Full Judgment
M.M. Kumar, J.
1. This petition filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity the Code) is directed against the order dated 5-2-2001 passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Chandigarh dismissing the application of the defendant-petitioner in which he has claimed that the plaintiff-respondent was under a legal obligation to deposit Court-fee as required by Section 7(i) of the Court-fees Act, 1870 (for brevity the 1870 Act) and, therefore while dismissing the application has held that the judgment of this Court in the case of Hem Raj v. Harchet Singh, 1993 Civil Court Case 48 applies to the controversy raised and dismissed the application of the defendant-petitioner.
2. I have heard Shri K.K. Gupta, learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner who has argued that perusal of Section 7 of the 1870 Act would show that only in cases covered by Sub-section (iv) of Section 7 liberty has been given to the plaintiff to value his claim for the purposes of Court-fee. According to the learned counsel no such liberty is avail able in respect of Clauses (i) to (iii) of Section 7 of the Act. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has placed reliance on a judgment delivered by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of S. Rm. Ar. S. Sp. Sathappa Chettiar v. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramariathan Chettiar. AIR 1958 SC 245 and another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Commercial Avitation and Travel Company v. Mrs. Vimla Pannalal, AIR 1988 SC 1636. The learned counsel has pointed out that the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent is covered by Clause (i) of Section 7 of the Act as damages or compensation in lieu of maligning his reputation to the tune of Rs. two lacs have been claimed. Learned counsel has also pointed out that the view taken in Hem Raj's case (supra) is not the correct view and is, therefore, liable to be reconsidered.
3. Shri Anuj Arora, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has argued that the question concerning the Court-fee is a lis between the plaintiff and the State and the Court has the power to allow the plaintiff to pay the Court-fee at any stage. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has placed reliance on a Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Ram Niwas v. Rakesh Kumar, (1982) 84 Pun LR 9 : (AIR 1981 Punj & Har 397) and a judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Khema v. Bhagwan, 1996 (2) Recent Revenue Reports 56 : (AIR 1995 Raj 94). The learned counsel has further pointed out that such an objection could be raised in a suit filed before the Court of limited jurisdiction but in a suit filed in a Court of unlimited jurisdiction valuation disclosed by the plaintiff should be taken as correct. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sujir Keshav Nayak v. Sujir Ganesh Nayak, 1992 (1) Recent Revenue Reports 172 : (AIR 1992 SC 1526).
4. I have thoughtfully considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and am of the view that the present revision petition is liable to be dismissed because under Section 7(1) to (iii) of the 1870 Act only those cases are covered where it is possible to reach the correct valuation of the relevant suit. In cases where even the Court is unable to evaluate the relief sought, the valuation put by the plaintiff shall be considered tentative. There is no bar on the Court to direct the plaintiff under Section 149 of the Code to pay the Court-fee in order to enjoy the relief granted. It is also true that the Court-fee is a matter between the plaintiff and the State. These principles have been amply supported by the judgment of this Court in Hem Raj's case (1993 Civil Court Cas 48) (supra) where judgments of the Supreme Court in Vimla Pannalal's Case (AIR 1988 SC 1636) and S. Km. Ar. S. Sp. Sathappa Chettiar's case (AIR 1958 SC 245) (supra) have been considered and relied upon. Even the Full Bench of this Court has taken the view that the plaintiff can be directed later on to pay the Court-fee as the Court may assess after granting the relief.
6. The facts of the present case as revealed in the instant petition are that the plaintiff-respondent has filed a suit for damages and compensation against the defendant-petitioner alleging that when he was posted as Assistant Store Keeper in the Medical Store of the Super Bazar in P.G.I. Chandigarh certain serious complaints were made against the plaintiff-respondent and the plaintiff-respondent was transferred from the medicine shop. He challenged his transfer order in which it was found that the complaint filed by the defendant-petitioner alleging that he used water in bottles which use to be sold as medicine. The complaint filed by the defendant-petitioner has been found to be false. Basing his claim on the aforementioned conclusion the plaintiff-respondent filed a suit claiming damages for maligning his reputation by the defendant-petitioner and he affixed the Court-fee of Rs. 50/-. It is, therefore, evident that no valuation at this stage would be possible in sure and certain terms. Therefore, in such like cases, this Court in Hem Raj's case (supra) has held that the valuation offered by the plaintiff has to be accepted because even the Court would not be able to assess the value and issue directions to the plaintiff to do the needful. It was in these circumstances that in Hem Raj's case (1993 Civil Court Cas 48) (supra), this Court has held as under :
'Coming to the third point, the law is fairly well settled that if the Court is itself unable to say what the correct valuation of the relief is, it cannot require the plaintiff to correct the valuation that has been made by him. In such a case the Court has no other alternative than to accept the plaintiffs valuation tentatively. In Commercial Aviation and Travel Company v. Mrs. Vimla Pannalal, AIR 1988 SC 1636 their Lordships referred to a Five Judge Bench decision in S. Rrn. Ar. S. Sp. Sathappa Chettiar v. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar, AIR 1958 SC 245 at Pp. 251-52 and extracted the relevant observations, part of which are as under :
If the scheme laid down for the computation of fees payable in suits covered by the several sub-sections of Section 7 is considered it would be clear that in respect of suits falling under Sub-section (iv) a departure has been made and liberty has been given to the plaintiff to value his claim for the purposes of Court-fees. The theoretical basis of this provision appears to be that in cases in which the plaintiff is given the option to allow his claim, it is really difficult to value the claim within any precision or definiteness. ....' The same view has been reiterated in various decisions of the Apex Court up to the recent decision in Sujir Keshav Nayak's case (AIR 1992 SC 1526) (supra), Mr. J.C. Nagpal learned counsel for the respondents, submitted that the various authorities cited by Mr. Chopra related to cases of rendition of accounts. He submitted that in suits relation to rendition of accounts the statute itself expressly gave power to the plaintiff to value the relief which he claims. He further pointed out that there was no such enabling provision insofar as suit for the recovery of compensation/damages falling in Section 7(1)(b) of the Court-fees Act was concerned. In my view, this is a distinction without a difference. In the case of the amount of compensation, there is no objective standard available which can help determine the amount for which the plaintiff has to value the relief claimed by him. In the nature of things, the valuation put by the plaintiff is tentative and in view of the settled position of law, the same cannot be disputed. It will be further seen that the decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. Tara Devi v. Sri Thakur Radha Krishna Maharaj, AIR 1987 SC 2085 related to the question of Court-fee payable under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act and in Gopala Krishna Pillai v. Meenakshi Ayal, AIR 1967 SC 155 the question related to recovery of mesne profits and in both these instances the suits related to suits other than one for rendition of accounts.'
6. The argument of the learned counsel that the judgment in Hem Raj's case (1993 Civil Court Cas 48) (supra) requires reconsideration has not impressed me because an exception has been carved out after reference to the various judgments of the Supreme Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the defendant-petitioner namely that in cases where the correct valuation and the relief cannot be assessed, the valuation given by the plaintiff shall be accepted tentatively. Therefore, I do not find any valid ground to make a reference for reconsideration of the judgment in Hem Raj's case (supra).
For the reasons recorded above, this petition fails and the same is dismissed.