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Kripal Singh and ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and ors.

Kripal Singh and ors. vs State of Rajasthan and ors.

Disposition Petition allowed Court Rajasthan Decided Sep 12, 1986
~3 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/760654

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Citation
Court
Rajasthan High Court
Judge
Decided On
Case Number
S.B. Cr. Revision No. 232 of 1979
Subject
Criminal
Disposition
Petition allowed

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

Criminal Procedure Code - Section 453--Delivery of ornaments--Claim for ornaments made by legal representatives after 9 year--Held, it would not be proper to allow to raise question of title of ornaments after 9 years.;Petition Allowed - Section 2(k), 2(1), 7 & 40 & Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)...

Key legal issue
Criminal
Outcome / disposition
Petition allowed

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Kripal Singh and ors.

Advocate Shri. B.R. Arora

Respondent

State of Rajasthan and ors.

Legal References

Cases Referred
Cooper v. Wordsworth Board of Works
Reported In
1987(1)WLN660

Excerpt

criminal procedure code - section 453--delivery of ornaments--claim for ornaments made by legal representatives after 9 year--held, it would not be proper to allow to raise question of title of ornaments after 9 years.;petition allowed - section 2(k), 2(1), 7 & 40 & juvenile justice (care and protection of children) rules, 2007, rule 12 & 98 & juvenile justice act, 1986, section 2(h): [altamas kabir & cyriac joseph, jj] determination as to juvenile - appellant was found to have completed the age of 16 years and 13 days on the date of alleged occurrence - appellant was arrested on 30.11.1998 when the 1986 act was in force and under clause (h) of section 2 a juvenile was described to mean a child who had not attained the age of sixteen years or a girl who had not attained the age of eighteen years - it is with the enactment of the juvenile justice act, 2000, that in section 2(k) a juvenile or child was defined to mean a child who had not completed eighteen years of a ge which was given prospective prospect - appellant was about sixteen years of age on the date of commission of the alleged offence and had not completed eighteen years of age when the juvenile justice act, 2000, came into force - juvenile act, of 2000 has been given retrospective effect by rule 12 of juvenile justice rule, 2007 - as such, accused has to be treated as juvenile under the said act. - ram pyari, failed to give any notice to shri karam chand to show cause before returning the said property. the principle is clearly stated in the leading case of cooper v. when karam chand failed even to make a claim for possession of the property before the learned magistrate, i do not find any error in his order in directing delivery of the property to the owners of the same......counsel has relied on state bank of india v. rajendra kumar singh and ors. : 1969 crilj659 where it is said.in our opinion, there is no warrant or justification for the arguments. it is true that the statute does not expressly require a notice to be issued, or a hearing to be given to the parties adversely affected. but though the statute is silent and does not expressly require issue of any notice there is in the eye of law a necessary implication that the parties adversely affected should be heard before the court makes an order for return of the seized property. the principle is clearly stated in the leading case of cooper v. wordsworth board of works (1863) 14 cb ns 180.3. the above case does not apply to the facts of the present case. here the property was merely pledged and karam chand did not make any application before the trial court claiming possession of the same or for payment of money in terms of section 453 cr. p.c. this point was not even raised during arguments in appeal before the sessions judge. the addl. munsif & judicial magistrate passed the order as back as july 12, 1977 and it would not be proper now after a period of 9 years to allow the petitioner to raise this question in this court in revision. when karam chand failed even to make a claim for possession of the property before the learned magistrate, i do not find any error in his order in directing delivery of the property to the owners of the same.4. the result is, the petition has no force and is dismissed.

Full Judgment

Shobhag Mal Jain, J.

1. This revision by the legal representatives of Karam Chand, is directed against the order of the Addl. Munsif & Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Sri Ganganagar, directing delivery of the record gold to Mst. Chinkaur and Mst. Ram Pyari, non-petitioners No. 2 and 3 here in. Three persons, namely, Pat Ram s/o Chet Ram, Path Ram s/o Hira Ram and Mani Ram were tried for the offence under, Section 494 I.P.C. for committing robbery of gold ornaments belonging to Mst. Chinkaur and Mst. Ram Pyari. The prosecution case was that these ornaments were kept by the accused with Karam Chand from where the same were recovered. The case of Karam Chand, however, was that the golden ornaments were pawned with him for Rs. 3000/- by Path Ram. The learned Magistrate convicted accused Path Ram s/o Het Ram and Mani Ram for the offence under Section 411 I.P.C. and while doing so he directed that the gold recovered from the possession of Karam Chand may be returned to Mst. Chain Kaur and Ram Pyari. An appeal against the aforesaid order for returning the property was filed before the Sessions Judge, Sri Ganganagar. The said appeal was heard by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, who by his order dated 1st May, 1979 dismissed the same. Aggrieved, the petitioners, who are legal representatives of Karam Chand, have filed the present revision petition in this Court.

2. Shri B.R. Arora, counsel for the petitioner has urged that the learned Magistrate while directing that the gold ornaments may be returned to Mst. Chin Kaur and Mst. Ram Pyari, failed to give any notice to Shri Karam Chand to show cause before returning the said property. The learned Counsel has relied on State Bank of India v. Rajendra Kumar Singh and Ors. : 1969 CriLJ659 where it is said.

In our opinion, there is no warrant or justification for the arguments. It is true that the statute does not expressly require a notice to be issued, or a hearing to be given to the parties adversely affected. But though the statute is silent and does not expressly require issue of any notice there is in the eye of law a necessary implication that the parties adversely affected should be heard before the Court makes an order for return of the seized property. The principle is clearly stated in the leading case of Cooper v. Wordsworth Board of Works (1863) 14 CB NS 180.

3. The above case does not apply to the facts of the present case. Here the property was merely pledged and Karam Chand did not make any application before the trial Court claiming possession of the same or for payment of money in terms of Section 453 Cr. P.C. This point was not even raised during arguments in appeal before the Sessions Judge. The Addl. Munsif & Judicial Magistrate passed the order as back as July 12, 1977 and it would not be proper now after a period of 9 years to allow the petitioner to raise this question in this Court in revision. When Karam Chand failed even to make a claim for possession of the property before the learned Magistrate, I do not find any error in his order in directing delivery of the property to the owners of the same.

4. The result is, the petition has no force and is dismissed.

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