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Jenson Alias Mathan Vs. State of Kerala

Jenson Alias Mathan vs State of Kerala

Disposition Appeal dismissed Court Kerala Decided Jun 24, 2004
~7 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/729288

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Citation
Court
Kerala High Court
Judge
Decided On
Case Number
Cri. A. No. 337 of 1997 (C)
Subject
Criminal
Disposition
Appeal dismissed

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]: [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appe...

Key legal issue
Criminal
Outcome / disposition
Appeal dismissed
Acts & sections
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1974 - Sections 477; Criminal Practice Rules - Rule 52; Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860 - Sections 300

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Jenson Alias Mathan

Advocate T.V. Prabhakaran and; S. Rajeev, Advs.

Respondent

State of Kerala

Advocate Sujith Mathew Jose, Public Prosecutor

Legal References

Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1974 - Sections 477; Criminal Practice Rules - Rule 52; Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860 - Sections 300
Reported In
2005CriLJ589

Excerpt

- code of civil procedure, 1908.[c.a. no. 5/1908]. section 100-a [as substituted by c.p.c. amendment act, 2002]: [v.k. bali, cj, kurian joseph & k. balakrishnan nair, jj] applicability held, section is not retrospective. all appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. but subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro court appeals against judgment of single judge is not maintainable. provisions of section 100-a, c.p.c., will prevail over the provisions contained in the kerala high court act, 1959. - so it is not safe to rely on that sole witnesses to fasten conviction. merely because other occurrence witnesses like pws-1 to 7 did not support the prosecution case, it cannot be concluded that pw-9 cannot be relied on, if his evidence reposes confidence in the court and the court feels it trustworthy. therefore, the court below was perfectly correct when it came to the conclusion that pw-9 the father of the victim can necessarily be believed, if his evidence is convincing. narayanan as interpreter in the deposition as well as in the judgment, really he was not an interpreter......the court below termed mr. narayanan as interpreter in the deposition as well as in the judgment, really he was not an interpreter. he was only translating what the witness had disclosed to the court. rule 52 obliges the court to administer oath only to the interpreter. literal meaning of the interpreter shows that the duty of the interpreter is to explain, whereas the duty of the translator is to give the meaning in another language. in such circumstance one shall take interpreter and translator in different sense as those are. the obligation to administer oath as contained in rule 52 of the criminal rules of practice is only when service of an interpreter is obtained and not when the service of a translator is made use of. there is nothing illegal in sri. narayanan acting only as a translator, without administration of oath.8. pw-1 had spoken to before the court below that his son ganesh had been distributing the day's wages to his other sons and others. it was at that time the accused came to that son and demanded rs. 20/-. the prosecution case was that the accused was demanding 'gunda fees' and that he had been in the habit of levying such fees from the workers. but pw-9 did not support the prosecution case in that regard. he only stated that he demanded rs. 20/- from his son, but his son refused. if he had any intention to rope in the accused unnecessarily, he would have fully supported the prosecution case. that means pw-9 as far as possible supported truth and deposed only what he did really know. according to him there was scuffle between the two. he saw only, as spoken to in the cross-examination, three instances of stabbing; but he was categoric that he did not know whether before those stab injuries were inflicted, any other stabbing had taken place. obviously when there was scuffle, even one sees the incident from very close, it cannot be possible to say how many stabbings had taken place during the scuffle. so the evidence given by pw-9 is natural......

Full Judgment

K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J.

1. The appellant is faced with conviction under Section 304, Part-I, I.P.C. and sentence to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 8 years and imposition of fine of Rs. 10,000/- with a default sentence of two years' imprisonment. The charge was under Section 302, IPC. The Court below found that he was entitled to the benefit of Exception No. 4 to Section 300, IPC. That was why he was found guilty of the offence punishable under Section 304, Part I, I.P.C.

2. Assailing the conviction, it is submitted that, out of the 9 witnesses cited as occurrence witnesses, namely PWs-1 to 9, only PW-9 who was none other than the father of the deceased alone supported the prosecution case. What was available was the sole testimony of PW-9, who is almost an interested witness. Therefore, the trial Court was not justified in convicting the appellant/accused relying on the said sole testimony. It is further submitted that, he had only seen a part of the occurrence. How the occurrence had really happened is not divulged by PW-9. So the genesis of occurrence has not come to light. It is again submitted that, as spoken to by PW-9, two of his other sons had been present on the scene of occurrence but they have not been cited as occurrence witnesses. It is further submitted that Exts. D1(a) to (f) contradictions marked through PW-9 will reveal that he had not spoken consistently with respect to the occurrence, before police and before the Court below. So it is not safe to rely on that sole witnesses to fasten conviction. It is again submitted that he had seen only the accused stabbing thrice. But there are several other injuries on the body of the deceased as evidenced by post-mortem certificate issued by PW-10. So the occurrence is not in tune with the evidence of PW-9.

