Devinder Kaur Vs. Amarjit Singh

- sections 80 (2) & 89 & punjab motor vehicles rules, 1989, rules 85 & 80: [t.s. thakur, cj, jasbir singh & surya kant, jj] appeal against orders of state or regional transport authority imitation held, a stipulation regarding the period of limitation available for invoking the remedy shall have to be strictly construed. that is because any provision by way of limitation is in the nature of a restraint on the remedy provided under the act. so viewed two inferences are clear viz., (1) sections 80 and 89 of the act read with rule 85 of the rules make it obligatory for the authorities making the order to communicate it to the applicant concerned and (2) the period of limitation for any appeal against the order is reckonable from the date of such communication of the reasons would imply communication of a copy of the written order itself, a party who knows about the making of an order cannot ignore the same and allow grass to grow under its feet and do nothing except waiting for a formal communication of the order or to choose a tenuous plea that even though he knew about the order, he was waiting for its formal communication to seek redress against the same in appeal. if a party does not know about the making of the order either actually or constructively it may claim that the period of limitation would start running from the date it acquires knowledge of the making of an order but one cannot understand how a party, who has acquired knowledge of the making an order either directly or constructively can ignore the same and belatedly seek redress just because the authority making the order had made a default in formally communicating the order to him. allowing a party to do so would amount to placing a premium on the lack of diligence of a party, who is remiss in seeking a remedy that was available to it. therefore, knowledge whether actual or construction of the order passed by the state or regional transport authority should result in commencement of the period of..........aggrieved with the same, the wife has preferred this appeal.3. the main contention of mr. khunger, learned counsel for the appellant is that at one stage the appellant had brought two witnesses. they were not examined. he further submitted that if one opportunity is given, the wife would produce her evidence at her own responsibility. having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, i agree with the submission made above. it will be in the interest of justice if the appellant-wife is given a reasonable opportunity of producing the evidence at her own responsibility. no costs are being awarded because it is at the instance of the wife that the case is being re-opened and the facts do not justify burdening her with any costs at this stage. accordingly, the judgment and decree dated january 11, 1988, are set aside and the case remitted to the trial court for granting a reasonable opportunity of producing the evidence to the appellant. the appellant will honour the undertaking made by her learned counsel in this court. thereafter, the case will be decided according to law. as the matter is hanging fire for a long time, it is further directed that the trial court shall re-decide the matter according to law within six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. parties through their counsel are directed to appear in the trial court on august 24, 1993 for further proceedings. both the parties are directed to co-operate in the expeditious disposal of the matter.4. mr. khunger has brought to my notice that according to order dated december 14, 1988, passed in the appeal, the husband was required to pay rs. 1,500/- as litigation expenses to the wife, which have not been paid so far. if that is so, the amount shall be paid in the trial court on a date to be fixed for the purpose by the trial court.5. the appeal is disposed of in these terms.