Chennai Court August 1915 Judgments
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Muddusami Siddappa and Vs. Bhaskara Lakshmi Narasappa and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-17-1915
Reported in: AIR1916Mad418; 30Ind.Cas.853
Sadasiva Aiyar, J.1. The defendants are the appellants in these two connected second appeals. The suit was brought by the reversioners after the death of a Hindu widow for possession of properties improperly-alienated by her to the appellants. The alienations are evidenced by the documents Exhibits XII, XIII and XIV, dated 5th February 1876.2. The lower Appellate Court came to the following findings of fact:(a) Of the Rs. 1,600, the total purchase-money mentioned in these three documents, about Rs. 1,300 went towards the discharge of debts which had been incurred by the last male owner. (See Exhibits I, II series, IV series, VII, VIII and XVI.)(b) Rupees 115 was due under a document, Exhibit XI, executed by the widow herself and Rs. 175 was paid in cash.3. Out of the Rs. 1,300 which went towards the discharge of the husband's debts, Rs. 1,200 was due under two usufructuary mortgage-bonds and a conditional sale-deed (see Exhibits I, II and IV), which had been executed for a total princi...
T.S. Subba Aiyar Vs. Su. Subba Aiyar and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-17-1915
Reported in: AIR1916Mad770; 31Ind.Cas.250
1. We accept the findings of fact arrived at by the lower Appellate Court.2. Mr. Govindaraghava Aiyar, for the Respondent, contended that a suit for the relief claimed by the plaintiff, though it might have been brought till 31st December 1908, could not be brought on or after 1st January 1909, as the new Civil Procedure Code and the new Limitation Act of 1908 made ail order passed on a claim petition conclusive unless set aside within one year, and he refers to Order XXI, Rule 63, of the new Civil Procedure Code and Article 11 of the new Limitation Act. The new Limitation Act Article 11 refers to an order passed under the Civil Procedure Code of 1903 and neither Section 158 of the Civil Procedure Code nor Section 8 of the General Clauses Act constrains us to read the phrase the Code of Civil Procedure 1908' in Article 11 as including a reference to the earlier Civil Procedure Cede of 1882. The order of 1905 which is relied upon as conclusive (because not set aside within one year) nee...
Murugesa Mudali Vs. Sama Goundan and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-16-1915
Reported in: AIR1916Mad727; 31Ind.Cas.102
1. The respondents put in a petition in the Court of the District Munsif to cancel the delivery of certain shops purchased by the decree-holder in execution of a decree passed against the respondents as trustees of a temple.2. The respondents contended that the shops did not belong to the judgment-debtor temple solely but to five other institutions and further contended that even the interest of the debtor temple in the corpus of the shop property could not have been and was not legally sold but only its right to receive a share of the rents and profits.3. We must take it that the petition was filed partly under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code (which has been held to apply also to disputes between decree-holder-purchasers and judgment-debtors) and partly under Order XXI, Rule 101. As only one order was passed in respect of both these contentions by each of the lower Courts and as that order has been based mainly on the contention raised by the respondents as trustees of the judg...
Subgaravelu Pillai Vs. Santhana Krishna Mudaliar
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-16-1915
Reported in: 31Ind.Cas.9
1. Following the decision Krishna Bar v. Srimati Ranamoyi Debi 29 Ind. Cas. 120, we hold that the application of 30th October 1909 for an order absolute for sale was a valid application in execution proceedings, as the mortgage decree had been passed before the new Civil Procedure Code came into force.2. We agree with the lower Courts that the application of 1909 was dismissed only for statistical purposes. An application in execution so dismissed in 1910 for statistical purposes can be revived within three years of such dismissal. Subba Chariar v. Muthuveeram Pillai 14 Ind. Cas. 264 : 24 M.L.J. 545. The present application of December 1912 was, in our opinion, rightly treated as one for continuation of the proceedings in the old application of 1909 and hence no question of limitation arises.3. The appeal is dismissed with costs....
Sivasubramania Ayyar Vs. Subramania Ayyar
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-15-1915
Reported in: (1916)ILR39Mad997
Abdur Rahim, Officiating C.J.1. The question referred to us must be answered in the negative. Section 55, Sub-section 4, Clause (b) of the Transfer of Property Act, says that in the absence of a contract to the contrary, the vendor shall have a charge upon the property in the hands of the buyer for the amount of the purchase money or any part thereof remaining unpaid. In this case the vendor has asked the purchaser to pay the unpaid purchase money to a certain creditor of his. It is not alleged that the creditor accepted the liability of the purchaser of the property in substitution of the vendor's own liability. But the purchaser as between himself and the vendor has accepted the obligation to pay the purchase money according to the vendor's direction. It has been held by the Privy Council in Webb v. Macpherson I.L.R. (1903) 31 Cal 57 that the statutory charge created by Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act is not to be negatived except where there is a contract to the contrary,...
