Full Judgment
E. Padmanabhan, J.
1. The petitioner prays for the issue of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the connected records of the 1st respondent relating to his proceedings in R.O.C. NO. 9573/97/A1 and quash the same insofar as it relates to the appointment of 2nd respondent as fit person and direct the 1st respondent to nominate the petitioner as a fit person of Arulmigu Umayakaliamman Temple at Mangalapatti Village, Kankayam Taluk.
2. The facts are not in controversy. Heard Mr. T.K. Rammohan, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, Mrs. T. Kokilavani, learned Government Advocate for the 1st Respondent and Mr. W.C. Thiruvengadam, learned Counsel for the 2nd respondent.
3. The petitioner's father was declared as hereditary trustee of Arulmigu Umayakaliamman Temple at Mangalapatti under Section 63(b) of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act in O.A. No. 63 of 1971 by order dated 4.12.1971 by the 1st respondent. Subsequently, certain charges have been framed against the petitioner's father M. Chinnasamy Gounder by the Joint Commissioner H.R. & C.E., Coimbatore on 26.6.1997 and the said Chinnasamy was placed under suspension. The 2nd respondent Executive Officer was appointed as the fit person pending enquiry into the charges. The petitioner herein, being the son of the said Chinnasamy, the hereditary office holder, claims that even in the temporary vacancy caused by the suspension of his father, Chinnasamy Gounder, he should have been appointed as being the person, next in the line of succession to perform the functions of the Trustee during the period of suspension. The petitioner further claims that during the period of disability of his father, he is entitled to perform the functions and duties of hereditary Trustee on his own right, as the next line of successor.
4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner relies upon the pronouncement of this Court in Pandian Jamindarini v. Deputy Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment (1996) 1 M.L.J. 228 and on that score seeks for quashing a portion of the impugned order dated 26.6.1997, by which the 2nd respondent was appointed as fit person and also a mandamus for the petitioner being appointed as the hereditary Trustee in the interregnum, viz., during the period of suspension of his father, the hereditary office holder.
5. The writ petition is being registered by the 2nd respondent, who has filed an affidavit and taken out the application to vacate the order of stay.
6. Mr. W.C. Thiruvengadam, learned Counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent contends that the claim of the petitioner is totally misconceived and cannot be sustained. Further, learned Counsel for the 2nd respondent points out that if the son of the hereditary Trustee-father is allowed to hold the office, that would be detrimental to the interest of the institution, besides it is not the scope and purport of the statutory provisions in the Act.
7. Identical claim had been considered by S. Ramalingam, J. in K. Manikanda Mudaliar v. The Deputy Commissioner. H.R. & C.E. Department, Salem, W.P. No. 12810 of 1990. In the said case, the learned Judge has considered the scope of Sections 53 and 54 of the Act and has held thus:
4. On a consideration of these rival submissions, it is seen that while Section 53(2) deals with the power of the appropriate authority to impose punishment on a trustee any order of suspension as a substantive punishment is imposed, it will disable the hereditary trustee to discharge his duties by reason of that disability by way of suspension and hence there is a duty cast upon the prescribed authority to consider the claims of the next line of succession to succeed to the office of that disabled hereditary trustee to perform the functions of the trustee until his disability ceases.
5. In a case where pending enquiry into certain charges if a trustee is placed under suspension, then, that ad interim suspension is governed by the provisions of Section 53(4) of the Act which enables the competent authority to appoint a fit per-son to discharge the duties of that trustee who is under ad interim suspension.
6. Here is a case where the petitioner who was a hereditary trustee was placed under ad interim suspension pending enquiry into certain charges and therefore Section 53(4) alone would be attracted and hot Section 53(2) of the Act. Under Section 53(4) of the Act, a fit person could be appointed pending enquiry into the charges framed against the hereditary trustee and the claim of the next in line of succession need not be considered at that stage. Hence the writ petition is dismissed.
8. Independent of the said decision of Ramalingam, J. I had also occasion to consider an identical question in W.P. No. 4893 of 1997 as well as W.P. No. 10951 of 1995 and I had also taken the same view as that of Ramalingam, J.
In W.P. No. 10951 of 1995, this Court has held thus:
6. Mr. K. Alagiriswami, learned senior Counsel placed reliance on the observation of the Division Bench which passage has already been set out above and contends that when the petitioner had made a request, it is incumbent on the part of the 1st respondent to consider the request and this should not be ignored. The law laid down by the Division Bench in W.A. No. 277 of 1962, K. Srinivasan, J. in P.K. Sundararaja Mudaliar v. The Deputy Commissioner, H.R. & C.E., Madras : (1964)1MLJ236 and the Division Bench in Pandian Jamindarini v. Deputy Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment, Madras (1966) 1 M.L.J. 288, made it clear that the petitioner is not entitled to be appointed as a fit person when the 3rd respondent has been placed under suspension under Sub-section (4) of Section 53. The statutory provisions of Sub-section (4) of Section 53 provides for appointment of a fit person. Section 54 which provides for filling up of vacancies in the office of hereditary trustee, when a vacancy arises either permanent or temporary. This provision cannot be read into Sub-section (4) of Section 53 nor a right is conferred on the petitioner for being appointed as a fit person. The Division Bench in (1966) 1 M.L.J. 288 has observed that although Sub-section (4) does not provide for it, the claims of the members of the family has to be considered and on the facts of case of that case, the Division Bench had held so. The learned Special Government Pleader pointed out that the writ petitioner had joined hands with the 3rd respondent in alienating the properties and assets of the temple and as such, he cannot be considered suitable for being appointed as a fit person. In the order passed by the 1st respondent, no such reasonings have been assigned and in fact, the writ petitioner's request had not been considered.
7. When Sub-section (4) of Section 53 provides for appointment of a fit person, as already held above, the provisions of Section 54(1) and (2) cannot be relied upon nor it could be pressed into service. In my considered view, as no vacancy had arisen, it is not for the 1st respondent to pass order under Sub-section (4) or (2) of Section 54. As of present the writ petitioner has no right at all. When it is found that the statute provides that a particular thing has to be done in a particular manner it has to be done in that manner and no other manner is permissible. In this case, Section 53 provides for filling up vacancy either temporary or permanent in the office of the Hereditary Trustee and such a contingency provided for in Section 53 cannot be read into Section 54. It has been held in Martin Burn Limited v. Calcutta Corporation A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 529 : (1996) 1 S.C.R. 543 as follows: 'A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation. A statute must of course be given effect.
When the statute does not enable the petitioner in terms of Section 53(4) for being appointed as a fit person in contra to distinction to Section 54 of the Act. In my considered view, the request of the petitioner need not be considered as there is no vacancy as 3rd respondent had been merely placed under suspension under section Sub-section (4) of Section 53.
9. Thus, on a consideration of the statutory provisions and following the earlier orders passed by this Court, the petitioner's claim cannot be sustained.
10. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed with cost of Rs. 1,000 to each of the respondents. Consequently the connected W.M. Ps. are dismissed.