3. It is again submitted that, PW-9 did not know Malayalam. He was a Tamiliyan, admittedly by the prosecution. He gave evidence before the Court in Tamil. His deposition was written by the Court in Malayalam, availing the service of an interpreter. The interpreter has not been administered oath as required under Rule 52 of the Criminal Rules of Practice. So the evidence of PW-9 cannot be taken note of at all.

4. PW-9 being father of the victim, of course, he will have that much interest. But that does not mean that evidence of such a person shall be rejected always as not cogent and convincing. Merely because other occurrence witnesses like PWs-1 to 7 did not support the prosecution case, it cannot be concluded that PW-9 cannot be relied on, if his evidence reposes confidence in the Court and the Court feels it trustworthy. Therefore, the Court below was perfectly correct when it came to the conclusion that PW-9 the father of the victim can necessarily be believed, if his evidence is convincing.

5. PW-9 was admittedly a Tamiliyan. He did not know Malayalam. Necessarily, if police had recorded his statement it was possible that there may be some variations. The contradictions marked as Exts. D1(a) to D1(f) if we read along with the evidence given by PW-9 as translated in the Court below, it can easily be seen that the alleged contradictions were variations in language and cannot in any way be termed as embellishment or embroideries added by PW-9 later.

6. Of course, his deposition before the Court below was taken down by the Court after it being translated by a senior Advocate of that Court, Mr. Narayanan who did know Tamil. There is no dispute that Mr. Narayanan knows Tamil.

7. Rule 52 of the Criminal Rules of Practice obliges the Court to administer oath to an interpreter. Even though, the Court below termed Mr. Narayanan as interpreter in the deposition as well as in the judgment, really he was not an interpreter. He was only translating what the witness had disclosed to the Court. Rule 52 obliges the Court to administer oath only to the interpreter. Literal meaning of the interpreter shows that the duty of the interpreter is to explain, whereas the duty of the translator is to give the meaning in another language. In such circumstance one shall take interpreter and translator in different sense as those are. The obligation to administer oath as contained in Rule 52 of the Criminal Rules of Practice is only when service of an interpreter is obtained and not when the service of a translator is made use of. There is nothing illegal in Sri. Narayanan acting only as a translator, without administration of oath.

8. PW-1 had spoken to before the Court below that his son Ganesh had been distributing the day's wages to his other sons and others. It was at that time the accused came to that son and demanded Rs. 20/-. The prosecution case was that the accused was demanding 'Gunda fees' and that he had been in the habit of levying such fees from the workers. But PW-9 did not support the prosecution case in that regard. He only stated that he demanded Rs. 20/- from his son, but his son refused. If he had any intention to rope in the accused unnecessarily, he would have fully supported the prosecution case. That means PW-9 as far as possible supported truth and deposed only what he did really know. According to him there was scuffle between the two. He saw only, as spoken to in the cross-examination, three instances of stabbing; but he was categoric that he did not know whether before those stab injuries were inflicted, any other stabbing had taken place. Obviously when there was scuffle, even one sees the incident from very close, it cannot be possible to say how many stabbings had taken place during the scuffle. So the evidence given by PW-9 is natural. When PW-9 was available, the prosecution is not expected to overburden itself by citing further more witnesses including the brothers of the deceased, to speak the same thing. Therefore non-examination of the brothers of the deceased as occurrence witnesses does not adversely affect the prosecution case.

9. Ext. P7 shows that there were several incised injuries on the chest, arm and hip etc. Three of the injuries were on the chest. Of course one was fatal. Thus there was an intention to cause death by stabbing. Otherwise there was no reason for inflicting that much injuries.

10. The evidence of PW-9 is to the effect that accused has come to the deceased demanding Rs. 20/- which really, he was not entitled. In such circumstance he was the real nail for the occurrence. In such circumstances there arises no question of a plea of right of private defence, even from the evidence, if available.

11. Of course if the accused had the intention at the initial stage to cause death of the deceased, when he refused to pay the amount he could have directly stabbed him. But what happened immediately was a scuffle. Consequently, the stabbing would have taken place out of the heat of passion during sudden quarrel. Necessarily, the Court below was perfectly justified in giving the benefit of Exception No. 4 of Section 300 to the accused. The imprisonment ordered is only for 8 years. The fine imposed is only Rs. 10,000/-. Of course, default sentence is too heavy. That shall be reduced to six months. In every other respect order of conviction and sentence is confirmed.

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