Chennai Court July 1896 Judgments
Rangayya Appa Rau Vs. Narasimha Appa Rau
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-30-1896
Reported in: (1896)ILR19Mad416
1. Plaintiff sued to set aside, a decision of the Survey officer passed under Section 25 of (Madras) Act XXVIII of 1860 in regard to the boundary between two villages, and for a declaration that the boundary was as stated by him in the plaint, and for recovery of certain lands within that boundary alleged to have been taken possession of by defendants after the decision of the Survey officer.2. The defendants pleaded that the suit was time-barred, and denied both the correctness of the boundary proposed by plaintiff and the alleged trespass.3. The District Munsif dismissed the suit as time-barred on the ground that, under Section 25 of Act XXVIII of 1860 (Madras) as amended by Section 9 of Act II of 1884, a suit to set aside the decision of a Survey officer must be brought within six months of the passing of the decision, whereas the present suit was not brought until the 25th April 1891, though the decision was passed on the 15th September 1890.4. At the appeal the plaintiff produced ...
Tag this Judgment!Udayana Pillai Vs. Senthivelu Pillai and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-30-1896
Reported in: (1896)ILR19Mad411
1. Plaintiff sued for recovery of Rs. 200 alleged to be due under an instrument of mortgage (Exhibit A) by sale of the mortgaged property.2. The District Munsif decreed for plaintiff, but the District Judge reversed the decree and dismissed the suit on the ground that Exhibit A evidenced a usufructuary mortgage, pure and simple, containing no covenant to repay the mortgage money, but with an express contract that plaintiff's only remedy should be to remain in possession if defendants failed to repay the mortgage money.3. Against this decree the plaintiff instituted this second appeal on the ground that the District Judge misconstrued Exhibit A.4. We think the appeal is well founded. Exhibit A is dated 8th October 1867. By it the defendant's father mortgaged certain lands for Rs. 200 to the plaintiff, and the contract between the parties is expressed as follows:In lieu of interest on this sum of Rs. 200, you will, for three years from this year, raise any crops you like, including summe...
Tag this Judgment!Appasami Nayakan Vs. Varachari and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-24-1896
Reported in: (1896)ILR19Mad419
ORDER1. We do not understand the grounds on which the District Judge objects to the procedure of the District Munsif in framing the third issue. When the defendants alleged a compromise for consideration in the course of the suit and the plaintiff's denied it, an issue arose between them, and the District Munsif was right to record it and determine it, so as to enable him to deal with the suit under Section 375, Code of Civil Procedure. That Section 375 was intended to meet cases in which the parties, having agreed to compromise subsequently fall out, has been held in Karuppan v. Ramasami I.L.R. 8 Mad. 482 and Appasami v. Manikam I.L.R. 9 Mad. 103. The District Munsif found that Rs. 80 was paid by the defendants as consideration for the promised withdrawal of the suit by plaintiffs, but that plaintiffs failed to fulfil their promise. We do not think that there is any necessity to consider the validity of the sale-deed which is said to have been executed. The only question is whether th...
Tag this Judgment!Queen-empress Vs. Pukot Kotu and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-23-1896
Reported in: (1896)ILR19Mad349
1. The District Magistrate appears to have had no ground for his finding that the Sub-Inspector acted irregularly in making the search. But assuming the Magistrate's finding had been correct, the irregularity would have afforded no justification for the defendants' acts.2. When the Magistrate states that the defendants were 'justified' in their resistance, we presume he means by the right of private defence (for we can conceive of no other justification), but the Magistrate has overlooked the provisions of the first and second clauses of Section 99 of the Penal Code, which do not allow of the exercise of that right when an act such as this is done by a public servant or under the direction of a public servant which the Sub-Inspector was.3. We must therefore reverse the District Magistrate's order of acquittal and direct that the appeal be restored to the file and heard and disposed of upon its merits. Ordered accordingly....
Tag this Judgment!Queen-empress Vs. Vasudevayya
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-23-1896
Reported in: (1896)ILR19Mad355
ORDER1. As ruled by the learned Chief Justice in Queen-Empress v. Arlappa I.L.R. 15 Mad. 137 the word 'presented' in Section 419 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 'evidently means that such petition shall be delivered to the proper officer of the Court either by the appellant or his pleader.'2. It is clear that what the law requires is that the petition of appeal be presented by one or other of those two persons, and not by anybody else. In order to secure this, it is necessary that the presentation be made in person. So that the same reason applies for not recognizing a petition found in a petition box as to one sent by post, namely, that it might have been deposited there by a third person who could not legally present it. The Head Assistant Magistrate was, therefore, right in returning the petition of appeal in this case for legal presentation, and when that presentation was made, the appeal being time-barred was rightly rejected....
