Chennai Court December 1894 Judgments
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Pichuvaiyangar Vs. Seshaiyangar
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-14-1894
Reported in: (1895)5MLJ39
1. We are of opinion that when there has been an appeal against the decree of the District Munsif and a decree has been passed thereon, the District Munsif has no longer any power to amend his decree.2. We therefore answer the question in the affirmative.3. This petition again came on for final hearing before Muthu-sami Aiyar and Shephard J. J. who following the ruling of the Full Bench dismissed the petition for amendment, cancelled the amendment made with reference to it and directed the petitioner to be entitled to his costs....
Sivasubramania Naicker and ors. Vs. Krishnammal and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-14-1894
Reported in: (1895)5MLJ168
Muthusami Aiyar, J.1. The contest in this appeal is as to alienability of the Palayam of Ammayanayakanur in the District of Madura. The 1st defendant, Bommachi Nayak, now deceased, was the last Palayagar; the 2nd defendant is his widow, and the 3rd defendant is their minor sonaged three years. On the 30th November 1891, the 1st defendant transferred to his wife, the 2nd defendant, by an instrument of gift marked as Exhibit VIII the estate of Ammayanayakanur with all its appurtenances. The question which we have to determine is whether the Palayagar was competent so to alienate the Palayapat.2. Admittedly,Ammayanayakanuris an ancient impartible estate and it appears from Exhibit D, that 'Visvanada Nayak, the founder of the Nayak dynasty of Madura, granted it. Since the grant, it has been in enjoyment of Appellants' family for a period of about 386 years. In Nelson's Manual on the District of Madura. 'it is mentioned as one of the 24 Palayams of the Dindigul group.3. Though it is assesse...
Pichuvayyangar Vs. Seshayyangar
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-14-1894
Reported in: (1895)ILR18Mad214
Muttusami Ayyar and Shephard, JJ.1. Following the ruling of the Full Bench we dismiss the petition for amendment and cancel the amendment made with reference to it.2. The petitioner is entitled to his costs....
Daivachilaya Pillai and ors. Vs. Ponnathal and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-13-1894
Reported in: (1895)ILR18Mad459
1. We are of opinion that the Judge's decision is correct. The point now raised as to whether a single fee of Rs. 10 is sufficient was not argued and considered in Narayana v. Muttayan I.L.R. 7 Mad. 1342. We agree with the lower Courts that each separate alienation is a different subject within the meaning of Section 17 of the Court Fees Act. Though all such alienations my be included in one suit, according to the course of decisions in this Presidency, it does not follow that each alienation is not a separate subject requiring a separate Court fee. Each alienation creates a distinct right vesting in the alienee, and, therefore, when the reversioner seeks for a declaration that a number of distinct alienations are invalid, he must be held to be suing for that number of declarations. The test indicated in Moti Singh v. Kaunsilla I.L.R. 16 AIL 308 appears to us to contain the correct principle on which should be determined the question as to the number of declarations which are sought to...
Periaroyalu Reddi Vs. Royalu Reddi and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-13-1894
Reported in: (1895)ILR18Mad434
1. We are unable to agree in the opinion of the Judge that because some of the formalities prescribed by the darkhast rules have not been observed, he is entitled to cancel the patta granted to the appellant by the Government. Darkhast rules are departmental and if they are infringed, the remedy for such infringement is also departmental. Irregularities in observing those rules constitute no valid ground of interference by the Civil Courts with a grant of land made by the Government. The land in dispute is entered in the pymash account as waste and as such it is at the disposal of Government. It is not competent to the Civil Courts to set aside a grant made by an officer competent to make the grant. The two objections taken by the respondents against the grant have been disallowed. It has been found that he has no title as against the Government and it appears also that the land is entered in the pymash accounts as waste and not as threshing-floor. The District Munsif has further found...
