Full Judgment
G.C. Garg, J.
1. This is wife's appeal which is directed against thejudgment dated October 29, 1991 of the learned Additional District Judge,Faridabad. The learned Additional District Judge granted divorce on the petitionfiled by the husband under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act (for short'the Act') seeking dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce. The husband atthe time of his marriage was a practising Chartered Accountant at Faridabad andthe wife was a Doctor in medicine. They were tied in the matrimonial bonds onFebruary 11,1989 by solemnising the marriage according to Hindu rites at KosiKalan, district Mathura in Uttar Pradesh. The parties were pursuing theirstudies at Agra in the year 1984-85 where they became friendly and prior to theirmarriage, they had been exchanging letters with each other. Ultimately, theywere married, as mentioned already, in February 11, 1989. Unfortunately,this marriage did not prove a success and within one and a half year of themarriage, the husband filed the present petition seeking divorce out of whichthis appeal has arisen. The broad allegations of cruelty on the strength of whichmarriage was sought to be dissolved by a decree of divorce may be noticed asunder.
2. The husband alleged that the wife did not allow him to consummatethe marriage right from day one till the date of filing the petition and wheneverhe desired to consummate the marriage, be that at Faridabad, Agra or Mussorie,the latter flatly refused to have an access to her person inspite of his pursuationthat it was an essential aspect of married life. But all the times, the wife showedher repugnance and even on some occasions used abusive language, as a resultthe husband suffered mental agony and shock. She ultimately went to Russia inNovember, 1989 without the consent, permission or knowledge of the husband.It was also pleaded that he did not know her address in Russia as she did notcorrespond with him. It was thus pleaded by the husband that all the acts of thewife amounted to cruelty against him and he was entitled to seek dissolution ofmarriage by a decree of divorce. The allegations as levelled in the petition werestoutly denied by the appellant-wife by filing a lengthy written statement. Sherefuted almost all the vital allegations. It was pleaded by her that the parties tothe marriage consummated the marriage at Faridabad and Agra where theystayed in hotels and the relationship of husband and wife continued between themwithout any interruption or displeasure on the part of either of the spouses. Theallegation of mental agony or shock was thus denied. The wife asserted that thetenure of her studies in the USSR was of a short duration which was arrangedwith full knowledge and consent of her husband. She further stated in her writtenstatement that it was wrong to say that there was any such conduct on her partwhich could inflict any sort of cruelty to her husband. She stated that she gaveprior information of her visit to India to her husband. It was also denied that shedid not visit the husband or his family members during her visits to India. Rathershe pleaded that after her return from the USSR, her husband started maltreatingher by threatening that he would get himself married again and desert her and eversince then her husband had not allowed her to stay with him. Besides denying theallegations taken in the petition, the wife specifically pleaded that her husbandhad openly declared that somehow or the other, he would get her divorced bymeans whatsoever at his command.
3. The husband filed replication controverting the allegations contained inthe written statement and reiterating those taken in the petition. On the respectivepleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed :
1. Whether the petitioner is entitled to a decree of divorce, on thegrounds mentioned in the petition OPP
2. Whether the petition is not maintainable in the present form OPR
3. Whether no cause of action accrued to the petitioner OPR
4. Whether the petitioner has not come to the Court with clean hands OPR
Additional issues:
4-A. Whether the Court at Faridabad has the territorial jurisdiction totry this petition OPP
5. Relief.
4. Issue No. 4-A was answered in favour of the husband and against thewife by observing that the parties to the marriage last resided together atFaridabad, hence the Court at Faridabad had the jurisdiction to try the petitioner.It was also observed that at the time of filing the petition, the husband was residingat Faridabad and the wife was away to USSR. Under issue No. 1 it was held thatthe wife was guilty of cruelty and the husband was entitled to seek dissolution ofmarriage by a decree of divorce on that ground.
