Commissioner of Wealth Tax Vs. Simpson and General Finance Co. Ltd. (No. 1)

.....had been granted to a person under the relevant provisions of the act, then to set right that mistake, the director should be enabled to exercise his power so as to effectuate the scheme of the act and to implement the purpose behind the act. the fact that the rule making authority has prescribed procedure in exercise of the powers under section 67 for making an application to the director does not mean that the suo motu power which is explicit in section 5(2) of the act is in any way curtailed or taken away. therefore, the contention of the respondent that making an application is sine qua non for invoking the power under section 5(2) of the act is not tenable. -- t.n. estates (abolition & conversion into ryotwari) act, 1948. sections 5(2) & 67; suo motu revisional powers held, on a bare reading of the provisions of section 5(2) of the act, it is clear that the power conferred on the director by section 5(2) to cancel or revise any of the orders, acts or proceedings of the settlement officer is very wide. in the first place, the director need not necessarily be moved by any party in that behalf, and the power could be exercised either on an application by an aggrieved person or suo motu. for example, if the director comes to know that contrary to the scheme of the act or due to misrepresentation or fraud played, a patta had been granted to a person under the relevant provisions of the act, then to set right that mistake, the director should be enabled to exercise his power so as to effectuate the scheme of the act and to implement the purpose behind the act. the fact that the rule making authority has prescribed procedure in exercise of the powers under section 67 for making an application to the director does not mean that the suo motu power which is explicit in section 5(2) of the act is in any way curtailed or taken away. therefore, the contention of the respondent that making an application is sine qua non for invoking the power under section 5(2) of..........and that as on the date of valuation, the land should be valued only as per the compensation payable under the act. the commissioner of income-tax (appeals) found that the matter has already been considered in favour of the appellant on identical facts and allowed the appeal.4. on further appeal by the revenue before the income-tax appellate tribunal, the tribunal dismissed the appeal holding that the compensation payable under the tamil nadu urban land (ceiling and regulation) act should be the basis for valuing the property and not by adopting the market rate.5. aggrieved against the same, the revenue has preferred these appeals raising the following substantial question of law:whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the tribunal was right in holding that the immovable property subject to the urban land ceiling laws should only be valued as per the compensation payable under the urban land ceiling act?6. it is fairly submitted by learned counsel appearing for the appellant that the issue raised in the question is covered against the revenue by the decision of the gujarat high court in cit v. g.s. krishnavati vahuji maharaj kalyanraiji temple : [2003]264itr517(guj) . in the said decision, the gujarat high court held as under (page 519):whenever there is any restriction on the transfer of any land, it is a matter of common knowledge that the value of the property or land, as the case may be, would be normally reduced. in the instant case, it was not open to the assessee to sell the land and, therefore, the value of the land in question cannot be more than what the government was to offer to the assessee under the provisions of the ceiling act.7. in view of the above settled law, we are of the considered view that the appellate tribunal was right in holding that the immovable property subject to urban land ceiling laws should only be valued as per the compensation payable under the urban land ceiling act. accordingly, the question of law referred to.....