Tag this Judgment!Balaji Rau Vs. Sithabhoy and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-21-1896
Reported in: (1896)ILR19Mad414
ORDER1. The appellant's remedy under Section 560 of the Code of Civil Procedure being barred by limitation through no fault of his own, we think we have the power to afford him an alternative remedy in second appeal under Clause (c), Section 584, so that we shall call upon the Lower Appellate Court to take evidence and find whether the appellant was or was not duly served with notice of the appeal. The report with the notice and return in original and the evidence are to be submitted as early as possible....
Tag this Judgment!Kunhi Chandu Nambiar Vs. Kunkan Nambiar and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-17-1896
Reported in: (1896)ILR19Mad384
Arthur J.H. Collins, C.J. and Benson, J.1. We accept the finding of the District Judge as to the amount of compensation to be paid. His order as to costs is correct.2. We extend the time for redemption to three months from this date. With this modification we confirm the decree of the District Judge.3. The appellant must bear the respondent's costs in this appeal....
Tag this Judgment!Ramamirtha Ayyan Vs. Gopala Ayyan
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-15-1896
Reported in: (1896)ILR19Mad433
1. We have no doubt that a deed of gift is not complete until it has been registered as required by Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, and that it only operates upon registration. In this ease the deed of gift was not registered until the sale had been completed and, therefore, was not effectual as against the deed of sale.2. We are further of opinion that a deed of gift being a voluntary transfer remains nudum pactum until the donor has done all that is necessary to make it legally complete. To do so, it is necessary, inter alia, that it should be registered; but he can be no more compelled to register the deed than to execute it in the first instance. The registration of the present deed contrary to the supposed donor's wishes, which was ordered by the Registrar, was therefore void. We accordingly hold there was no gift, and reverse the decision of the Subordinate Judge and restore that of the Munsif. The appellant's costs in this Court and in the first Appellate Court must...
Tag this Judgment!Bava Saib and anr. Vs. Mahomed
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-14-1896
Reported in: (1896)ILR19Mad343
1. The rule of Muhammadan law in regard to hibbat is that the gift must not be implied. It must be express and unequivocal and the intention of the donor must be demonstrated by his entire relinquishment of the thing given, and the gift is null and void where he continues to exercise any act of ownership over it.2. Where, as in this case, a house is the subject of the gift, if it continues to be occupied by the giver, there is no complete gift, (See case xxii at page 231 of MacNaughten's Precedents, 4th edition.)3. The only exceptions are where the house gifted is given by a husband to a wife, or by a father or guardian to his minor child or ward (vide MacNaughten's Principles of Muhammadan law, 4th edition, chapter v, page 51, and Ameeroonissa Khatoon v. Abedoonissa Khatoon L.R. 2 IndAp 104 . In this case the donee is not shown to come within the exceptions, and we must, therefore, hold that the District Judge was wrong in finding the gift was valid.4. We accordingly reverse the decre...
Tag this Judgment!Anantha Bhatta Vs. Holeya Deyyu and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-14-1896
Reported in: (1896)ILR19Mad437
1. The only question argued before us in this appeal is whether the suit is barred by limitation. The respondent's case is that the appellant having become absolute owner in 1876 (on the expiry of the ten years stipulated in Exhibit A), his right to recover possession arose then, and as he was not then or afterwards in possession up to the date of suit, a period of more than twelve years, his right to recover was barred.2. This argument is defective. Under Exhibit A executed in 1866, the plaintiff was the landlord and Keshava Hebbara was his tenant and was in possession of the land as his tenant. Before the expiry of the ten years stipulated for in Exhibit A Keshava Hebbara died and Exhibit I was executed by his widow. It gave possession of the plaint land to Gopala Bhatta, who thus became a tenant in possession under the plaintiff.3. The fact that in 1876, on the expiry of the ten years stipulated for in Exhibit A, the plaintiff's title became that of absolute owner instead of merely ...
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