Shaik Ibrahim Rowther Alias Chinnappa Rowther and Three ors. Vs. Muham ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-12-1915
Reported in: AIR1916Mad700; (1916)ILR39Mad664
John Wallis, C.J. 1. This case raises a question of considerable difficulty and importance as to the existence of a special custom among Lubbais or Tamil-speaking converts to Muhammadanism in the District of Coimbatore, or alternatively in the family of the parties to the present suit, who belong to that district, to depart from the Muhammadan rule of succession and as alleged by the defendants to follow the Hindu Law as regards the law of property, succession and partition. This however is too broadly pleaded as the only question arising in the suit is whether they follow the particular rule of Hindu Law which excludes females from the right of succession. The suit is brought by the plaintiffs who are respectively the husband and minor daughter of the deceased Ponnuthayee aa her heirs to recover her share under the Muhammadan Law in the estate of her father, the late Muhammad Hussain Rowther who pre-deceased her. In 1877, in a suit tried by Innes, J., on the original aide of the High ...
In Re: Pichari Anthu and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-12-1915
Reported in: AIR1916Mad1144(1); 30Ind.Cas.446
ORDERSpencer, J.1. The Sub-Magistrate's direction that the sentence of two month's imprisonment for the offence under Section 225B of the Indian Penal Code should taken effect after the expiry of the sentence which the accused Nos. 3 and 4 were undergoing for default to find security for good behaviour, was illegal See. Joghi Kannigan v. Emperor 31 M.K 515 : 4 M.L.T. 223 : 8 Cri. L.J. 402. I direct that it be reckoned to commence from the date of the Magistrate's order, viz., 9th April 1915....
Chundum Veettil Pazhaya Ottayil Muhamad Alias Imbichi Vs. Tharamel Che ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-12-1915
Reported in: AIR1916Mad1168(2); 30Ind.Cas.692
1. The decree under appeal is one declaring that a mortgage to the 1st and 2nd defendants of the plaintiffs' tarwad property by the 3rd defendant and a lease of it to him are not binding. The 4th defendant, the present appellant, was impleaded as being in possession of the property by the mortgage from the 3rd defendant, in consequence of the allegations in the 1st and 2nd defendants' written statements. But the necessary amendment in the plaint was, however, not made. The 4th defendant's first complaint here is that a decree has been passed against him, explicity by the lower Appellate Court for profits, and by implication for possession, when no relief against him was asked for, and the plaint disclosed no cause of action against him. There is no doubt that the District Munsif and those concerned in the litigation were guilty of carelessness, in not making the necessary amendment, before beginning the trial. But we find that the 4th defendant never called attention to the omission in...
M.S.A. Pl. Palaniappa Chetty Vs. T. Mr. Alagappa Chetty
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-12-1915
Reported in: 30Ind.Cas.691
1. It is quite clear in this case that the agent was tired of waiting for his principal to send a successor, and that he eventually threw up the agency at Rangoon and came back to Madras in March 1909. This was a termination of this Agency and was a starting point for limitation. The fact that he went back to give evidence and again acted for a time until the principal sent a successor can not prevent the running as regards the first agency. It is not pleaded that there was any acknowledgment of liability to account after the termination of the first agency, and it is not shown that any of the documents exhibited amounts to such an acknowledgment of liability to account for the first agency.2. In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs....
Machikandi Parkum Maramittath Tharuvil Mootha Chettiam Veettil Chakkar ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-12-1915
Reported in: AIR1916Mad391; 30Ind.Cas.755
John Wallis, C.J.1. It seems desirable at the outset to point out that the decision of the Full Bench in Kunhacha Umma v. Kutti Mammi Hajee 2 M.L.J. 226 which is uestioned in the reference merely decides hat among the followers of the Marumakkathayam Law, when a gift is made by the father to the mother and her children, there is a presumption that they are intended to take such properties as the exclusive properties of the branch or tavazhi consisting of the mother and her children, that is to say, with the usual incidents of tarivad property. In the absence of express provision, the presumption is that the property is to be enjoyed by the mother and her issue in the way in which property is customarily held and enjoyed among followers of the Marumakkathayam Law. The decision proceeded on the authority of two decisions of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee, which laid down that the law governing the parties is one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration in ascertaini...
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