Paramjit Singh and ors. Vs. State of Haryana and ors.

- sections 80 (2) & 89 & punjab motor vehicles rules, 1989, rules 85 & 80: [t.s. thakur, cj, jasbir singh & surya kant, jj] appeal against orders of state or regional transport authority imitation held, a stipulation regarding the period of limitation available for invoking the remedy shall have to be strictly construed. that is because any provision by way of limitation is in the nature of a restraint on the remedy provided under the act. so viewed two inferences are clear viz., (1) sections 80 and 89 of the act read with rule 85 of the rules make it obligatory for the authorities making the order to communicate it to the applicant concerned and (2) the period of limitation for any appeal against the order is reckonable from the date of such communication of the reasons would imply communication of a copy of the written order itself, a party who knows about the making of an order cannot ignore the same and allow grass to grow under its feet and do nothing except waiting for a formal communication of the order or to choose a tenuous plea that even though he knew about the order, he was waiting for its formal communication to seek redress against the same in appeal. if a party does not know about the making of the order either actually or constructively it may claim that the period of limitation would start running from the date it acquires knowledge of the making of an order but one cannot understand how a party, who has acquired knowledge of the making an order either directly or constructively can ignore the same and belatedly seek redress just because the authority making the order had made a default in formally communicating the order to him. allowing a party to do so would amount to placing a premium on the lack of diligence of a party, who is remiss in seeking a remedy that was available to it. therefore, knowledge whether actual or construction of the order passed by the state or regional transport authority should result in commencement of the period of..........filed against the petitioners, they had been appearing on each and every date fixed before the trial court and as on account of the compromise, no one was interested in prosecuting the case, the present petition has been filed.2. on behalf of respondent no. 1, reply had been filed in which though the factum of the parties having compromised the matter is admitted, it was sought to be urged that the case is not one in which the proceedings initiated against the petitioners should be quashed,3. i have heard mr. yogesh goel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, mr. vijay dahiya, assistant advocate general, haryana appearing on behalf of respondent no. 1 and respondent no. 3 appearing in person.4. the present case against the petitioners arose out of a dispute which arose between paramjit singh and madhu bala who after their marriage were not able to live in harmony with one another. it is not disputed before me that the articles of dowry have since been returned and the parties have compromised all disputes that existed between them through an agreement executed on 6.7.1997. after the compromise the respondents do not seem to be interested in prosecuting the case and that is why no progress is being made therein. it is probably on account of this that the petitioners have sought the intervention of this court and since the factum of the compromise is not disputed by the state and admitted in the affidavit filed on behalf of respondent nos. 2 and 3, who have also indicated therein that they have no objection if the petition is allowed, there is no possibility of any witness coming to depose in favour of the stand put forth in the f.i.r. and therefore, the continuance of the proceedings any further cannot be justified.6. taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case, i feel that the proceedings initiated on the basis of f.i.r. no. 476 dated 22.11.1994, deserves to be quashed. ordered accordingly.