Chennai Court April 1893 Judgments
V. Ramachandra Row and ors. Vs. Sesha Aiyangar
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Apr-27-1893
Reported in: (1893)3MLJ225
1. It is urged on petitioner's behalf that the document sued upon is not a negotiable instrument but an instrument of pledge. It is in these terms:-' On deposit of title-deeds I promise to pay you or order Rs. 160 for value received.' The words 'or order,' show that the intention was that the promissory note should circulate from hand to hand, and the question therefore is whether the terms, 'on deposit of title-deeds,' control its operation and restrain its negotiability. Deposit of title-deeds as a collateral security does not make a promissory note the less a negotiable instrument, and it was held in Wise v. Charlton, 4 Ad & E 790 Do the words, 'on deposit of title-deeds,' import in the case before us more than a collateral security is also given or in any way restrain the operation of the promissory note as a negotiable instrument? We do not think that an allusion to the mere deposit of title-deeds makes the payment contingent or otherwise qualifies the operation of the document as...
Tag this Judgment!Ramachandra and ors. Vs. Sesha
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Apr-27-1893
Reported in: (1894)ILR17Mad86
1. It is urged on petitioners' behalf that the document sued upon is not a negotiable instrument but an instrument of pledge. It is in these terms: 'On deposit of title-deeds I promise to pay you or order Rs. 160 for value received.' The words 'or order, 'show that the intention was that the promissory note should circulate from hand to hand, and the question therefore is, whether the terms ' on deposit of title-deeds ' control its operation and restrain its negotiability. Deposit of title-deeds as a collateral security does not make a promissory note the less a negotiable instrument, and it was so held in Wise v. Charlton 4 Ad. & E. 790 Do the words 'on deposit of title-deeds,' import in the case before us more than that a collateral security is also given, or in any way restrain the operation of the promissory note as a negotiable instrument? We do not think an allusion to the mere deposit of title-deeds makes the payment contingent or otherwise qualifies the operation of the documen...
Tag this Judgment!Siriparapu Ramanna and ors. Vs. Sreemantu Raja Yerlagadda Mallikarjuna ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Apr-26-1893
Reported in: (1893)3MLJ207
1. This is a second appeal from the decree of the District Judge of Kistna, disallowing appellant's claim with costs. Respondent is the Zamindar of Devarakota and appellant is a jirayati ryot in his Zamindari. A patta was tendered for Fasli 1297 by the former, but the latter refused to accept it. The Zamindar then distrained the ryot's property for arrears of rent which he claimed for 1297 and the tenant sued to set aside the distraint as being illegal. The question for determination was whether the patta tendered, Exh. I, was one which appellant was bound to accept and the requirement of Section 7, Act VIII of 1865, was thereby complied with. Appellant objected to two items in Exh. I, viz, the rate of Rupees 9 annas 8 per acre charged on dry land irrigated under the Kistna anicut and the fee entered as payable to a temple at Sivaganga, The Special Assistant Collector considered that the consolidated wet assessment of Rs. 9-8-0 per acre was too high and that the usual dry rate of Rs 2-...
Tag this Judgment!Mallikarjuna Prasad Nayudu Vs. Lakshminarayana
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Apr-26-1893
Reported in: (1894)ILR17Mad50
1. These second appeals arise from suits brought by the receiver of the Devarakota estate to enforce the acceptance of. pattas for fasli 1298 by raiyats in the jirayati village of Nidumole. The raiyats objected to three items in the pattas tendered to them, viz., Nayakvadi fees, tax on palmyra trees, and consolidated wet rates imposed on lands irrigated by the anicut channels from the Kistna. As regards the first two items, both the Courts below decided in favour of the zamindar, and the raiyats have not appealed from their decision. As for the wet rate, it is conceded no sanction has boon obtained from the Collector as required by the first proviso to Section 11, Act VIII of 1865; but it is contended that such sanction was not necessary, and that, even if necessary, it must be taken to have been accorded, the wet rates being inserted in the pattas under the orders of the Collector, who was the receiver. The first proviso to Section 11 expressly prescribes the sanction, of the Collecto...
Tag this Judgment!Lakshmana Vs. Appa Rau
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Apr-26-1893
Reported in: (1894)ILR17Mad73
1. These second appeals relate to suits brought by the zamindar of Nuzvid to compel the raiyats in the village of Kuyur to accept pattas for fasli 1297. The raiyats are the appellants and the zamindar is the respondent before us. The items in the pattas to which appellants object in second appeal are (i) the consolidated wet rate; (ii) the fees to village artisans : Oil) the tax on trees; (iv) the condition that no land should be cultivated without first obtaining a patta; (v) that no building should be erected on lands in appellant's possession; (vi) that no remissions are to be allowed, and (vii) that interest shall be paid on instalments of rent from the dates on which they fall due according to the kistbundi.2. The first item is the most important and the history of the rates which prevailed in the village from fasli 1265 is given by the 'Head Assistant Collector in his judgment. It will be observed that the sharing system was in force till fasli 1264, that the money rates varied f...
