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Moor Vs. County of Alameda
Cites for this judgment
- US Supreme Court
- May 14, 1973
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Moor v. CountySearch
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of Alameda - 411 U.S. 693 (1973) U.S. Supreme Court Moor v. CountySearch
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of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973) Moor v. CountySearch
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under Monroe v. PapeSearch
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to apply that provision here by imposing vicarious liability upon the County would contravene the holding in Monroe v. PapeSearch
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extends to a State's political subdivision that is not simply the arm or alter ego of the State, Cowles v. MercerSearch
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the federal civil rights claims in the Moor suit. The County relied upon this Court's decision in Monroe v. PapeSearch
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The starting point for petitioners' argument is this Court's decision in Monroe v. PapeSearch
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this case are not asking us to create a substantive federal liability without legislative direction. See United States v. StandardSearch
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United States v. GilmanSearch
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Cf. Richards v. UnitedSearch
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in the scheme of federal civil rights legislation is amply illustrated by our decision in Sullivan v. LittleSearch
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civil rights claim. Such a result would seem to be less than consistent with this Court's prior holding in Monroe v. PapeSearch
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Brown v. TownSearch
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Ries v. LynskeySearch
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Brown v. AmesSearch
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Wilcher v. GainSearch
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rather, we must construe the statute in light of the impressions under which Congress did in fact, act, see Ries v. LynskeySearch
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County under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Petitioners rely principally upon the decision in Mine Workers v. GibbsSearch
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approach of Hurn v. OurslerSearch
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See Monroe v. PapeSearch
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the District Court and Court of Appeals considered themselves bound by the Ninth Circuit's previous decision in Hymer v. ChaiSearch
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and, significantly, Hymer was largely based on the Court of Appeals' earlier decision in Kataoka v. MaySearch
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predated Gibbs and the expansion of the concept of pendent jurisdiction beyond the narrow limits set by Hurn v. OurslerSearch
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Miller v. CountySearch
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Lowe v. ManhattanSearch
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jurisdiction. That proposition has been established at least since this Court's decision in Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. AlabamaSearch
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U. S. 482 , 155 U. S. 487 (1894). See also Minnesota v. NorthernSearch
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is a citizen of the State for diversity purposes. Page 411 U. S. 718 See, e.g., Bullard v. CitySearch
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Loeb v. ColumbiaSearch
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Cowles v. MercerSearch
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See, e.g., 43 U. S. C. & C. R. Co. v. LetsonSearch
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Barrow S.S. Co. v. KaneSearch
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U. S. 100 , 170 U. S. 106 (1898). Thus, in the seminal case of Cowles v. MercerSearch
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Illinois v. CitySearch
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indication possible from California's Supreme Court of the status of California's counties. In People ex rel. Younger v. CountySearch
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Cal.3d at 491 n. 12, 487 P.2d at 1199 n. 12 (emphasis added). See also Pitchess v. SuperiorSearch
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independent corporate character to dictate that it be treated as a citizen of California under our decision in Cowles v. MercerSearch
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See Answer to Complaint, Moor v. MadiganSearch
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Answer to Complaint, Rundle v. MadiganSearch
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Lankford v. GelstonSearch
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Richards v. UnitedSearch
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