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Kolkata Court February 1876 Judgments

Feb 22 1876

Lallah Ramesshur Doyal Singh Vs. Lallah Bissen Doyal and anr.

Court: Kolkata

Decided on: Feb-22-1876

Reported in: (1876)ILR1Cal407

Kemp, J.1. In the case alluded to of Odoit Roy v. Radha Pandey 7 W.R. 72 Norman and Seton Karr, JJ. held that a suit would not lie between joint owners of undivided estates for damages sustained by the whole estate in consequence of the default of one or more of the co-proprietors in paying their shares of the Government revenue. As already observed, this case followed a decision of the Sudder Court of 1857 in the case of Gungapersaud Sahee v. Madhopersaud Sahee 13 S.D.A. 1244. We think that the rule laid down in those decisions is a proper one; and further we find that, under the provisions of Act XI of 1859, Section 40,[1] the plaintiff could have protected his interests by having his mokurrari right registered. He, also under the said Act, could have paid in the Government revenue due on account of the shares of his co-proprietors in the mokurrari, and thus saved the estate from sale. We find, on turning to the kyefeut of the collectorate amlah, which was called for by the Collector...

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Feb 14 1876

Kennelly Vs. Wyman

Court: Kolkata

Decided on: Feb-14-1876

Reported in: (1876)ILR1Cal179

Phear, J.1. The Court intimates it has considered the matter, and refers to Wright v. Pitt L.R. 3 Ch. App. 809 and states it is clear the applicant connot cross-examine upon the affidavit but can only show that it is not an honest affidavit. The omitted document is sufficiently mentioned and described in the written inspection, if inspection is needed. Summons dismissed. Costs to be costs in the cause. The report of Noel v. Noel 9 Jur. N.S. 589 : S.C. 1 De Gex J.S. v. Pitt L.R. 3 Ch. App. 809....

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Feb 01 1876

In the Goods Of: Wilson (Deceased)

Court: Kolkata

Decided on: Feb-01-1876

Reported in: (1876)ILR1Cal150

Phear, J.1. I have read this Section (258) as if there were a comma after the words 'fourteen clear days,' and the word 'respectively' after 'death:' and I understand 'letters of administration' not to include the case of letters of administration with the will annexed. The distinction intended by the Legistature appers to me to be this: where a will is proved, the grant may be make on the lapse of seven clear days, but where there is no will, not until after the expiration of fourteen clear days. The application may be granted....

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