Full Judgment
Rampini and Pratt, JJ.
1. This is a rule calling upon the opposite party to show cause why the order of the Magistrate in this case, passed under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, dated the 24th April 1899, should not be set aside for the reasons stated in the affidavit.
2. Mr. Pugh for the opposite party has appeared to show cause. It is quite clear that, under the provisions of Section 145, as now amended, no order under that section can be set aside by this Court in its Revisional jurisdiction, except under the provisions of the Charter, and on the ground of want of jurisdiction. This is apparent, not only from the terms of Section 435, Clause (3), but from the ruling of this Court in the case of Hurbullubh Narain Singh v. Luchmeswar Prosad Singh (1899) I.L.R., 26 Cal., 188.
3. The learned Counsel (Mr. Jackson) who appears on behalf of the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction upon two grounds--first, that the dispute in this case is as to the right to collect rent; and, secondly that it is a dispute between two joint owners governed by the Mitakshara law. He further contends that the order should be set aside, because a Receiver to the property has subsequently been appointed by this Court in its Civil jurisdiction.
4. Now, with regard to the first two of these grounds, we need only say that under the provisions of Section 145, Clause (2), we think there is no want of jurisdiction on the part of the Magistrate because the dispute in this case was a dispute regarding the collection of rent between joint owners governed by the Mitakshara law; and, moreover, it appears to us that this point has already been decided in this very case by a Division Bench consisting of O'klnealy and Stanley, JJ., on the 3rd February 1899 when an attempt was made to stay these proceedings, and the Bench directed that the proceedings should go on, and we think that the purport of their order is that there was no want of jurisdiction in the Magistrate with regard to this case. Then as to the subsequent appointment of Mr.Grey as Receiver, we do not think that can affect the question of jurisdiction at all. Mr. Grey was not appointed as Receiver until after the order of the Magistrate in this case was passed, and his subsequent appointment cannot affect the question of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate at the time he passed the order.
5. Mr. Jackson, however, urged that Mr. Grey's appointment as Receiver has superseded the order of the Magistrate under Section 145. If that be so, on which we express no opinion, then we can only say that it is unnecessary for us, in our Criminal jurisdiction, to set aside an order which, we are told, has been already superseded by this Court in its Civil jurisdiction. For these reasons we think that this rule should be discharged, and we accordingly discharge it.