Full Judgment
V.M. Jain, J.
1. This is a petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C. filed by the accused petitioners, seeking quashment of the criminal complaint, copy Annexure P2 and the summoning order dated 15-5-1995, copy Annexure P3, passed by the learned Magistrate ordering summoning of the present petitioners as accused for the offences under Sections 182, 466, 467, 468, 471, 120 read with Section 120B, IPC in the criminal complaint filed by complainant respondent Iqbal Singh, to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court.
2. In the petition it was alleged by the accused-petitioners that Balwinder Singh, petitioner No. 2, lodged FIR No. 48 dated 28-6-1992 under Sections 336, 379, 447, 148, 149 IPC, in PS KotBhai, Distt. Faridkot, against Gurcharan Singh and 4 others, including complainant respondent Iqbal Singh. It was alleged that accused in the said FIR were tried by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, for the offences under Sections 148, 452, 395 IPC but all the accused in the said FIR were acquitted by the Addl. Sessions Judge, vide order dated 10-2-1995, copy Annexure PI. It was alleged that while acquitting the accused in the said FIR, learned Addl. Sessions Judge had made a reference that the receipt Exhibit P8 produced by Balwinder Singh, during investigation in the said case, arising out of the said FIR, was fabricated. It was alleged that without filing any application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. for initiating proceedings against the present petitioners about the said receipt, being forged, complainant respondent namely Iqbal Singh filed criminal complaint, copy Annexure P2, in the court of Judicial Magistrate and after recording preliminary evidence the learned Judicial Magistrate, vide order dated 15-5-1995, copy Annexure P3, ordered summoning of the petitioners besides ASI Gurpal Singh (who had investigated the case arising out the aforesaid FIR), as accused for the aforesaid offences. It was alleged that under Section 195(1)(a)(i), Cr.P.C. (wrongly mentioned as IPC), no court could take cognizance of any offence which would be under Sections 172 to 188 IPC, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned. It was further alleged that under Section 195(1)(b)(ii), Cr.P.C, no court could take cognizance of any offence described in Section 463 or punishable under Sections 461, 475 or 476 IPC, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court, except on the complaint in writing of that court. It was alleged that since the aforesaid receipt in question was produced before the I.O. and used as evidence in the court during trial of the criminal case, the prosecution except on the complaint of the court concerned was not maintainable. It was accordingly prayed that the criminal complaint, summoning order and all subsequent proceedings taken thereon be quashed.
3. In the written reply filed by complainant-respondent Iqbal Singh, it was alleged that the present petition was not maintainable in this court. It was alleged that Balwinder Singh, petitioner had lodged a false FIR against the complainant-respondent and that he was rightly acquitted by the Addl. Sessions Judge. It was alleged that the provisions of Section 340, Cr.P.C. were not applicable to the present case. It was alleged that provisions of Section 195(1)(a)(i) and 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C, were not applicable to the facts of the present case, as there is nothing to show that the alleged forgery was committed while the document was in the custody of the court. It was accordingly prayed that the petition be dismissed.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record carefully.
5. Learned counsel for the accused-petitioners has submitted before me that since the criminal complaint is in respect of a document which was produced in the court and was found to be forged, only the court concerned could file a complaint in view of the provisions of Section 340 Cr.P.C. read with Section 195 Cr.P.C Reliance has been placed on the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported as Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh (1996) 3 Rec Cri CR 240 : 1996 Cri LJ 2304.
6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted before me that since the aforesaid receipt was not forged, after it was produced in the court, but was produced in the court after it had been forged, provisions of Section 195, Cr.P.C. and Section 340 Cr.P.C. would have no application to the facts of the present cased (case). Reliance was placed on the law laid down by this court, in the case reported as Madan Lal Sharma v. Punjab and Haryana High Court (1999) 2 Rec Cri 223.
7. As referred to above, in the present case, it is not the case of the complainantrespondent that the alleged receipt, which was stated to be a forged receipt, was forged after it was produced in the court. On the other hand, the case of the complainant-respondent is that the aforesaid receipt was produced before the police during investigation of the aforesaid FIR and it was produced in the court with the challan and since the receipt in question was a forged document, various offences had been committed in this case and accordingly the complainant had filed the criminal complaint in the court of Judicial Magistrate against the accused-petitioners.
8. In Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar (1998) 2 SCC 493 : 1998 Cri LJ 1565 the question before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was as under (para 1) :-
Can prosecution be maintained in respect of a forged document produced in court unless complaint has been filed by the court concerned in that behalf? In other words, the question involved in this appeal is, whether the provision contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (for short the 'Code'), would apply to such prosecution.
