V.V. Joseph and Others Vs. Union of India and Others

- [a.n. ray, c.j.,; a. alagiriswami,; h.r. khanna,; k.k. mathew and; p.n. bhagwat, jj.] section 20(3) (b) of the act lays down that the government may, by notification, exempt from the payment of tax any factory which in the opinion of the government, has substantially expanded to the extent of such expansion for a period not exceeding two years from the date of completion of the expansion. the andhra pradesh government took a policy decision to grant exemption from payment of purchase tax to new and expanded sugar factories in the cooperative sector only due to present financial position of the government. in pursuance of the said policy, the exemption was granted for one year from the payment of tax to the cooperative societies of growers of sugarcane. the benefit of the exemption was refused to the appellant and other joint stock companies running the sugar factories. on behalf of the appellant it was contended that the government could not by laying down a policy to exempt only cooperative sugar factories fetter their hands from examining the merits of each individual case. it was also contended that the policy behind sec. 21(3) being to encourage new sugar facto- ries or expanded factories the government could not refuse to consider all except one class, that is, the cooperative sugar factories, for the purpose of granting exemption. it was further urged that new sugar factories aid expanded sugar factories all fall into one class and there is nothing particular or special about cooperative sugar factories justifying their treatment as a special class deserving a special treatment. the state of andhra pradesh contended that it had full discretion to decide the policy in granting the exemption and that cooperative sugar factories consisting of cane growers is a distinct category justifying their treatment as a class separate from other sugar factories. on facts it was asserted by the state that the exemption was granted only to new cooperative sugar..........they have come to this court by a petition under article 32, contending that the said judgment is not binding on them since they were not impleaded as parties therein.4. we have heard mr. vaidyanathan at considerable length. having regard to the fact and circumstances of this case, we do not find ourselves in a position to agree with him. the union of india and the officers representing the department had placed all relevant circumstances before the high court and again before this court, but could not succeed. the interpretation which was put on the afore mentioned order on 4-8-1977 and the rule enunciated thereon applied to all the present parties including the respondent no. 4 in the same way. if the ground raised on behalf of the petitioners is allowed to be raised for decision on merits, a piquant situation will arise so far the service is concerned and union of india and its officers will not be able to know the correct position in this regard. the stand that the union of india took in the earlier litigation was the same as that of the petitioners today, and it had been contested seriously up to the supreme court stage. the plea raised by mr. vaidyanathan on behalf of the petitioners that the petitioners did not have any information about the earlier litigation, does not appear to be convincing. several paragraphs of the writ petition were placed by the learned counsel before us, repeatedly stating that no notice of the case was sent to them, and that after the impugned order implementing the judgment was passed, they had collected the details.5. after examining all the circumstances we do not agree with the petitioners that they had no information of the litigation at all. it appears that they were satisfied by the stand of the union of india taken in their favour and in pursuing the matter from stage to stage. the union of india, therefore, should in the present case, be deemed to have represented the petitioners interest and the judgment cannot now be.....