Jagdish Vs. State of Rajasthan

.....to the matrimonial home and that the petitioner did not by his or her action by word or conduct provide a just cause to the other spouse to desist from, making any attempt at reconciliation or resuming cohabitation; -but where, however, on the facts it is clear that the conduct of the deserted spouse has had no such effect on the mind of the deserting spouse there is no rule of law that desertion ter- minates by reason of the conduct of the deserted spouse. an offer to return to the matrimonial home after sometime, though desertion had started, if genuine and sincere and represented his or her true feelings and intention, would bring to an end the desertion because thereafter the animus deserendi would be' lacking, though the factum of separation might continue; but on the other hand, if the offer was not sincere and there was in reality no intention to return, the mere fact that letters were written expressing such an intention would not interrupt the desertion from continuing. bipin chander laisinghbhai shah v. prabhawati,[1956] s.c.r, 838, dunn v. dunn, [1948] 2 all e.r. 822 and brewer v. brewer [1961] 3 all e.r. 957, relied on. the parties were married in 1946 at hyderabad in sind (now in pakistan) and a child, a son, was born in 1947. the married life of the couple was not as harmonious as it should have been and it soon transpired that much of the trouble arose out of the fact that while the appellant and his parents appear to have been of an orthodox and conservative outlook and bent of mind the respondent and her parents apparently did not set much store by orthodoxy and were liberal and modern. as a result of the partition in 1947 the parties had to leave sind. the appellant and his parents stayed in a house in bombay, while the respondent's parents went to poona. the appellant's complaint was that the respondent was frequently going away to her parent's house. on february 26, 1954, the respondent left' the appellant's house and went to poona. the.....fazal ali, j.1. in this appeal under the supreme court (enlargement of criminal appellate jurisdiction), act, the appellant was convicted along with other accused by the sessions judge under section 304 pt. 1 read with section 34 of the i.p.c. and sentenced to five years r.i. the state filed an appeal to the high court against the acquittal of the appellant under section 302 i.p.c. and other accused. the high court while allowing the appeal of other accused also allowed the appeal of the state against the appellant jagdish and set aside his acquittal under section 302 i.p.c. and convicted him under section 302 i.p.c. and sentenced him to life imprisonment. we have gone through the judgment of the high court which has given cogent reasons for holding that the trial court judge was absolutely wrong in acquitting the appellant of the charge under section 302 i.p.c. the injuries found on the deceased were very severe which resulted in fracture of the scalp on the left perietal bone and also a fracture of the temporal bone. these were the two injuries which according to the prosecution were the cause of the death of the deceased jairam. the sessions judge was of the opinion that as some of the accused persons had also injuries it was a case of mutual assault and therefore, there was no intention to cause murder. the high court has rightly pointed out that the findings of the sessions judge are hot based on a proper appreciation of the evidence. it is true that the accused had some injuries on their persons. the injuries on their persons were extremely superficial and could be easily explained. as regards. nanda, it is true that he had five injuries out of which two are contused wounds. it was the evidence of d.w. 1 that he examined the injuries on 25.6.67 i.e. two to four days after the occurence. it has not been proved that all the injuries sustained by him were sustained in the course of altercation which resulted in the death of the deceased, so as to lay the burden.....