Tata Chemicals Ltd. Vs. Stepan Chemicals Ltd. and anr.

- sections 80 (2) & 89 & punjab motor vehicles rules, 1989, rules 85 & 80: [t.s. thakur, cj, jasbir singh & surya kant, jj] appeal against orders of state or regional transport authority imitation held, a stipulation regarding the period of limitation available for invoking the remedy shall have to be strictly construed. that is because any provision by way of limitation is in the nature of a restraint on the remedy provided under the act. so viewed two inferences are clear viz., (1) sections 80 and 89 of the act read with rule 85 of the rules make it obligatory for the authorities making the order to communicate it to the applicant concerned and (2) the period of limitation for any appeal against the order is reckonable from the date of such communication of the reasons would imply communication of a copy of the written order itself, a party who knows about the making of an order cannot ignore the same and allow grass to grow under its feet and do nothing except waiting for a formal communication of the order or to choose a tenuous plea that even though he knew about the order, he was waiting for its formal communication to seek redress against the same in appeal. if a party does not know about the making of the order either actually or constructively it may claim that the period of limitation would start running from the date it acquires knowledge of the making of an order but one cannot understand how a party, who has acquired knowledge of the making an order either directly or constructively can ignore the same and belatedly seek redress just because the authority making the order had made a default in formally communicating the order to him. allowing a party to do so would amount to placing a premium on the lack of diligence of a party, who is remiss in seeking a remedy that was available to it. therefore, knowledge whether actual or construction of the order passed by the state or regional transport authority should result in commencement of the period of..........8 of 1983, was revived.2. the prayer has been opposed by learned counsel for the respondents on the sole ground that the permission could be granted prior to the disposal of the main petition and once it has been dismissed, the court has become functus officio and has no jurisdiction to pass any order in the present petition. the contention is wholly misconceived. permission under rule 101 of the companies (court) rules, 1959, can be granted when the petitioner in the main petition consents to withdraw the same or to allow it to be dismissed. the words 'allow it to be dismissed' clearly envisage that another creditor can be allowed to be substituted and pursue the petition even after it has been got dismissed by the main petitioner.3. the matter can be looked at from another angle also. in the present case, the company judge has allowed the petition. at the appellate stage, the present petitioner was not made a party and the petition was dismissed on an agreement of the parties to the appeal. although the present application was pending, the present petitioner got no opportunity to seek permission to pursue the main petition at the time when the same was allowed to be dismissed. if the provisions of rule 101 are interpreted in the manner suggested by learned counsel for the respondents, then the petition, like the present one, would always be rendered infructuous by adopting a similar course as was done in the present case. i am, therefore, of the view that the cause of action would be available to the petitioner even after the earlier petition has already been dismissed at the behest of the main petitioner.4. for the reasons recorded above, this application is allowed and the petitioners are substituted as creditors in the main petition. the petitioner is directed to file the amended petition before january 31, 1986. no costs.