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Dharamvir Singh Vs. State

Dharamvir Singh vs State

Type Court Judgment Court Punjab and Haryana Decided Oct 21, 1974
~4 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/619319

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Citation
Court
Punjab and Haryana High Court
Judge
Decided On
Subject
Criminal

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- Sections 80 (2) & 89 & Punjab Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, Rules 85 & 80: [T.S. Thakur, CJ, Jasbir Singh & Surya Kant, JJ] Appeal against orders of State or Regional Transport authority imitation Held, A stipulation regarding the period of limitation available for invoking the remedy shall have to be strictly con...

Key legal issue
Criminal

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Dharamvir Singh

Respondent

State

Legal References

Cases Referred
John v. The State of Kerala
Reported In
1975CriLJ884

Excerpt

- sections 80 (2) & 89 & punjab motor vehicles rules, 1989, rules 85 & 80: [t.s. thakur, cj, jasbir singh & surya kant, jj] appeal against orders of state or regional transport authority imitation held, a stipulation regarding the period of limitation available for invoking the remedy shall have to be strictly construed. that is because any provision by way of limitation is in the nature of a restraint on the remedy provided under the act. so viewed two inferences are clear viz., (1) sections 80 and 89 of the act read with rule 85 of the rules make it obligatory for the authorities making the order to communicate it to the applicant concerned and (2) the period of limitation for any appeal against the order is reckonable from the date of such communication of the reasons would imply communication of a copy of the written order itself, a party who knows about the making of an order cannot ignore the same and allow grass to grow under its feet and do nothing except waiting for a formal communication of the order or to choose a tenuous plea that even though he knew about the order, he was waiting for its formal communication to seek redress against the same in appeal. if a party does not know about the making of the order either actually or constructively it may claim that the period of limitation would start running from the date it acquires knowledge of the making of an order but one cannot understand how a party, who has acquired knowledge of the making an order either directly or constructively can ignore the same and belatedly seek redress just because the authority making the order had made a default in formally communicating the order to him. allowing a party to do so would amount to placing a premium on the lack of diligence of a party, who is remiss in seeking a remedy that was available to it. therefore, knowledge whether actual or construction of the order passed by the state or regional transport authority should result in commencement of the period of..........rama-swamy nadar : air1970 mad85 ; gulzar khan's case (supra) was noticed but it was not followed. similarly kathi kalu oghad's case was referred and was distinguished. in this case, para. 10. kathi kalu oghad's case (supra), was reproduced in extenso. in para. 14, which contains the facts of that case. the learned judge of the madras high court observed at p. 89 of air : (at p. 258 of cri. l. j.)-nowhere in this passage we find that section 73 of the evidence act authorises the court to take the finger impression or specimen handwriting of the iperson present in court in the course.of investigation bv the police.the learned judge further observed at (p. 90 of air : (259 of cri. l. j.)-this passage makes it abundantly clear that the supreme court was not concerned with anv other question in relation to the facts of each of these cases. i am. therefore, of the view that, there is no basis for the contention of the learned counsel that the supreme court has at least indirectly approved the ipoint that the magistrate can take handwriting or signature of the accused1 in the course of investigation.similar view was expressed! bvta division bench of the kerala hieh court in alov-sious john v. the state of kerala (1966) mad lj (cri) 298.3. in view of the above cited judgments it is clear that section 73 of the indian evidence act does not contemplate that the accused can be asked, persuaded or coerced1 to give his handwriting or thumb impressions at the instance of the police so that these may be, at a later stage, used against him. the learned additional sessions judge took pains to make a detailed reference. the learned magistrate transgressed the provisions of law in directing dharamvir singh petitioner to eive his signatures at the instance of the jjolice. the order being bad in law amounts to illegality and requires to be quashed. accepting the reference of the learned additional sessions judge, ambala. thej order is set aside.

Full Judgment

ORDER

Kulwant Singh Tiwana, J.

1. Criminal cases under Sections 406, 420, 467 and 471. Indian Penal Code, are pending against Dharam Vir Singh which are being investigated by Ja^dhri Police. The investigating agency was in necessity of the signatures of DhaTamvir Singh in order to connect him with those offences. An application in this behalf was made to the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jagadhri bv the Investigating Officer for issuing a direction to Dharamvir Singh accused-fpeti-tioner to give specimen writings so that those could toe got compared from the hand-writing expert. The learned Judicial Magistrate First Class. 'Jagadhri. acting under Section 73 Of the Indian Evidence Act. allowed this application. As the. order of the learned Magistrate went against the interest of the petitioner he preferred a revision which was heard bv Shri P. R, Aggarwal. Additional Sessions Judge, Ambala. The learned Additional Sessions Judge vide his report, which is before this Court, disagreed with the order of the Judicial Magistrate. First Class. Jagadhri, and has made a reference for quashing those orders. It is in this manner that this revision is before this Court.

2. The only question involved in this revision is whether a Court jHnder Section 73. Indian Evidence Act can direct an accused person to give his1 signatures at the instance of the investigating agency so that after comparison from an expert these could1 be used against him as evidence. The learned counsel for the State relied on a Full Bench decision of Patna High Court in Gulzar Khan v. State : AIR1962 Pat255 to argue that such a thing was permitted by law. He also tried to derive help from State of Bombav v. Kathi Kalu Oghad : 1961 CriLJ856 In T. Subbiah v. S. K. D. Rama-swamy Nadar : AIR1970 Mad85 ; Gulzar Khan's case (supra) was noticed but it was not followed. Similarly Kathi Kalu Oghad's case was referred and was distinguished. In this case, para. 10. Kathi Kalu Oghad's case (supra), was reproduced in extenso. in para. 14, which contains the facts of that case. The learned Judge of the Madras High Court observed at P. 89 of AIR : (at p. 258 of Cri. L. J.)-

Nowhere in this passage we find that Section 73 of the Evidence Act authorises the Court to take the finger impression or specimen handwriting of the iperson present in Court in the course.of investigation bv the police.

The learned Judge further observed at (P. 90 of AIR : (259 of Cri. L. J.)-

This passage makes it abundantly clear that the Supreme Court was not concerned with anv other question in relation to the facts of each of these cases. I am. therefore, of the view that, there is no basis for the contention of the learned counsel that the Supreme Court has at least indirectly approved the ipoint that the Magistrate can take handwriting or signature of the accused1 in the course of investigation.

Similar view was expressed! bvta Division Bench of the Kerala Hieh Court in Alov-sious John v. The State of Kerala (1966) Mad LJ (Cri) 298.

3. In view of the above cited judgments it is clear that Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act does not contemplate that the accused can be asked, persuaded or coerced1 to give his handwriting or thumb impressions at the instance of the police so that these may be, at a later stage, used against him. The learned Additional Sessions Judge took pains to make a detailed reference. The learned Magistrate transgressed the provisions of law in directing Dharamvir Singh petitioner to eive his signatures at the instance of the jjolice. The order being bad in law amounts to illegality and requires to be Quashed. Accepting the reference of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ambala. theJ order is set aside.

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