Peri Pedda Venkata Narasimhalu Vs. Peri Peramma
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-12-1894
Reported in: (1895)5MLJ32
1. The Article applicable is clearly No. 97 of Schedule II and the cause of action accrued on the date of failure of the consideration i.e. the date of the High Court's decree dated 31st October 1889. This suit brought within three years from that date is in time.2. It has been found in a former suit between the same parties that Rs. 737 were paid and that the sale-deed could not be set aside by the respondent by whom it was executed voluntarily.3. In order that the cause of action should run from the date of the sale it must be found that the sale was void ah initio.4. It is only in such a case that Article 62 can apply of Hanuman Kamat v. Hanuman Mandur I.L.R. (1891) C. 128 It was found, no doubt in the former suit that the plaintiff had the means of knowing that defendant's husband had been absent for only three or four years. But the ground of the present suit; is failure of consideration, which must depend upon the result of the suit and not on a particular finding in that suit.5....
Venkatanarasimhulu Vs. Peramma
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-12-1894
Reported in: (1895)ILR18Mad173
1. The article applicable is clearly No. 971 of Schedule II, and the cause of action accrued on the date of failure of the consideration, i.e., the date of the High Court's decree, dated 31st October 1889. This suit brought within three years from that date is in time.2. It has been found in a former suit between the same parties that Rs. 737 were paid and that the sale-deed could not be set aside by the respondent by whom it was executed voluntarily.3. In order that the cause of action should run from the date of the sale, it must be found that the sale was void ab initio.4. It is only in such a case that Article 622 can apply, cf. Hanuman Kamat v. Hanuman Mandur I.L.R. 19 Cal. 123 It was found, no doubt, in the former suit that the plaintiff had the means of knowing that defendant's husband had been absent for only three or four years. But the ground of the present suit is failure of consideration, which must depend upon the result of the suit and not on a particular finding in that ...
Muthusami Mudaliar Vs. Nallakulantha Mudaliar
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-12-1894
Reported in: (1895)ILR18Mad418
1. Three objections are urged in support of this appeal. The first is that the Courts below are in error in holding the suit to be not barred by limitation. Assuming the averments in the plaint to be correct, we are not prepared to accede to this contention. The suit is for partition of family property reserved for future division at a partition of 1877. In March 1882 plaintiff and his brothers demanded their shares and first defendant denied their claim by the letter C on the 12th idem. The -suit is brought within twelve years from that date and Article 127[1] of Schedule II of the Limitation Act is applicable. The suit is, therefore, not time-barred.2. It is urged that when a portion of property is reserved for future partition, it ceases to be coparcenary or joint family property, and the decision of the Privy Council in Appovier v.Rama Subba Aiyan 11 M.I.A. 75 is referred to as Suporting this contention. The passage relied on has reference to property divided into shares, though no...
Munisami Reddi Vs. Arunachala Reddi and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-10-1894
Reported in: (1895)ILR18Mad265
1. The question is whether there was any order under Section 281 of the Code. When a claim is preferred under Section 278 and duly prosecuted, it is incumbent on the Court after investigation of the facts to satisfy itself either that the facts are as stated in Section 280 or as stated in Section 281. Without being satisfied either way, no order can properly be passed. Chundra Bhusan Gangopadhya v. Ram Kanth Banerji I.L.R. 12 Cal. 108 In this case the claim was practically withdrawn and there was no investigation.2. There being no order within the meaning of Section 281, the one year's rule does not apply.3. We reverse the decree and remand the suit for trial by the District Munsif. The respondents must pay costs of this appeal, other costs to be provided for in the revised decree....
In Re: Reference Under Stamp Act, Section 46
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-07-1894
Reported in: (1895)ILR18Mad235
1. The reason for making an allowance for a spoiled stamp under Section 51 is that the stamp has become unfit for use, but in this case the stamp was not rendered unfit for use by punching, for the Court itself engrossed upon the paper the deed for which the stamped paper was presented. We are of opinion that the Deputy Collector was in error in treating the document as unstamped....
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