Chennai Court September 1921 Judgments
In Re: Ramaswami Tevan
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-29-1921
Reported in: 69Ind.Cas.380
Kumaraswami Sastri, J.1. The Sessions Judge finds that first accused was not present at the scene of offense but web at a place 50 or 60 miles away. There is no finding that five persons or more took part in the offence-Three were originally put up for trial and were convicted and two were subsequently put up for trial. One was acquitted on the ground that he did not take any part and the appellant was convicted Hinder Sections 147 and 304, On the findings of the Sessions Judge it is difficult to support a conviction as it is not shown that five or more persons took part in the offence. It is not shown that the appellant did any act which caused the death of Veerappa Tevan and he can only be convicted if it is shown that there was an unlawfull assembly of five or more persons whose common object was to commit an offense under Section 304 and appellant was one of them. The Public Prosecutor says he cannot support the conviction on the findings. He asks for & re-trial but I do not think ...
Tag this Judgment!In Re: Kuppammal and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-28-1921
Reported in: (1921)41MLJ562
ORDERKumaraswamy Sastri, J.1. I think Clause XI of Section 71 of the City Police Act covers a, case of obstructing a thorughfare in any manner and is not limited to obstruction caused by vehicles and animals. There is no reason to suppose that the legislature intended to permit all other kinds of obstruction and punish only obstructions by vehicles or animals. There is a semi-colon before the sentence 'or in any way wilfully obstructs etc.' In the case of obstruction by vehicles and animals there is no question of intention, the act and obstruction caused by the act are sufficient. In other cases intention is necessary to be proved in addition to the obstruction. These are questions of fact to be determined by. the Magistrate. The fact that Act III of. 1889 contains Clause 6 to Section 3 which deals with exposing goods for sale so as to cause obstruction which follows Clause 5 which is similar in terms to clause XI of the City Police Act affords no guide to the interpretation of the Ci...
Tag this Judgment!In Re: Thyarammal
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-28-1921
Reported in: (1922)ILR65Mad26
Kumaraswami Sastri, J.1. I think Clause (xi) of Section 71 of the City Police Act covers a case of obstructing a thoroughfare in any manner and is not limited to obstruction caused by vehicles and animals. There is no reason to suppose that the legislature intended to permit all other kinds of obstruction and punish only obstructions by vehicles or animals. There is a semicolon before the sentence 'or in any way wilfully obstructs, etc.' In the case of obstruction by vehicles and animals there is no question of intention--the act and obstruction caused by the act are sufficient. In other cases intention is necessary to be proved in addition to the obstruction. These are questions of fact to be determined by the Magistrate. The fact that Act III of 1889 contains Clause (6) to Section 3 which deals with exposing goods for sale so as to cause obstruction which follows Clause (5) which is similar in terms to Clause (xi) of the City Police Act affords no guide to the interpretation of the C...
Tag this Judgment!The Great Indian Peninsula Railway Company Ltd. Vs. Chella Ram Giancha ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-27-1921
Reported in: AIR1921Mad510; (1921)41MLJ603
Spencer, J.1. I agree with the majority of the judges of the Small Cause Court and with the decision in Sudarshan Maharaj Nandrum v. East Indian Railway Company I.L.R. (1919) All. 76 .2. The plaintiff described the articles in respect of which he made his claim as ''shawls ' and in my opinion it is a consideration of no consequence that the particular shawls which were lost were not Kashmir shawls, nor made of wool nor articles of comparatively high value provided that the value of the articles in the parcel exceeded Rs. 100 in all.3. The use of the words 'special value' in the marginal note to Section 75 of Act IX of 1890 and in Clause' (s) of the second schedule in my opinion must not be taken to imply that only articles falling within the descriptions of the schedule which are of exceptional value, must be declared.4. As pointed out by Mr. Justice Stuart in Sudarshan Maharaj Nadrum v. East Indian Railway Company I.L.R.(1919) All. 76 the words 'lace' 'watches' and 'Government stamps'...
Tag this Judgment!Katta Ramaswami Gupta Vs. Kamalammal
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-27-1921
Reported in: AIR1922Mad44; (1922)42MLJ32
1. In this case the plaintiff lent certain jewels to one Meenakshi Ammal for the purpose, as the plaintiff says, of decking the latter's daughter for a prospective bridegroom. Meenakshi Ammal took the jewels and pledged them with Thangavelu Mudali and Chinnaswami Sah. The defendant after redeeming the jewels from the pledgees bought them from Meenakshi Ammal. The plaintiff brought the suit against the defendant for the recovery of the value of the jewels which was decreed to her. The defendant now appeals against this judgment.2. Two points are raised on defendant's behalf, first, one of fact, that the sale to the defendant was by the consent of the plaintiff. We have examined the evidence with great care. It appears that the plaintiff, who is described as somewhat simple-minded, handed the jewels to Meenakshi Ammal without the knowledge of her husband but with the knowledge of one of her sons a High Court Vakil. Meenakshi Ammal who was subsequently convicted in connection with these j...