9. In the reported case, the complaint was filed by the complainant in the court of CJM, alleging offences, inter alia under Sections 468, 469, 471 IPC, on the facts that the appellants had forged a document and produced it in the court of the Executive Magistrate, which was dealing with the proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C. While considering this matter, it was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as under (paras 7, 8 and 9) :-
A reading of the Clause (195 (i) (b) (ii)) reveals two main postulates for operation of the bar mentioned there. First is, there must be allegation that an offence (it should be either an offence described in Section 463 or any other offence punishable under Sections 471, 475, 476 of the IPC) has been committed. Second is that such offence should have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceedings in any court. There is no dispute before us that if forgery has been committed while the document was in the custody of a court, then prosecution can be launched only with a complaint made by that court. There is also no dispute that if forgery was committed with a document which has not been produced in a court, then the prosecution would lie at the instance of any person. If so, will its production in a court make all the difference?
Even if the Clause is capable of two inter pretations, we are inclined to choose the narrower interpretation for obvious reasons. Section 190 of the Code empowers, 'any Magistrate of the 1st Class' to take cognizance of 'any offence' upon receiving a complaint or police report or information or upon his own knowledge. Section 195 restricts such general powers of the Magistrate and general right of a person to move the court with a complaint is to that extent curtailed. It is a well-recognized canon of interpretation that provision curbing the general jurisdiction of the court must normally receive strict interpretation unless the statute or context requires otherwise (Abdul Wahid Khan v. Bhawani AIR 1966 SC 1718).
That apart it is difficult to interpret Section 195(1)(b)(ii) as containing a bar against initiation of prosecution proceedings merely because the document concerned was produced in a court albeit the act of forgery was perpetrated prior to its production in the court. Any such construction is likely to ensue unsavoury consequences. For instance, if rank forgery of a valuable document is detected and the forgerer is sure that he would imminently be embroiled in prosecution proceedings he can simply get that document produced in any long-drawn litigation which was either instituted by himself or by somebody else who can be influenced by him and thereby pre-empt the prosecution for the entire long period of pendency of that litigation. It is a settled proposition that if the language of a legislation is capable of more than one interpretation, the one which is capable of causing mischievous consequences should be averted.... The Clause which we are now considering contains enough indication to show that more natural meaning is that which leans in favour of a strict construction and hence the aforesaid observation is eminently applicable here.
10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had placed reliance on the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case reported as Laljibhai Somabhai v. State of Gujarat (1971) 2 SCC 376 : 1971 Cri LJ 1437 as also the law laid down in the cases reported as Raghunath v. State of U. P. (1973) 1 SCC 564 : 1973 Cri LJ 858, Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan (1974) 3 SCC 628 : 1974 Cri LJ 350 and Legal Remembrancer of Govt. of West Bengal v. Haridas Mundra (1976) 1 SCC 555 : 1976 Cri LJ 1732. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also upheld the law laid down by a Full Bench of this Court, reported as Harbans Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1987 Punj & Har 19 : 1986 Cri LJ 1834. After discussing the entire matter, it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as under para 24 of 1998 Cri LJ 1565 :-
The sequitur of the above discussion is that the bar contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) is not applicable to a case where forgery of the document was committed before the document was produced in a court.
The authority (1996) 3 Rec Cri R 240 : 1996 Cri LJ 2304 (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the accused-petitioners, in my opinion, would have no application to the facts of the present case, in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sachida Nand Singh's case 1998 Cri LJ 1565 (supra). The point for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was as to whether the criminal court is debarred from proceeding with the private complaint laid against the appellants for offences punishable under Sections 468, 471 read with Section 120B, IPC with the allegations that the appellants had conspired and fabricated an agreement and forged the signatures of Smt. Dalip Kaur and on the basis thereof they attempted to claim retention of the possession of the remaining part of the house. The Magistrate after examining preliminary evidence ordered the issuance of process summoning the appellants as accused in the said complaint. Subsequently, the accused appellants filed a civil suit for injunction to restrain Smt. Dalip Kaur from interfering in the possession of the appellants and also produced the agreement which was allegedly executed and signed by Smt. Dalip Kaur. Thereafter, the accused-appellant filed an application to quash the criminal complaint on the ground of bar under Section 195, Cr.P.C. The Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering various aspects of the matter found that in the said case the criminal court had taken the cognizance earlier while the original document was produced in civil court later. Under these circumstances, it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that since cognizance was already taken before the filing of the document before the civil court, the High Court was right in directing that the Magistrate would be at liberty to proceed with the trial of the criminal case. The law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in this authority thus would be of no help to the accused-petitioners in this case.
11. In (1992) 2 Rec Cri R 223 (supra), the Hon'ble Full Bench of this court (consisting of five Hon'ble Judges) had observed that the law laid down by a Full Bench of this court, in Harbans Singh's case 1986 Cri LJ 1834 (supra), had been approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Sachida Nand Singh's case 1998 Cri LJ 1565 (supra),
12. In the present case, as referred to above, since the document in question was allegedly forged before the said document was produced in the court, the bar contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii), Cr.P.C. would have no application. That being so, the learned trial Magistrate was justified in passing the summoning order against the accused-petitioners.
13. No other point has been raised in this petition.
14. In view of my detailed discussion above finding no merit in this petition the same is dismissed.
15. Since the proceedings before the trial Court were stayed by this Court, vide order dated 7-8-1995, parties through their counsel are directed to appear before the trial court on 14-12-2001 for further proceedings in accordance with law.