5. During the pendency of the appeal, the wife moved Civil Misc. No. 2111/C.II of 1992 under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure seekingpermission to produce the record of the Central Bank of India, Krishna NagarBranch, Mathura regarding the hiring of locker No. 148 alongwith the recordof its operation and surrender. This Civil Misc. Application was moved to showthat the parties last resided together at Mathura and, therefore, the Court atFaridabad had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for divorce. Such anapplication was also moved before the Trial Court but the same was declined.Learned Counsel submitted that if the appellant had been permitted to produceadditional evidence, she would have shown that the parties last resided togetherat Mathura and record of the bank would have established this fact. The contentionhas no merit. In the first instance, if the parties had last resided together at Mathurathe appellant would know the address of Mathura and should have producedthe same. The appellant has neither disclosed the address of Mathura in herapplication nor has she disclosed it during the course of arguments. It is thus clearthat the application was moved only to delay the disposal of the dispute betweenthe parties on its own merits. Even otherwise the appellant while appearing as herown witness as RW-1 clearly stated that after her internship was shifted from Agrato Mathura she used to go to Kosi Kalan practically everyday and in case it was notpossible she used to stay with her uncle Shri Ramesh Chand Garg, Advocate atMathura. It is thus clear that no purpose whatsoever would be served by grantingthe application or by summoning the record of the bank. Civil Misc. Applicationfor production of additional evidence is consequently dismissed.
6. Learned Counsel for the appellant next contended that the Court atFaridabad lacked territorial jurisdiction to try the petition. Learned Counselreferred to Section 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act to contend that Faridabad wasneither the place where marriage was solemnised nor the respondent wasresiding there at the time of presentation of the petition for divorce. LearnedCounsel submitted that the parties did not establish a matrimonial home atFaridabad and they also did not last reside together at Faridabad. According to thelearned Counsel for the appellant their casual stay for a day or two at Faridabadcould not be taken to mean that the parties last resided together at Faridabad andsuch casual stay could not confer jurisdiction on the Court at Faridabad. LearnedCounsel in support of his submission placed reliance upon Smt. Kalpana Devi v.Ranjit Kumar Choudhary and Anr., 1980 HLR 787. However, I am of theopinion that the contention has no merit. Clause (iii) of Section 19 of the Actconfers jurisdiction on a Court where parties to the marriage last residedtogether. It was not the case of the appellant that they had establishedmatrimonial home at a place other than Faridabad. Normally the residence of thehusband is the place of matrimonial home unless shown otherwise. In this case,the husband is a practising Chartered Accountant at Faridabad and after themarriage the parties came to Faridabad and stayed there. The parents of thehusband also held a reception for the newly weds at that place. The parties to themarriage did not take any other house on rent where they might have lived orhad the intention to live or settle. Temporary stay for a day or two at Agra orelsewhere would not be taken to be the place where they last resided together, orestablished a matrimonial home. Address on the passport of the wife, Exhib it PX,is again that of Faridabad and the marriage, if at all, was consummated atFaridabad where they first stayed together after the marriage. Doctrine of permanenceof residence, in the facts and circumstances of this case also applies to Faridabadand no other place because of professional obligations of the husband, especiallywhen it was neither alleged nor shown that they ever resided together at any otherplace. The husband while appearing as PW1 as his own witness clearly stated thathe was a qualified Chartered Accountant and was practising as such at Faridabadsince 1984 and had established a good practice at that place and had becomepermanent resident of the town and that Shri R.K. Aggarwal was his partner in theprofession and that he was maintaining his permanent residence at House No. 565,Sector 7-B, Faridabad and the office was also in the same house. The husband wasnot cross-examined on this aspect of the matter. Thus it has to be taken that thematrimonial home was at Faridabad and there was no change in the said addresstill at least the date of filing of the petition. Stay of the parties for a day or two ata place other than Faridabad did not and could not take away the jurisdiction ofthe Court at Faridabad.