Tag this Judgment!Katta Ramasami Gupta Vs. Kamalammal
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-27-1921
Reported in: (1922)ILR65Mad173
1. In this case the plaintiff lent certain jewels to one Meenakshi Ammal for the purpose, as the plaintiff says, of decking the latter a daughter for a prospective bridegroom. Meenakshi Ammal took the jewels and pledged them with Thangavelu Mudali and Chinnaswami Sah. The defendant after redeeming the jewels from the pledgees bought them from Meenakshi Ammal. The plaintiff brought the suit against the defendant for the recovery of the value of the jewels which was decreed to her. The defendant now appeals against this judgment.2. Two points are raised on defendant's behalf, first one of fact, that the sale to the defendant was with the consent of the plaintiff. We have examined the evidence with great care. It appears that the plaintiff, who is described as somewhat simple-minded, handed the jewels to Meenakshi Ammal without the knowledge of her husband but with the knowledge of one of her sons, a High Court vakil. Meenakshi Ammal, who was subsequently convicted in connexion with these...
Tag this Judgment!Obla K. Subbayyan Vs. Thoppai Muthayyan
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-23-1921
Reported in: AIR1922Mad54(1); (1922)42MLJ71
Krishnan, J.1. Following the ruling in Karunakara v. Krishna 28 M.L.J. 262 which takes a strict view of Order 21. R 89 and holds that the terms of the rule should be 'very strictly conformed to' I think this petition must be allowed. The 1st defendant did not deposit in court the amount stated in the proclamation and the 5 per cent himself. He is not entitled to take advantage of any deposit, made by his co-judgment debtor of the defendant, which was not made conjointly with him but quite independently of him. Such a deposit in Court cannot be treated as money received by the decree-holder within the meaning of the rule so as to enable the respondent to take advantage of it; see Trinback v. Ramachandra I.L.R. 23 Bom. 723 followed in Karunakara v. Krishna (1915) .L.R. 39 Mad. 429 cited above.2. In these circumstances 1 must hold that the provisions of R. 89 has not been complied with by the respondent and the order setting aside the sale of item 1 must be reversed. The order of the Dist...
Tag this Judgment!Pachai Pillai and anr. Vs. C. Gopala Pillai and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-23-1921
Reported in: AIR1921Mad647; (1922)42MLJ276
1. We see no reason for differing from the learned Judge who disbelieved the evidence of plaintiff's mother and their witness Subba Reddi as to the removal of the tali and the payment to her of Rs. 50, the parisam. The evidence of the two witnesses is insufficient to prove that there is a custom amongst the Vellalas which permits divorce. The decision in Veerasangappa v. Rudrappa I.L.R. (1885) Mad, 440 does not support the contention as it only decides that there is such a custom amongst the Lingayats. It is clear from the Full Bench decision in Soundarajan v. Arunachalam Chetti 29 M.L.J. 793 that before the illegitimate sons of a Sudra can succeed they must show that the connection between their parents was not adulterous. In the present case it is admitted that their mother was married to Veerasami Mudaly before she joined the deceased Venkata-chalam. It is argued that mere desertion by Veerasami of the plaintiff's mother and their separation for several years is sufficient to dissol...
Tag this Judgment!Pachai Pillai and ors. Vs. C. Gopal Pillai and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-23-1921
Reported in: 70Ind.Cas.122
1. We see no reason for differing from the learned Judge who disbelieved the evidence of the plaintiffs' mother and their witness, Subba Reddi, as to the removal of the thali and the payment to her of Rs. 50 the parisam. The evidence of the two witnesses is insufficient to prove that, there is a custom among the Vellalas which permits divorce. The decision in Virasangappa v. Rudrappa 8 M. 440 does not support the contention as it only decides that there is such a custom amongst Lingayats. It is clear from the Full Bench decision in Soundararajam v. Arunachalam Chetty 33 Ind. Cas. 858 that before the illegitimate sons of a Sudra can succeed, they must show that the connection between their parents was not adulterous. In the present case, it is admitted that their mother was married to Veeraswamy Mudaly before she joined the deceased Venkatachallam. it is argued that mere desertion by Veeraswamy of the plaintiffs' mother and their separation for several years is sufficient to dissolve th...
Tag this Judgment!P. Baba Sah and ors. Vs. K.G. Mahomad HusaIn Sahib and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-22-1921
Reported in: AIR1922Mad123; (1922)42MLJ179
William Ayling, Officiating C.J1. The Officiating Chief Justice.--The facts of the case are so succinctly stated in the first paragraph of the judgment of the learned Trial Judge that I cannot do better than quote therefrom.The plaintiffs are the trustees of a Hindu temple and the defendants are the worshippers at a neighbouring Muhammadan mosque. Between the two buildings there were formerly a land and some other buildings. The latter have been acquired by the temple-trustees who desire to adapt and use these buildings, for religious purposes. The worshippers at the mosque who by the plaintiffs' acquisition of the intervening buildings, have been brought into proximity to the temple ' 0.S.A. No. 31 of 1920, 22nd September, 1921, complained to the Police of the acts of the plaintiffs in connection with the new buildings acquired by them. The Police took action under Section 144, Criminal Procedure Code. Orders were passed by the Magistrate and notifications were made by the Local Gover...
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