Tag this Judgment!Aukella Vydianatham Vs. Kuncham Gangarazu
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Apr-25-1893
Reported in: (1893)3MLJ132
Muthusami Aiyar, J.1. The question for determination in this case is whether the contract sued on is a marriage brokerage contract and if so whether it is valid. There is no reason to think that the contract in question is not a contract as found by the court below to assist the defendant for reward in procuring a wife. The point which the question then comes to is whether the rule of public policy which invalidates marriage brokerage contracts in England is applicable to the case before us. The reason of that rule as stated in Hall v Thynne Show, P. C. 76, which went to the House of Lords is that it is conducive to public good that marriages should be procured and promoted by the mediation of relatives and friends and not by hirelings. On principle this rule appears to be of general application and not of a special or conventional character. Is there anything then in the usage of this country to preclude its operation? As far as I am aware there is nothing to the contrary. On the othe...
Tag this Judgment!Bhupathi Vs. Rajah Rangayya Appa Rau
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Apr-21-1893
Reported in: (1894)ILR17Mad54
1. Plaintiff, respondent, is the zamindar of Nuzvid and appellants are raiyats in the Jeroyati village of Mantena comprised in his zamindari. The contest between them is whether the pattas tendered for fasli 1296 were such as the raiyats were bound to accept. The first objection urged by them was that the land taken up for excavating Uppaleru drainage channel was not deducted from their holdings on the ground that the Government had paid no compensation for the land so taken up to the zamindar. Both the Courts below allowed this objection, and the zamindar has not appealed from their decision.2. The next item to which the raiyats object is the rate per acre imposed on dry land converted into wet. The rate claimed by the zamindar was Rs. 9-2-8 per aero, and the raiyats contended that the proper rate was the rate which had prevailed at the time of permanent settlement in 1802. The Head Assistant Collector and the Judge inferred, from the facts which they accepted as proved, a contract to...
Tag this Judgment!Lakshmi Ammah Vs. Ponnassa Menon and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Apr-19-1893
Reported in: (1894)ILR17Mad394
1. We are of opinion that from an order under Section 231 of the Code of Civil Procedure, being an order relating to the execution of a decree between the parties to the decree within the meaning of Section 244 of the same Code, an appeal lies. If all the joint decree-holders apply for execution, there can be no doubt that the order passed on such application, whether refusing or granting it, will be appealable. Section 231 provides for the case in which all the decree-holders are unable or are unwilling to join in the application, and in such case enables one or more of such decree-holders to apply for execution of the whole decree, and then the Court is authorized to impose such terms as are necessary for the protection of the interests of the other decree-holders. This appears to us to disclose an intention to provide facility for executing decrees even when all the decree-holders are unable or unwilling to join in applying for execution. It is no doubt true that the Court has discr...
Tag this Judgment!Muthevy Lakshimanrayanappa Vs. Muthevy Venkataratnam and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Apr-18-1893
Reported in: (1893)3MLJ237
1. Article 124 of the Limitation Act is not applicable as this is not a suit for possession of the hereditary office, but a suit by the existing karnam for having declared void the appointment of 3rd defendant as karnam jointly with themselves. We observe that the appointment was made under the orders of the Collector administering the estate on behalf of the Zamindar on the ground that the existing karnams did not discharge the duties of their office with efficiency.2. As regards respondent's contention that 3rd defendant was appointed as an additional karnam we find that 3rd defendant's father had been karnam of the village and it was quite open to the landholder, in fact it was his duty, to fill up the vacancy caused by 3rd defendant's fathers's death under Section 7 of the Regulation (XXIX of 1802). The faisal number of karnams cannot be reduced without the sanction of the Board of Revenue and the omission to appoint a successor to 3rd defendant's father was contrary to the policy ...
Tag this Judgment!The Secretary of State for India in Council, Represented by the Distri ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Apr-17-1893
Reported in: (1893)3MLJ231
In 8. A. No. 109 of 18911. This appeal has reference to trees standing on land the claim to which had been adjudicated by the Forest Settlement officer [under Section 11 of the Madras Forest Act No. V of 1882. The appeal in such cases lies to the Forest Court or, where no such court is constituted, to an officer of the Revenue Department whom Government may appoint to hear such appeals. The District Court had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal.2. It is contended on behalf of respondent that if the District Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, this Court is equally without jurisdiction to hear this second appeal. This by no means follows. The existence of the District Courts' decree in a case of this kind is sufficient to justify the entertainment by this Court of a second appeal to consider the question whether the lower court had, or had not jurisdiction.3. We set aside the lower courts' decree and direct respondent to pay appellant's costs in this and in the lower appel...
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