Full Judgment
THOTTATHIL B. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.
1. This appeal is filed against a consent decree passed by the Family Court, with application seeking condonation of delay of 785 days in filing it.
2. There is no dispute that what is impugned is a consent decree. The appellant pleads that he signed the consent under fear of being subjected to criminal cases if he were to refuse endorsing the compromise. Though that may be a matter for consideration by the court considering the compromise, on appropriate objection in that regard, that is not a ground for an appeal. Law dictates so, as is fairly well-settled in terms of the Code of Civil Procedure. There can be no distinction on this question when it comes to a Family Court. Section 19(2) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 is similar to Section 96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, on the face of Section 19(2) of the Family Courts Act, this appeal does not lie. The appeal is liable to be rejected, as one that is not provided for by law.
3. In the light of the aforesaid, the application seeking condonation of delay is only to be dismissed because the merit of the appeal deserves to be considered even at the stage of considering issuance of notice of the application for condonation of delay. It is advisable to do so at that stage to control proliferation of litigations, by sieving them on merits at the threshold. There is no inhibition in law to do so. For support, see Calicut City Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. State of Kerala (2008 (3) KLT 1011).
4. Hence, holding that the appeal is liable to be rejected, the C.M. Application is dismissed and the appeal is rejected, leaving open the appellant’s right, if any, to seek remedy before the court that passed the impugned consent decree, in accordance with law. As regards that, we leave open all issues because, different precedents covering that field stare at us, dissuading any expression in that regard.