Controller of Estate Duty Vs. S.S. Mehta

Controller of Estate Duty vs S.S. Mehta

Type Court Judgment Court Rajasthan Decided Jan 10, 1995

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Citation: sooperkanoon.com/756923
Court: Rajasthan High Court
Judge: Y.R. Meena and; V.K. Singhal, JJ.
Decided On: Jan 10, 1995
Case Number: D.B. Estate Duty Reference No. 126 of 1984
Subject: Direct Taxation

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- Section 2(k), 2(1), 7 & 40 & Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, Rule 12 & 98 & Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, Section 2(h): [Altamas Kabir & Cyriac Joseph, JJ] Determination as to Juvenile - Appellant was found to have completed the age of 16 years and 13 days on the date of alleged oc...

Key legal issue: Direct Taxation
Acts & sections: Estate Duty Act, 1953 - Sections 33, 33(1), 34 and 34(1)

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Controller of Estate Duty

Advocate G.S. Bafna, Adv.

Respondent

S.S. Mehta

Legal References

Acts: Estate Duty Act, 1953 - Sections 33, 33(1), 34 and 34(1)
Reported In: (1995)127CTR(Raj)406

Excerpt

- section 2(k), 2(1), 7 & 40 & juvenile justice (care and protection of children) rules, 2007, rule 12 & 98 & juvenile justice act, 1986, section 2(h): [altamas kabir & cyriac joseph, jj] determination as to juvenile - appellant was found to have completed the age of 16 years and 13 days on the date of alleged occurrence - appellant was arrested on 30.11.1998 when the 1986 act was in force and under clause (h) of section 2 a juvenile was described to mean a child who had not attained the age of sixteen years or a girl who had not attained the age of eighteen years - it is with the enactment of the juvenile justice act, 2000, that in section 2(k) a juvenile or child was defined to mean a child who had not completed eighteen years of a ge which was given prospective prospect - appellant was about sixteen years of age on the date of commission of the alleged offence and had not completed eighteen years of age when the juvenile justice act, 2000, came into force - juvenile act, of 2000 has been given retrospective effect by rule 12 of juvenile justice rule, 2007 - as such, accused has to be treated as juvenile under the said act. 1. the income-tax appellate tribunal has referred the following question of law arising out of its order dated february 10, 1983 :' whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the tribunal was justified in holding that the share of lineal descendants in the self-occupied property was liable to be excluded from the principal estate of the assessee for rate purposes under section 34(1)(c) of the estate duty act, 1953 '2. the brief facts of the case are that the deceased had a one-fifth share in the immovable property belonging to the hindu undivided family of which he was karta. he was survived by his wife and three sons. all the sons stayed outside in connection with either employment or profession. the value of the house, after adjustment of the loan, was taken at rs. 1,60,000. the property was partly self-occupied and partly let out. the share of the lineal descendants was taken at rs. 60,000 in the let out portion and at rs. 36,000 in the self-occupied portion and both the amounts were included for rate purposes in view of section 34(1)(c) of the estate duty act. on appeal, the appellate controller of estate duty excluded the sum of rs. 36,000 representing the share of the lineal descendants in the self-occupied portion, following the decision of the andhra pradesh high court in the case of ced v. estate of late durga prasad beharilal : [1979]116itr692(ap) . the order of the appellate controller of estate duty was accepted by the tribunal and it was observed that the self-occupied portion which was used by the deceased was exempt. except the deceased and his family, no stranger lived in the self-occupied portion. the part of the house which exclusively remained in the occupation of the deceased, therefore, was fully exempt under section 33(1)(n) and clause (c) has no application to such portion.3. this matter was considered by this court in the case of ced v. nirmala saxena [1995] 214 itr 566 (d. b. estate duty reference no. 112 of 1983 decided on.....

Full Judgment

1. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has referred the following question of law arising out of its order dated February 10, 1983 :

' Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the share of lineal descendants in the self-occupied property was liable to be excluded from the principal estate of the assessee for rate purposes under Section 34(1)(c) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 '

2. The brief facts of the case are that the deceased had a one-fifth share in the immovable property belonging to the Hindu undivided family of which he was karta. He was survived by his wife and three sons. All the sons stayed outside in connection with either employment or profession. The value of the house, after adjustment of the loan, was taken at Rs. 1,60,000. The property was partly self-occupied and partly let out. The share of the lineal descendants was taken at Rs. 60,000 in the let out portion and at Rs. 36,000 in the self-occupied portion and both the amounts were included for rate purposes in view of Section 34(1)(c) of the Estate Duty Act. On appeal, the Appellate Controller of Estate Duty excluded the sum of Rs. 36,000 representing the share of the lineal descendants in the self-occupied portion, following the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of CED v. Estate of late Durga Prasad Beharilal : [1979]116ITR692(AP) . The order of the Appellate Controller of Estate Duty was accepted by the Tribunal and it was observed that the self-occupied portion which was used by the deceased was exempt. Except the deceased and his family, no stranger lived in the self-occupied portion. The part of the house which exclusively remained in the occupation of the deceased, therefore, was fully exempt under Section 33(1)(n) and Clause (c) has no application to such portion.

3. This matter was considered by this court in the case of CED v. Nirmala Saxena [1995] 214 ITR 566 (D. B. Estate Duty Reference No. 112 of 1983 decided on January 4, 1995). It was observed by this court as under (at page 572) :

' In view of the various decisions referred to above and on the basis of the language used in Section 33(1)(n), we are of the opinion that the exemption is available only in respect of the property which belongs to the deceased and which passes on his death. The Hindu undivided family property in which the lineal descendants have any interest cannot be said to be entirely belonging to the deceased, it is only the share of the deceased to the extent which passes on his death which is exempt. It is his share alone which passes on his death and, therefore, the exemption contemplated in Section 33(1)(n) is restricted to the share of the deceased. Under Section 34(1)(c), the value of the share of the lineal descendants of the deceased in the coparcenary property has to be aggregated with the principal value of the estate of the deceased for the purposes of rate of duty.

In view of the specific language of Clause (c) of Section 34(1) the validity of which has already been upheld by the apex court, the interest of the lineal descendants is liable to be included and, therefore, we are of the view that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was not justified in holding that the share of lineal descendants in coparcenary property was not includible in the principal estate of the deceased for rate purposes under Section 34(1)(c). '

4. Following the above decision, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the share of the deceased (?) in the self-occupied portion was liable to be excluded for rate purposes under Section 34(1)(c) of the Estate Duty Act.

5. Accordingly, the reference is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No order as to costs.

Same Court & Year Rajasthan · 1995 Same Parties Controller of Estate Duty vs S.S. Mehta Same Subject Direct Taxation Same Judge Y.R. Meena and; V.K. Singhal, JJ. Acts & Sections Estate Duty Act, 1953 - Sections 33, 33(1), 34 and 34(1)

Direct Taxation