Full Judgment
B.J. Shethna, J.
1. All these petitions are disposed of by this common order as the impugned order in question challenged in these writ petitions is the same.
2. The Authorised Officer (Sub-Divisional Officer), Banner, passed separate orders on 21.4.1975, 19.9.1975, 12.8.1975 and 29.5.1976 in four different ceiling cases No. 337 of 1970 State v. Ambadan, 1 of 1975 State v. Bachhibai 1322 of 1974 State v. Durgadan and 1323 of 1974 State v. Gamer Dan. Ambadan, Bachhibai, Durgadan and Gamer Dan were the members of one family. During the pendency of these ceiling proceedings, Ambadan died leaving behind his aforesaid legal heirs.
3. The Tehsildar, Sheo, District Banner submitted an application under Section 82 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act (for short 'the Act') to the Additional Collector requesting that the aforesaid orders passed by the Authorised Officer in the aforesaid ceiling cases be set aside because the same are bad in law, illegal and against the provisions of the law.
4. In turn, the Addl. Collector made a joint reference before the Board of Revenue, Ajmer, for setting aside the aforesaid orders passed in aforesaid ceiling cases. The said reference came to be rejected by the Board of Revenue on 1.5.1991 on the ground that it was the consistent view of the Board of Revenue that reference cannot be made for cancellation of the orders passed by the Authorised Officer in the proceedings initiated under the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973 because the Authorised Officer was not subordinate to the Collector. Therefore, the reference made by the Collector was not competent.
5. Regarding the order dated 21.4.1971 passed in ceiling case No. 337 of 1970 State v. Ambadan, the Board of Revenue observed in its impugned order that it was passed in proceedings under Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act initiated against Ambadan. If the State was aggrieved by the order passed by the S.D.O., Banner, (Authorised Officer) dated 21.4.1971 then it was free to file an appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority.
6. Aggrieved by the rejection order dated 1.5.1991 passed by the Board of Revenue rejecting the reference No. 15 of 1990, the State of Rajasthan preferred three separate writ petitions bearing S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1587 of 1998 State v. Gamer Dan and Anr. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1713 of 1998 State v. Durgadan and Anr. and S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2235 of 1998 State v. Smt. Bachhi Bai and Ors.
7. It is pertinent to note here that all the three writ petitions were filed by the State of Rajasthan simultaneously on one date i.e. on 30.11.1997 before this Court and all were in objections. When there was one impugned order challenged in all the writ petitions then all the three writ petitions should have been placed for hearing for the purpose of admission and arguments by the State of Rajasthan on one date. However, it appears that defects were removed in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1587 of 1998 State v. Gamer Dan and, therefore, it came up for admission before my learned Brother Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J. on 15.5.1998. On that day, the following order was passed:
The instant writ petition has been filed against the impugned judgment and order dated 1st May, 1991. This has been presented before this Hon. Court on 13th Nov. 1997 i.e. after a lapse of 6 years 6 months and 12 days from the date of the impugned order. The explanation furnished for approaching this Court such a belated stage reads as under:.since the legal complications had arisen as to whether the case should have been reopened or not and in this way, it could not have been finally decided and therefore, the steps for filing the writ petition could not have been taken forthwith.The explanation furnished by the petitioner State is of no merit in view of the Judgment of this Court in Laxmansingh Kawadia v. State of Rajasthan 1997 (3) RLW 1560. The petition is dismissed only on the ground of delay and laches without going into merit.
Shri Hemant Choudhary, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, states that by virtue of this impugned judgment the petitioner State has suffered a huge loss and if the impugned order is not interfered it will perpetuate further. The State Govt. is the custodian of the rights of the population of the whole State collectively and should have taken action against the person who is responsible to cause such delay. No action has been taken against the Officer for negligence on which count the State has suffered such a huge loss. The Court should not interfere in such a matter without any explanation worth consideration on behalf of the State. The State is at liberty to take action against the Officer who is responsible for causing more than 6 and 1/2 years delay in approaching this Court and there is no legal bar to recover the damages to which State has suffered from such Officers. The writ petition is dismissed.
8. Thereafter, Writ Petition No. 1713 of 1998 State v. Durgadan was placed for admission before my learned Brother Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J. on 27.5.1998. I am at pains to note that though the identical Writ Petition No. 1587 of 1998 (State v. Gamer Dan) was dismissed by my learned Brother Dr. B.S. Chauhan, j. by the speaking order dated 15.5.1998, Mr. Hemant Chaudhary the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner did not bring to the notice of the learned Judge and prayed that the petition be put up after vacation and accordingly, my learned Brother Dr. B.S. Chauhan ordered for putting up that petition after vacation as prayed for by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. Thereafter, the said writ petition No. 1713 of 1998 came up before my learned Brother V.G. Palshikar, J. on 21.7.1998 and it was ordered to be put up for final disposal along with Writ Petition No. 2235 of 1998 State v. Smt. Bachhibai and Ors. on 27.7.1998. Thereafter, on 28.7.1998, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1713 of 1998 was admitted by my learned Brother Mohd. Yamin, J.
9. At this stage, I may state that Writ Petition No. 2235 of 1998 came up for admission on 15.7.1998 before my learned brother V.G. Palshikar, J. and it was straightway admitted and notices were ordered to be issued to the respondents.