7. Reference may also be made to Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedurein that behalf. It provided that no objection as to the place of suing shall be allowedby any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in theCourt of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases wherethe issues are settled on or before such settlement and unless there has been aconsequent failure of justice. In the present case, the first two conditions aresatisfied. The third condition regarding failure of justice, however, is not satisfied.Learned Counsel for the appellant could not refer to any fact on record that thewife did not have a fair trial at Faridabad and as consequence thereof there wasa failure of justice. The appellant has led full evidence on the merits of thecontroversy between the parties. There is no failure of justice to the appellantagainst whom a decree has been granted by the Court at Faridabad. It will on thecontrary be total unjust and occasion a failure of justice to the husband in casethe objection as to jurisdiction is upheld at this stage. As already noticed, noprejudice whatsoever has been shown to have occasioned to the wife regardingfair trial at Faridabad. No other place where the parties had last resided togetherhad been indicated by the wife either in the written statement, in her statementin Court or even during the course of arguments. In the absence of any findingof failure of justice, decree passed by thfe Court below cannot be set aside byaccepting the contention of the wife that the Court at Faridabad lacked jurisdiction.Support for this view can be had from R.S.D.V. Finance Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. ShreeVallabh Glass Works Ltd., (1993) 2 Supreme Court 130, Koopilan Uneen'sdaughter Pathumma and Ors. v. Koopilan Uneen's Son Kuntalan Kutty deadby L.Rs. and Ors., A.l.R. 1981 S.C. 1683 and Suraj Bhan and Ors. v. Hans Rajand Ors., 1983 Current Law Journal 16.
8. In the absence of special circumstances, the husband acting bona fide isentitled to determine the locus of matrimonial home. In this case as alreadynoticed, the husband has settled at Faridabad and has a permanent residence there.Even after the marriage, the husband alongwith the appellant-wife came toFaridabad where they stayed for some days. It is not a case where the parties to themarriage last resided at a place other than Faridabad. They did not take any otherpremises at any place on rent or otherwise with the intention to reside therepermanently or for a sufficiently long time. It is difficult to comprehend that Clause(iii) of Section 19 of the Act is not applicable to the facts of this case at all. It is noteven the case of the appellant. Thus, in the circumstances, it can safely be concludedthat the parties to the marriage last resided at Faridabad. The appellant cannotdraw any support from Smt. Kalpana Devi's case (supra).
9. Clause (iv) of Section 19 of the Act further provides that the petition underthis Act shall be presented to District Courts within local limits of whose ordinarycivil jurisdiction the petitioner is residing at the time of the presentation of thepetition, in a case where the respondent is, at that time, residing outside theterritories to which the Act extends. In this case, the appellant left India for USSRon November 4,1989 and finally came back to India on August 18,1990 though hervisa was valid upto December 20, 1990. The petition for divorce was filed onAugust 17,1990.
10. In the aforesaid situation, I am of the opinion that the objection of theappellant as to the place of suing has no merit and it was rightly held by the learnedAdditional District Judge that the Court at Faridabad had jurisdiction to try thepetition.
11. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to notice still anothercontention of the learned Counsel for the appellant. According to he learnedCounsel, in order to succeed on the ground of cruelty, it was necessary to provethat the wife had persistently or repeatedly treated the husband with cruelty as tocause a reasonable apprehension that it was harmful for him to live with her. Thecontention was raised on the premises that marriage between the parties wassolemnised at Kosi Kalan in district Mathura of Uttar Pradesh. Hence, the crueltyas defined by the Uttar Pradesh Act XIII of 1962 [The Hindu Marriage (UttarPradesh Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam, 1962] shall prevail. The contention in myview has no merit. Prior to the enforcement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment)Act, 1976 cruelty was not a ground for seeking divorce under Section 13 of the Act.A spouse was entitled to obtain a decree for judicial separation under Section 10of the Act after proving that the petitioner had been treated with cruelty as to causea reasonable apprehension in his mind and that it would be harmful or injuriousto live with the other party. The Legislature of Uttar Pradesh vide U.P. Act XIIIof 1962, which Act had not been reserved for the consideration of the President ofIndia, added Clause (i-a) after Clause (i) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 of theHindu Marriage Act to provide cruelty as another ground for seeking divorce.The amendment enabled a spouse to obtain divorce if the complaining spouse hadbeen persistently or repeatedly treated by the other spouse with such cruelty as tocause a reasonable apprehension that it will be harmful or injurious to live with theother. The Parliament by Central Act No. 68 of 1976 has amended Section 13 of theAct and has provided an occasion to a spouse to obtain divorce by proving thathe/she had been treated with cruelty by the other party. Marriage and divorceis a subject on the concurrent list at Entry No. V of the VII Schedule to theConstitution of India. Thus, in view of the provisions made in Article 254 of theConstitution of India, the amendment made by the Parliament shall prevail overthe provisions made by the State Legislature. A spouse is thus, entitled to seekdivorce by simply proving that he/she has been treated with cruelty and it is notnecessary for the said spouse to prove anything more, the U.P. Act having beenimpliedly repealed by the Central Act in terms of the provisions of Article 254 ofthe Constitution of India.
