisions of Act XL of 1858, and not the subsequent taking out of the certificate is that by which a guardian is appointed of the person and property of a minor within the meaning of Section 3 of the Indian Majority Act. With great respect to the Judges who decided that case, we are unable to agree with them. Stephen v. Stephen I.L.R. 8 Cal. 714 is an authority the other way; and though on appeal it was found that the learned Judge, Wilson, J., who had decided the case had mistaken the facts, not only was no doubt thrown by the Court of Appeal on his view of the law, but Garth, C. J., says, 'I think until the certificate has been actually issued, the estate of the minor does not vest in the person who obtains the certificate see Stephen v. Stephen I.L.R. 9 Cal. 901. ...
Rudra Prokash Misser Vs. Bhola Nath Mukherjee, Manager of the Phulwari ...
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Feb-22-1886
Reported in: (1885)ILR12Cal612
Tottenham and Norris, JJ.1. This is an appeal against an order of the District Judge of Bhaugulpore refusing to appoint the appellant guardian of his minor brother under the provisions of Act XL of 1858, the ground of the refusal being that the petitioner is himself a minor, not having reached the age of twenty-one.2. The learned Counsel for the appellant contends that, although the petitioner has not yet reached the age of twenty-one, his minority has ceased, because the guardian once appointed by the Court, namely, the Collector, has resigned his trust; and ha asks us to hold that the first Clause of Section 3 of the Indian Majority Act (IX of 1875) ceases to have effect if the; guardian appointed dies or resigns his trust after the minor has attained the age of eighteen years. Section 3 of Act IX of 1875[1] provides that 'every minor of whose person or property a guardian has been or shall be appointed by any Court of Justice* * * *shall be deemed to have attained his majority when ...
Ram Ratan De Vs. Srinath Bhattacharji
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Feb-19-1886
Reported in: (1885)ILR12Cal606
Wilson and Ghose, JJ.1. We are unable to agree in the view which has been taken in the lower Courts on the question of limitation. It has no doubt repeatedly been held that, where the suit is one to establish title, the case does not fall within Section 27 of the Rent Act. On the other hand, we think that the Full Bench case of Jonardun Acharjee v. Haradhun Acharjee B.L.R. Sup. Vol. 1020 : 9 W. R. 513 and the case of Imam Buksh Mondal v. Momin Mondul I.L.R. 9 Cal. 280 decided by Garth, C.J. and Mr. Justice Bose, are authorities to this effect, that where the existence of the tenure is not disputed, and the plaintiff's original title as tenant is not and never has been questioned, and where there is no question of title either raised in the suit or raised before the suit, except whether on the one hand the plaintiff has been dispossessed by force, or on the other hand his tenure has come to an end by his having relinquished it, the suit is not a suit to try title within the meaning of t...
In Re: Haidar Ali
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Feb-18-1886
Reported in: (1885)ILR12Cal520
McDonell and Beverley, JJ.1. We think that the proceedings of the Bench in this case ought to be set aside on two grounds. In the first place the order made, under Section 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, does not comply with the provisions of that section. This is a mere technical irregularity; but on general grounds we think that the mere fact that the person from whom the security was demanded had been previously convicted of offences against property is not in itself sufficient to justify proceedings under Section 110 of the Code, unless there is additional evidence (which in this case there is not), that the person complained against has done some act, or resumed avocations that indicate on his part an intention to return to his former course of life, and to pursue a career of preying on the community. In this case the person from whom security was required had only recently been released from jail, and we think it was rather the duty of the Police to assist him in finding h...
Ram Sunder De Vs. Rajab Ali and anr.
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Feb-16-1886
Reported in: (1885)ILR12Cal558
McDonell and Beverley, JJ.1. Without going into the question whether or not any criminal offence has been committed, we think that the order of the Bench acquitting the accused must be set aside on the ground that no member of that Bench was a member of the Bench which heard the evidence for the prosecution in the case. The trial was a summary one in which the evidence is not recorded at any length, and it was, therefore, the more necessary that the case should have been disposed of by one or more Magistrates before whom the witnesses had been examined. We accordingly set aside the order of dismissal, and direct that the matter be tried de novo, or, if possible, disposed of by a Bench of whom one or more of the Magistrates who heard the evidence for the prosecutions shall be members....
Azam Bhuyan and ors. Vs. FaizuddIn Ahamed and anr.
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Feb-16-1886
Reported in: (1885)ILR12Cal594
Wilson, J.1. We think it unnecessary to call upon the respondent in this case.2. The point raised is this: that assuming Abirjan to have been out of possession ever since the death of her brother in 1255 or 1256, nevertheless the present plaintiffs, her sons and others claiming as heirs, are not barred by limitation; and that contention is based upon Article 141 of the second schedule of the Limitation Act. That article must be read with; Article 140, which says that in a suit 'by a remainderman, a reversioner (other than a landlord), or a devisee for possession of immoveable property,' the period of limitation is twelve years from the time 'when his estate falls into possession.' Then Article 141 says, that in a 'like suit by a Hindu or Mahomedan entitled to the possession of immoveable property on the death of a Hindu or Mahomedan female,' the period of limitation is twelve years from the date when the female dies.3. In the present case it has been argued that the plaintiffs acquired...
C.B. Gregson Vs. Udeyadeta Deb
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Feb-16-1886
Reported in: (1885)ILR12Cal624
Tottenham, J.1. The appellant in this case is the judgment-debtor against whom a decree for specific performance in respect of the execution of a mortgage had been passed, with costs, and the decree provided that the decree-holder should obtain immediate possession of the property to be mortgaged. An appeal having been preferred from that decree, the judgment-debtor applied under Section 545 for the stay of execution. The Court below granted the prayer for the stay of execution, but required the judgment-debtor to furnish security to the amount of Rs. 70,000. Against the last part of the order the present appeal has been preferred by the judgment-debtor.2. A preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the respondent that no appeal was allowed by law in respect of an order passed under Section 545 of the Code, such order not being appealable under Section 588; and Baboo Rash Behari Ghose for the respondent contended that it was also not appealable under Section 244. There is, however, ...
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