10. From the perusal of the orders dated 15.7.1998 and 28.7.1998 passed by my learned brothers V.G. Palshikar and Dr. B.S. Chauhan, JJ. in Writ Petitions No. 2235 of 1998 and 1713 of 1998 respectively, it nowhere appears that the fact of dismissal of identical Writ Petition No. 1587 of 1998 (State v. Gamer Dan) by my learned Brother Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J. on 15.5.1998 by a speaking order was brought to the notice of their lordships. The judicial proprietory demands that if an identical petition is dismissed by a Single Bench of this Court by a speaking order then the other Single Benches of this Court are bound by that Judgment. If a learned single Judge does not agree with that view then the only course is to refer the matter to the Division Bench and not to straightway admit the same.
11. It must be further stated that it was only after the Writ Petitions No. 2235 of 1998 and 1713 of 1998 were admitted by the learned judges of this Court on 15.7.1998 and 28.7.1998 respectively, the State of Rajasthan filed D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 870 of 1998 before the Division Bench of this Court arid it came up before the Division Bench consisting of Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice V.S. Kokje and Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.S. Godara on 16.10.1998. Before the Division Bench, Mr. Hemant Chaudhary, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition in limine but against the same impugned order, two other writ petition were filed which have been admitted by two separate Single Benches of this Court.
12. On this submission being made before the Division Bench, record was called for and it was found that the contention of Mr. Chaudhary was true. Therefore, in order to maintain uniformity, the Special Appeal was disposed of by the Division Bench vide its order dated 16.10.1998 in the following manner:
Heard Mr. Choudhary on admission. The learned Counsel for the petitioner States that learned Single Judge has dismissed the petition in limine, but against the same order, which was before the learned Single Judge, two other petitions were filed which have been admitted by two separate Single Benches. We had called for the record of those cases and found that the contention was true. In order to maintain the uniformity, we dispose of this appeal by setting aside the order of dismissal of writ petition passed by the learned Single Judge and instead direct that the petition be admitted and disposed of by the regular Single Bench along with SBCW Pet. No. 1713/98 and SBCW Pet. No. 2235/98. There is no necessity to issue notice to the respondents as order of dismissal of writ petition was passed in limine. Let the three petitions be listed together before concerned Single Bench. This appeal stands disposed of with the aforesaid observations.
13. It is clear from the order that the fact of earlier writ petition dismissed on 15.5.1998 by Hon'ble Dr. B.S. Chauhah, J. and later on two other Hon'ble Judges admitted Writ Petitions No. 1713 of 1998 and 2235 of 1998 without being aware about the dismissal order passed by Dr. Chauhan, J. was not brought to the notice of the lordships of the Division Bench. In my opinion, once a learned Single Judge dismissed identical writ petition No. 1587 of 198 by a speaking order then it was the duty of the learned Counsel for the petitioner to bring that fact to the notice of the other learned Judges who heard other identical matters. The uniformity should be maintained as observed by the Division Bench in the aforesaid order. It was at least not expected from the counsel of State of Raj. to get orders in this manner.
14. It was also submitted by Mr. Hemant Chaudhary, the learned Counsel for the petitioners that once the petitions are admitted then they cannot be thrown on the ground of delay and laches. It may be stated that those two other writ petitions were straightway admitted without issuing notices to the other side. If before admitting the petitions, notices were given to the other side then they would have certainly raised the objection regarding gross delay and laches. In fact, in my opinion, Writ Petition No. 1587 of 1998 was initially rightly dismissed by Dr. Chauhan, J. on the ground of gross delay and latches of 6 years 6 months and 12 days in challenging the impugned order. The explanation offered in filing Writ Petitions at a belated stage 'that since the legal complications had arisen as to whether the case should have been reopened or not and in this way, it could not have been finally decided and therefore, the steps for filing the writ petition could not have been taken forthwith', cannot be accepted by any reasonable person and in my opinion, it was rightly not accepted by my learned brother Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J.
15. The submission of Mr. Chaudhary that by virtue of the impugned order, the State of Raj. suffered huge loss if the impugned order is not interfered with, therefore, it will not be in the interest of justice to dismiss the petitions on the ground of delay has no substance and cannot be accepted, because the State is the custodian of the rights of the people and it should have taken stringent action against the person concerned who was responsible in causing such a gross delay. Instead of taking action against such person, the State has simply filed these petitions after delay of more than 6 years and the same has not at all been satisfactorily explained.
16. The question regarding loss suffered by the State can be taken care of by the State Govt. itself by initiating disciplinary proceedings against the person concerned who was responsible for such a gross delay and the loss suffered by the State can be recovered from the salary or pension of that person.
17. On merits also, the petitioner has no legs to stand. From the perusal of the impugned order of the Board of Revenue,it is clear that it was a consistent view of the Board of Revenue that reference cannot be made for cancellation of orders passed by the Authorised Officer in proceedings under the Rajsthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973 because the Authorised Officer is not subordinate to the Collector. Hence, the reference made by the Collector was not competent. In my opinion, this consistent view taken by the Board of Revenue holds good till today and this Court so far has not taken any contrary view. Therefore, it must be held that against the orders passed by the Authorised Officer in proceedings under 'the Act of 1973' no reference can be made by the Collector as the Authorised Officer is not subordinate to the Collector.
18. In view of the above, these petitions fail and are hereby dismissed. Before parting, I must state that this order is required to be brought to the notice of the State Govt. for taking necessary action in the matter against the concerned persons. The Office is directed to send a copy of this order to the State Govt., forthwith.