12. Reverting to the grounds of divorce, it can safely be said that the husbandsought divorce on the ground of cruelty, mental and not physical. No hard and fastrules have either been laid down nor can be so done for holding one spouse to beguilty of cruelty qua the other. It necessarily will depend on the facts of each case.Norms of society, social obligations, bindings and education of parties willcertainly be relevant factors for coming to the conclusion if the husband has beenable to prove mental cruelty in this case so as to enable him to seem divorce onthe ground of mental cruelty. In V. Bhagat v. Mrs. D. Bhagat, [1994(1) All IndiaHindu Law Reporter 74 (S.C.) = I (1993) DMC 435 (SC)], it was observed by theApex Court as under :
'Mental cruelty in Section 13(1)(ia) can broadly be defined as that conductwhich inflict upon the other party such mental pain and suffering aswould make it not possible for that party to live with the other. In otherwords, mental cruelty must of such a nature that the parties cannotreasonably be expected to live together. The situation must be such thatthe wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with suchconduct and continue to live with the other party. It is not necessary toprove that the mental cruelty is such as to cause injury to the health of thepetitioner. While arriving at such conclusion, regard must be had to thesocial status, educational level of the parties, the society they move in, thepossibility or otherwise of the parties over living together in case they arealready living apart and all other relevant facts and circumstances whichit is neither possible nor desirable to set out exhaustively. What is crueltyin one case may not amount to cruelty in another case. It is a matter to bedetermined in each case having regard to the facts and circumstances ofthat case. If it is a case of accusations and allegations regard must also behad to the context in which they were made.'
13. Adverting to the facts of this case, it may be seen that the husband soughtdivorce on the ground of mental cruelty and to prove mental cruelty, he hasbroadly alleged two facts, one that the appellant did not allow him to consummatethe marriage and as and when he tried to persuade her to see reason, she wouldpick up quarrel and start abusing. The second allegation is that she went to the USSR on November 4, 1989 without his consent, knowledge and withoutinforming him.
14. Learned Counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that thehusband miserably failed to prove that the appellant refused to cohabit with therespondent and thereby did not allow the marriage to be consummated. LearnedCounsel submitted that if the allegation had been true, relations between the twocould not remain cordial. Learned Counsel referred to letters Exhibit R. 5 datedFebruary 20, 1989, Exhibit R.8 dated March 2, 1989, Exhibits R. 6 and R. 37 datedMay 14,1989, Exhibit R.7 dated July 17,1989, Exhibit R. 9 dated August 7,1989and Exhibit R. 10 dated October 16,1989 to highlight that there was not even aslightest indication in any of the letters, which were admittedly written by thehusband, to the wife that the wife at any time had declined to cohabit or wasrepugnant to the idea of cohabitation and did not allow the husband toconsummate the marriage. According to the learned Counsel, no evidence hascome on the record to prove this allegation except the statement of the husbandwhich has been controverted by the appellant. Learned Counsel pointed out thatall these letters are full of love and affection towards the wife. He furthersubmitted that the appellant went to the USSR for higher studies and she soughtadmission there with the consent and full knowledge of the husband. He wenton argue that even the passport of the appellant was not issued by the respondent.Letter Exhibit R. 35 dated December 28,1988 was referred to in that behalf.
