Ramjit and Others Vs. Ramadevi and Others

.....public purpose. the validity of s. 7 of the amending act was challenged on the ground' that it contravened art. 31(2) inasmuch as it makes acquisition for a company before july 20, 1962 as being for a public purpose even though it may not be so in fact. section 7 was also challenged on the ground that it contravenes art. 14 inasmuch as it makes an unreasonable discrimination in the matter of acquisition for a company before july 20, 1962 and after that date insofar as the former acquisitions are validated on the basis of their being deemed to be for a public purpose while the latter acquisitions are not so deemed and have to satisfy the test of public purpose. held (per p. b. gajendragadkar, c.j., k. n. wanchoo, k. c. das gupta and j. c. shah jj.): (i) if the language of a provision of law is capable of only one construction and if according to that construction the provision contravenes a constitutional provision it must be struck down. a literal interpretation is not always the only interpretation of a provision in a statute and the court has to look at the setting in which the words are used and the circumstances in which the law came to be passed to decide whether there is something implicit behind the words actually used which would control the literal meaning of the words used. the mysore state electricity board v. bangalore woollen, cotton ,and silk mills, [1963] supp. 2 s.c.r. 127; followed. (ii) it is well settled that if certain provisions of law construed in one way will be consistent with the constitution and if another interpretation would render them unconstitutional the court would bear in favour of the former construction. kedar nath singh v. state of bihar, [1962] supp. 2 s.c.r. 769, followed. 134-159 s.c.-50 (iii) applying the above principles of construction it cannot be paid that s. 40(aa) contravenes art. 31(2) for the public purpose required therein is present where land is acquired for the construction of a building or work which must..........court when the special leave was granted. according to him his brief has been lost and he has reconstituted his record; therefore, he is not in a position to produce original certified copy and a photostat copy has now been produced.2. in case the certified copy of the judgment as claimed was taken there would be material available to establish the fact. order sheet of the case between july and december, 1974 had not been traced. it is the stand of the appellant that petition for substitution has remained undisposed of. the high court during the pendency of the writ petition by interim direction had required the trial court to dispose of the pending substitution petition but on the plea that same was not available and perhaps had not been filed the direction of the high court was not implemented. the allegation is that the papers have been lost in the court. it is the paramount duty of the court to ensure that no prejudice is caused to the litigating parties on account of some lapse on its part. we, therefore, are not satisfied that the appellant's claim had been properly dealt with. we set aside the order of the high court and remit the matter to it with the direction that the high court while retaining writ petition on its record may direct an inquiry to be instituted either by the district judge or by the trial court as to the fact of filing of the substitution petition. both parties should be given full opportunity to place their claims as to the filing of that matter. a lot of time has been lost and mrs. rani chhabra is justified in making the demand that the fruits of the decree have yet not been made available to the respondents; we, therefore, direct, the high court to ensure the disposal on or before 21-12-1990.3. status quo as ordered shall continue for two months with liberty to the appellant to apply to the high court for further directions. no costs.