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Tuilaepa Vs. California
Cites for this judgment
- US Supreme Court
- Mar 22, 1994
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U.S. 967 (1994) October Term, 1993 Syllabus Tuilaepa V. CaliforniaSearch
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the circumstances of the crime are a traditional subject for consideration by the sentencer, see, e. g., Woodson v. NorthSearch
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Together with No. 93-5161, Proctor v. CaliforniaSearch
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also on certiorari to the same court. 968 Syllabus Court's precedents. See Eddings v. OklahomaSearch
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Brief any citation in this list with AI Studio
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questions. The States are not confined to submitting to the jury specific propositional questions, see, e. g., Zant v. StephensSearch
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a capital sentencer be instructed how to weigh any particular fact in the sentencing decision. See, e. g., California v. RamosSearch
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penalty, the defendant must be convicted of a crime for which the death penalty is a proportionate punishment. Coker v. GeorgiaSearch
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or its equivalent) at either the guilt or penalty phase. See, e. g., Lowenfield v. PhelpsSearch
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it must apply only to a subclass of defendants convicted of murder. See Arave v. CreechSearch
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Second, the aggravating circumstance may not be unconstitutionally vague. Godfrey v. GeorgiaSearch
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language defining the circumstance is itself too vague to provide any guidance to the sentencer''') (quoting Walton v. ArizonaSearch
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see also Woodson v. NorthSearch
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relevant mitigating evidence of the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of the crime. Blystone v. PennsylvaniaSearch
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see Johnson v. TexasSearch
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of these two inquiries can be in some tension, at least when the inquiries occur at the same time. See Romano v. OklahomaSearch
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the process is neutral and principled so as to guard against bias or caprice in the sentencing decision. See Gregg v. GeorgiaSearch
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see Maynard v. CartwrightSearch
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risk of randomness, the mark of the arbitrary and capricious sentencing process 975 prohibited by Furman v. GeorgiaSearch
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U. S. 238 (1972). See Stringer v. BlackSearch
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special circumstances true. See California v. RamosSearch
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This again is an unusual challenge in light of our precedents. See Eddings v. OklahomaSearch
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sentencer need not be instructed how to weigh any particular fact in the capital sentencing decision. In California v. RamosSearch
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U. S., at 1008-1009, n. 22. Likewise, in Proffitt v. FloridaSearch
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is not impermissible in the capital sentencing process. McCleskey v. KempSearch
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see also Barclay v. FloridaSearch
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per curiam), the distinctive procedural requirements of the Eighth Amendment have been exhausted. See Walton v. ArizonaSearch
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as Justice White put it in Jurek v. TexasSearch
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concurring in the judgment. As these cases come to us they present a question that the Court answered in Zant v. StephensSearch
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factors actually reduces the risk of arbitrary capital sentencing. Prior to the Court's decision in Furman v. GeorgiaSearch
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and the actual sentencing decision. First, as CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST writing for the Court in Lowenfield v. PhelpsSearch
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Id., at 244 (quoting Zant v. StephensSearch
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of the offense or because its imposition may be influenced by unacceptable factors-is diminished. See McCleskey v. KempSearch
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safeguard to protect death-eligible defendants from the arbitrary imposition of the extreme penalty. In Lockett v. OhioSearch
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that complies with the narrowing requirement defined in Lowenfield v. PhelpsSearch
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Woodson v. NorthSearch
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to my view that the death penalty cannot be imposed fairly within the constraints of our Constitution, see Callins v. CollinsSearch
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Whether an aggravator is used for narrowing, or for weighing, or for both, it cannot be impermissibly vague. See Arave v. CreechSearch
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Stringer, 503 U. S., at 229-230, we have not subjected aggravating circumstances to a vagueness analysis. See Zant v. StephensSearch
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on death's side of the scale, so we analyze aggravators for clarity, objectivity, and principled guidance. See Maynard v. CartwrightSearch
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