15. In order to appreciate the contentions raised, it is necessary to broadlynotice the evidence led in the case. Rakesh Gupta, respondent herein whileappearing as P.W. 1 as his own witness brought out the sequence of events pointingout that the appellant did not allow him to consummate the marriage and pushedhim aside by stating that she had no interest in sex and she was only interestedto attain the highest degree in medicine and that the consummation of marriagewould be an obstacle in her way to achieve the professional qualifications. He alsostated that the appellant on the other occasions did not allow him to indulge in sexby saying that her profession did not allow her to indulge in sex and thereby givingbirth to the children and she married only to have the status of a married woman.He went on to state that he came to know in November, 1989 that the appellant hadleft for USSR without his consent and knowledge. He came to know of this throughhis relations at Kosi Kalan and that she did not inform him or any other memberof his family about her plan or of her address of USSR. He came to know onSeptember 18,1990 itself that she had come back from USSR. He further went onto state that even after coming back from USSR she did not even once come toreside with him or his parents or any other family member. He stated that themarriage between the parties had not been consummated and he suffered a lot ofmental agony on that account and this has ruined has professional career as aChartered Accountant. The appellant while cross-examining the respondent-husband had not been able to shatter his testimony made in the examination-in-chief.
16. PW 2 Murari Lal Gupta father of the respondent appeared as a witnessand he supported the case of his son on all material points. He denied thesuggestion that on the occasion of Dusshera, the parents of the appellant had notbeen informed about the matrimonial dispute between the parties. Furthersuggestion that it was only told that she should not go to USSR and no other talktook place about the marital relations of the parties on account of non-cooperationof the appellant and in not allowing the husband to have sexual relationship withher was denied. The further suggestion that he, witness or his wife did not talkto the appellant about marital relationship between the parties was also denied.The witness went on to state that his son had been telling him about maritalproblems orally. He, however, stated that neither he norany member of his familyever wrote any letter in that regard.
17. The appellant while appearing as her own witness as RW-1 stated thatshe stayed with her husband on about fifteen occasions and marriage wasconsummated and that she never refused to have sex with her husband. Shefurther stated that after landing in the USSR she informed her husband about heraddress of the USSR on phone and wrote two/three letters during her entire stayin USSR but he did not respond. She was subjected to lengthy cross-examination.During the course of her cross-examination, she had to admit that she visited Indiaon four occasions during the period of her stay in USSR and that she left the coursein between and that she had written only one letter addressed jointly to herfather-in-law and mother-in-law. She further stated that she did write letters from USSR to her friends, parents, brothers, sisters as also other relations and that allof them responded. The witness also stated that on one occasion of her visit fromthe USSR to India, she stayed in India for about a week and in between went toEngland where she stayed for about 10/15 days and that she had not informedabout it either to her husband or in-laws. The appellant also stated that after hercoming back from USSR and till she joined the All India Institute in New Delhi, shedid not contact her husband and that even after joining at New Delhi she did notcontact him till the date of her making the statement except during the reconciliationproceedings that took place in the Court. She had to admit that after her comingback from USSR she had not written any letter to her husband. She further admittedthat she came to know of divorce petition in December, 1990 and till then she didnot come to Faridabad to see her husband after coming from USSR in August, 1990.
18. Mr. S.C. Aggarwal, father of the appellant also appeared as a witness as RW 2 in support of the case of her daughter. He deposed that neither the husbandof the appellant nor his parents ever told him or his wife about non-cooperation ofthe appellant in the matter of discharge of her matrimonial obligations. In cross-examination, the witness stated that to his knowledge, the appellant never stayedor resided at Faridabad at the house of her husband. He stated that after Diwali,1989, the appellant did not reside with her husband. He, however, admitted thatthe appellant did not go to see her husband or stayed with him when she visitedIndia during her studies in the USSR and he never enforced her to go and stay withher husband and he also never asked his son-in-law, respondent herein to take herwith him.
