Skip to content
How to use Judgment tools
  1. Click Tools to open PDF, Print, Tag, Note, Favourite, and CiteSignal.
  2. Use Brief & Ask in the toolbar for the AI Brief and case chat.
  3. Jump to sections with the pills below the help bar.

Bhanwar Singh and ors. Vs. Rama and ors.

Bhanwar Singh and ors. vs Rama and ors.

Disposition Reference accepted Court Rajasthan Decided Oct 17, 1949
~4 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/750614

For advocates & juniors · 7-day free trial

Brief this judgment before chambers

Stop skimming 50 pages - get an 18-section AI Brief on this case, ask scoped follow-ups, and find related precedents with Semantic Search. Full trial, no card required.

  • 18-section brief - facts, issues, ratio, relief
  • Ask this case - answers cite the judgment
  • Semantic search - find precedents by meaning
  • Research drawer - sections, cites, related cases

No card required · credentials emailed · Log in if you already have an account

Citation
Court
Rajasthan
Judge
Decided On
Case Number
Criminal Ref. No. 12 of 1949
Subject
Criminal
Disposition
Reference accepted

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman Part time employees Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either...

Key legal issue
Criminal
Outcome / disposition
Reference accepted
Acts & sections
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1898 - Sections 145(4) and 147

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Bhanwar Singh and ors.

Advocate Sumerdan, P.P. for Sarkar

Respondent

Rama and ors.

Legal References

Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1898 - Sections 145(4) and 147
Cases Referred
Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque
Reported In
AIR1950Raj8

Excerpt

.....control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. it is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. the other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. a full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. if a person falls under the definition of workman under section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the i.d. act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said act. a perusal of section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the i.d. act. however, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. the control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person..........served on them. the learned public prosecutor has appeared and i have heard him. he has supported the recommendation made by the learned district magistrate.4. the learned district magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. the first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. this may be described as a ground of fact. the second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. he has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) bamchandra v. shankarrao, a.i.r. (19) 1932 nag. 83 : (33 gr. l. j. 556) and (2) sk. khoda bux v. mozaharul haque, a. i. r. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. l. j. 728).5. i have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the district magistrate in support of his recommendation. i agree with the learned public prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned district magistrate is well founded. both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. the learned district magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under section 147, criminal p. c. the other ground mentioned by the learned district magistrate is also correct. in my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a magistrate, in whose court proceedings under section 147, criminal p. c., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. the second proviso to sub-section (4) of section 145 of the code, on which the trial magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.6. for the reasons stated above, i accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the magistrate of parbatsar on 26th october 1948.

Full Judgment

ORDER

Verma, C.J.

1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.

2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.

3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.

4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).

5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.

6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.

Continue Your Research


AI Briefs · Semantic Search · Save & annotate judgments

Start your 7-day free trial