Full Judgment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Cr. M.P. No. 1923 of 2015 Pramod Kumar Mishra @ Pramod Mishra …… Petitioner Versus The State of Jharkhand …… Opposite Party --------- CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANANT BIJAY SINGH --------- For the Petitioner : Mr. K.S. Nanda, Advocate For the State :Mr. Sanjay Kumar Pandey-2, Advocate --------- 09/Dated:
08. 12/2016 The instant application has been filed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C whereby the petitioner has prayed for setting aside the orders dated 29.05.2015 passed by Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Ghatsila in G.R. No. 293 of 2005 arising out of Chakulia P.S. Case No. 40 of 2005 registered under Sections 144/153(A)/332/353/341/504 of the I.P.C, whereby the learned trial Court have cancelled the bail of the petitioner and further prayer for quashing of the order order dated 24.08.2015 passed by learned Sessions Judge, East Singhbhum in Criminal Revision No.190 of 2015. The case is pending before learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class at Ghatsila. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that while referring to annexure-2, he was regularly making pairawi and while referring to order dated 22.08.2015, submitted that petitioner on 22.08.2015 failed to appear in the Court below as he was suffering from Jaundice. That without following the due procedure of law, the Court below cancelled the bail of the petitioner. The facts has also not been taken on the impugned order of the learned Sessions Judge who have failed to exercise the revisional power on the ground that the interim order is interlocutroy in nature. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Amar Nath & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana & Ors., reported in 1977 4 SCC137 wherein it has been held that
“5. The concept of an interlocutory order qua the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, therefore, was completely foreign to the earlier Code. Subsequently it appears that there had been large number of arrears and the high Courts were flooded with revisions of all kinds against interim or interlocutory orders which led to enormous delay in the disposal of cases and exploitation of the poor accused by the affluent prosecutors. Sometimes interlocutory orders caused harassment to the accused by unnecessarily protracting the trials. It was in the background of these facts that the Law Commission dwelt on this aspect of the matter and in the 14th and 41st reports submitted by the commission which formed the basis of the 1 973 Code the said commission suggested -2- revolutionary changes to be made in the powers of the High Courts. The recommendations of the commission were examined carefully by the Government, keeping in view, the following basic considerations: "(i) an accused person should get a fair trial in accordance with the accepted principles of natural justice; (ii) every effort should be made to avoid delay in investigation and trial which is harmful not only to the individuals involved but also to society; and (iii) the procedure should not be complicated and should, to the utmost extent possible, ensure fair deal to the poorer sections of the community." This is clearly mentioned in the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the 1973 Code. Clause (d) of Paragraph 5 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons runs thus: "the powers of revision against interlocutory orders are being taken away, as it has been found to be one of the main contributing factors in the delay of disposal of criminal cases." Similarly, replying to the debate in the Lok Sabha on sub-clause (2) of Clause 397, Shri Ram Niwas Mirdha, the Minister concerned, observed as follows: "It was stated before the Select Committee that a large number of appeals against interlocutory orders are filed with the result that the appeals got delayed considerably. Some of the more notorious cases concern big business persons. So, this new provision was also welcomed by most of the witnesses as well as the Select Committee. .........This was a well-thought out measure so we do not want to delete it." Thus it would appear that S. 397 (2) was incorporated in the 1973 Code with the avowed purpose of cutting out delays and ensuring that the accused persons got a fair trial without much delay and the procedure was not made complicated. Thus the paramount object in inserting this new provision of sub-s. (2) of S. 397 was to safeguard the interest of the accused.
6. Let us now proceed to interpret the provisions of S. 397 against the historical background of these facts. Sub-section (2) of S. 397 of the 1973 Code may be extracted thus: "The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding." The main question which falls for determination in this appeal is as to what is the connotation of the term "interlocutory order" as appearing in sub-s (2) of S. 397 which bars any revision of such an order by the High Court. The term "interlocutory order" is a term of well-known legal significance and does not present any serious difficulty. It has been used in various statutes including the Code of Civil Procedure, Letters Patent of the High Courts and other like statutes. In Websters New World Dictionary "interlocutory" has been defined as an order other than final decision. Decided cases have laid down that interlocutory orders to be appealable must be those which decide the rights and liabilities of the parties concerning a particular aspect. It seems to us that the term "interlocutory order" in S. 397 (2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very o bject which formed the basis for -3- insertion of this particular provision in S. 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397 (2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court”. In view of the law laid by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, the impugend order of the learned Magistrate is not interlicutory in nature, so it was submitted that the trial Court without considering the fact that the petitioner was making regular paravi, has cancelled the bail of the petitioner. Learned A.P.P. has opposed the prayer on the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. After hearing both the parties and on perusal of the record it prima facie appears that the order of learnd Sessions Judge is not in accordance with law. I am of the view that learned District Judge have not considered the matter on merits and have failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him in accordance with law, hence the impugned order is set aside and Cr.M.P. No.1923 of 2015 stands allowed subject to the condition that petitioner shall deposit Rs.5000/- to the Secretary Ghatsila Sub Division Bar latest by 09.01.2017 and shall file a receipt before the trial Court and further the petitioner will physically appear before the trial Court on 17.01.2017 and he will admit to file bail application on the same day. Let a copy of this be sent to the trial Court through FAX by the Secretary, Ghasila Division Bar. (Anant Bijay Singh, J.) tarun/rohit