Parthasarathi Chetti (Dead) and anr. Vs. Abdul Rahim Sahib

limitation act (ix of 1908), schedule 1, article 182(5) - execution of decree--order by court--application for time--step-in-aid of execution. - t.n. district police act, 1859 [act no. 24/1859]. section 10 & tamil nadu special police subordinate service rules, rule 14(b), clause (iv) explanation (1); [a.p. shah,c.j., f.m. ibrajhim kalifulla & v. ramasubramanian, jj] rule 14(b),ci.(iv) explanation (1) providing that a person acquitted or discharged on benefit of doubt shall be treated as person involved in criminal case - validity being questioned - held, the impugned rule 14(b) ci.(iv) explanation (1) has been issued in exercise of the power conferred upon the government under the tamil nadu district police act, the criminal city police act and the proviso to article 309 of the constitution., the rule is not assailed on the ground of lack of competence. it is challenged only on the ground that it is violative of articles 14 and 16 of the constitution. but it is well settled that if a rule passes the twin tests of (i) being founded on an intelligible differentia, and (ii) such differentia having a nexus with the object sought to be achieved, it cannot be said to be violative of articles 14 and 16 of the constitution. the impugned rule creates a classification of persons, who were not involved in criminal cases and persons, who were involved in criminal cases. the object of creating such a classification is to ensure that only those persons, whose character and antecedents were beyond and shadow of doubt alone, are permitted entry into the police service of the state. the rule is only a reflection of the intention of the government to maintain purity of administration. the rule merely provides a check post or a filter point, to ensure that only those, who had a clean record of personal life, are admitted into the system. that the existing system, has already come under heavy dose of criticism, cannot be swept under the carpet. therefore, as an employer, the..........time, that would not be a step-in-aid.3. the petition is then argued on the ground that time really ran from 10th may 1917, on which date the execution petition then pending was dismissed. this is not in accordance with the wording of article 182 of schedule i of the limitation act; and the only authority shown me for it is chalavadi kotiah v. poloori alimelammah 31 m. 71 : 18 m.l.j. 46 : 3 m.l.t. 309 and kedamath dutt v. harrachand dutt 3 c. 420 : 4 ind. dec. 263 followed therein. in chalavadi kotiah v. poloori alimelammah 31 m. 71 : 18 m.l.j. 46 : 3 m.l.t. 309 the question was of an execution, which had been suspended owing to a bar to its proceeding and in which a strike off order of the well-known type was passed. the reasoning of the learned judges is not fully stated. in fact, they give two alternative grounds for their conclusion and it is not clear to me that they meant to lay down a general principle which would involve a wide departure from the language of the act. kedarnath dutt v. harrachand dutt 3 c. 420 : 4 ind. dec. 263 is a decision of a single judge. his reason for holding that the right to apply was still subsisting apparently was that the application was one in a pending suit. if so, that reason is not available to the petitioner in the present case, for the present application is not made in any pending suit or other pending proceedings.4. the result is that the revision petition fails and is dismissed.