Full Judgment
2. Before us the case for the appellants was argued by Shri R. Chander Kumar, ld. Advocate. Shri A.T. Usman, ld. JDR, represented the Revenue.
3. Ld. counsel argued that while other Tariff Item Nos. such as 25, 26 and 26A contained definition of "wire" even after their amendment in 1981, the omission of such definition from Tariff Item No. 27 was conscious and, therefore, the attempt to import definition from other tariff items was not permissible. Referring to the catalogue of such wires he claimed that in the trade parlance also such goods were known as wires whether solid or cored. As submitted the tariff after amendment in 1984 also remained the same and, therefore, there was no reason for denial of the classification under this Tariff Item. He stated that the belief of the Collector that for classification under Tariff Item 27 the wire could not have any material other than metal was not based on any authority.
4. In reply to a specific query the ld. counsel explained the process of manufacture. He stated that the wire bars were cast with the cores running along with the length. The cores were filled with flexing material. The wires were than drawn from the bars.
7. Upto 1-8-1984 Tariff Item No. 27A covered only unwrought led. The manufacturers were later covered and wires were exempted under Notification No. 187/84-C.E., dated 1-8-1984.
8. The authorities below have held that the cored wire is in fact a tube if the flexing material is removed and since it is a tube it cannot have a solid cross section. As per the process described by the ld. Counsel the cores are filled even before the wire is drawn. In fact, the drawn wire does not have any hollows and, therefore, it cannot be called a tube. For the same reasons a cross section of this wire would also be a solid section. The definition of "solid" as per the Concise Oxford Dictionary is ... "tube of such materials, not hollow or containing cavities (a solid sphere)." Thus, to qualify for the term "solid" the goods should not be hollow. The impugned goods qualify on this ground. The second ground advanced by the ld. Collector is that for a product to be covered under Item 27A it has to be entirely made of metal. No support for this belief has been given by him in his order. The definition of lead in the Tariff Item includes alloys in which lead predominates. The inclusion of non-metal ingredient is not specifically or even indirectly excluded from this definition. The third reason advanced by the Collector is that since the main purpose of solder wire is soldering it cannot be called a wire. This finding is without any logic. In no tariff item the classification of wire is made by the end use. A wire can be used to make nails. It can be used as packing material. It can be used as solder. But irrespective of use its classification would continue to be the same. In this case the uncovered lead wires made by the appellants were classified under Tariff Item 27A even when their sole purpose was of soldering, without any objection from the Department.
9. The lower authorities have borrowed definition from other Tariff Item to support their rejection. The Ld. Advocate claimed that the omission of any definition in 27A is deliberate. We cannot comment on this submission in the absence of the insight of the framers of the tariff. But flexing material is solid. The cross section of this used lead wire would also be solid and thus pass the test prescribed for wires in other tariff items also.
10. The appellants have also submitted that the cored wire are known as wires in the market and have justified the classification in terms of trade parlance. Although, as pointed out by the ld. JDR, the catalogue is of their own, it does have the strength to justify the appellant's case. The appellants in their catalogue given a long list of buyers who have been buying the impugned goods as wires.
11. We, therefore, find that the impugned goods squarely fell within the ambit of Tariff Item No. 27A(5) and were eligible for the benefit of Notification No. 187/84-C.E., dated 1-8-1984. We, therefore, set aside the lower orders and allow this appeal and direct consequential relief.