Gram Panchayat Vs. Narinder Kumar

.....statutory provisions or public duty, judicial review of such state action is inevitable. likewise, if state enters into a contract in consonance with article 299 rights of the parties shall be determined by terms of such contract irrespective of fact that one of the parties to it is a state or a statutory authority. for these precise reasons the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel has been made applicable against the government, as against any other private individual, even in cases where no valid contract in terms of article 299 was entered into between the parties. hence, if government makes a representation or a promise and an individual alters his position by acting upon such promise, the government may be required to make good that promise and shall not be allowed to fall back upon the formal defect in the contract, though subject to well known limitations like larger public interest. the state, thus, has no dominus status to dictate unilateral terms and conditions when it enters into contract and its actions must be reasonable, fair and just and in consonance with rule of law. as a necessary corollary thereto state cannot refuse to confirm highest bid without assigning any valid reason and/or by giving erratic, irrational or irrelevant reasons. -- consumer protection act, 1986 [c.a. no. 68/1986]. articles 14 & 300a: government contract noon-acceptance of highest bid held, it does not result in taking away right to property of highest bidder highest bid, per se, unless it is accepted by competent authority, and consequential sale certificate is issued, does not grant the highest bidder right to property of type which is protected under article 300a right to property is limited to confer highest bidder the right to challenge action of appropriate authority in refusing to accept highest or other bids. [air 1984 p&h 282 (fb) explained] articles 14 & 226: government contract rejection of highest bid held, highest bidder has locus standi to..........learned trial court. he submits that the learned lower appellate court could interfere in the order passed by the learned trial court only if the lower appellate court had come to the conclusion that the learned trial court had acted arbitrarily or perversely or capriciously or in disregard of sound legal principles or without considering all relevant records. in support of his submission, the learned counsel has placed reliance on two judgments of this court in guru nanak educational trust (regd.) v. balbir singh, (1995-2) 110 p.l.r. 625 and maman chand v. smt. kamla, 1995 p.l.j. 508.3. mr. bhag singh, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents could not satisfy me as admittedly the learned lower appellate court has not given any valid reason for setting aside the order passed by the learned trial court. in view of these facts i am of the opinion that the impugned order dated 12.8.1997 cannot be sustained. accordingly the petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 12.8.1997 is set aside and the matter is remanded to learned district judge, ambala to pass a reasoned order after hearing both the parties and keeping in view the law laid down by this court in the judgments of guru nanak's case and maman chand's case (supra); parties are, however, left to bear their own costs. the parties are directed to appear before the learned district judge on 27.1.1998.