19. In the context of the evidence noticed above, I am of the opinion that thecontentions raised by the Counsel for the appellant have no merit. A perusal ofletters referred to by the learned Counsel for the appellant goes to show thatthe contention has merit to the extent that no grouse was made by the husbandregarding non-consummation of marriage or that the wife did not permit him toconsummate the marriage at any point of time. It may also be noticed thataccording to the husband, the appellant-wife stayed with him, may be atFaridabad, Agra, Dehradun or Mussorie or elsewhere for only 6 to 8 days duringthe period February 11, 1989 to November 4,1989, when she left India for USSR.According to the appellant she stayed with the respondent at the aforesaidplaces for a day or two more than what had been alleged by the husband. In thesituation, it is very difficult to record a firm finding, whether the marriage hadbeen consummated or not. The circumstances however, lead one to believe thatthe allegation as levelled by the husband is correct, at least to the extent that theappellant was repugnant to the idea of sex. Love affair between the partiesculminated into marriage, though an arranged one. The parties to the marriage,as already noticed, are highly educated. As a decent husband it seems to me thathe kept all restraints in exposing himself or his wife to the relations about non-consummation of marriage or the appellant being averse to sex and showered alllove and affection on her not only through letters as noticed above but evenotherwise. On an earlier occasion, the parties to this litigation had appeared beforethis Court in Civil Misc. 1498/C.II of 1991 when an effort was made forreconciliation. The appellant had then flatly refused to join the husband and hadstated that it was not possible for her to stay in the matrimonial home. Thehusband had at that time made a sincere effort to settle her in the matrimonialhome. It may also be noticed that admittedly, the appellant went to USSR onNovember 4, 1989 for one year and she did not inform her husband about herdeparture and she left India without his knowledge, consent and permission.Letter Exhibit R. 36 dated September 26, 1989 written to the appellant by hermother-in-law clearly goes to show that the appellant had been requested not togo to the USSR. This clearly gives an indication that the husband and his motherwere not at all interested in the visit of the appellant to the USSR. If relationsbetween the parties were cordial as was sought to be argued by the learnedCounsel for the appellant, there was no reason for the appellant to leave Indiafor studying abroad without informing her husband of her proposed visit to the USSR. The appellant cannot take advantage of letter Exhibit R. 35 dated December28,1988 as it was written much before the date of the marriage. Furthermore, theappellant stayed in USSR from November 4,1989 to August 18,1990 and duringthis period she visited India on three / four occasions. Admittedly, she did not visither husband on any of these occasions and even did not inform him of his visit toIndia. She admitted while appearing as her own witness that she had beenwriting to her husband from USSR but brought nothing on the record to show thatshe had been so doing. The very fact that she did not visit her husband or informedhim of her visit to India, clearly goes to show that she had not been writing to himduring the period she stayed in the USSR. This inference is clear because she hadnot informed her husband about her departure from India to the USSR and it waskept a secret. During her visit to India she as per her own statement, visited certainrelations but not the husband.
20. It is the admitted case of the appellant that she came to India on August18,1990 and from that day till December 1990, she did not go to see her husbandor wrote any letter to him or informed him of her arrival in India. She even did nottell her husband about her visit to England. This shows that she never wantedto come to the matrimonial home. Thus, the conduct of the appellant of going to USSR without informing her husband and against his wishes coupled with hersubsequent conduct lead credence to the case of the respondent that the appellantdid not allow him to consummate the marriage and in any case she was remissin the discharge of matrimonial duties. She is more conscious of her career as adoctor. It is further obvious that she or her father made no effort whatsoeverto settle her in the matrimonial home. This, in my view, gave a clear cause tothe husband to seek divorce on the ground of cruelty.
21. Mental cruelty can only be adjudged by having regard to the facts of thecase. It can only be perceived and not defined. It will depend on the facts of eachcase. Inaction or omission or series of such acts of a spouse may cause injury tothe other spouse which may further cause mental agony amounting to mentalcruelty. Sex is a binding force to keep two spouses together and the denial thereofby one spouse to the other would, in my view, effect mental health amounting tomental cruelty especially in a case where the parties are young and have recentlymarried after a prolonged courtship. Reference in that behalf may be made toPreet Singh Bhullar v. Kamaljit Bhullar, 1990(2) All India Hindu Law Reporter203 (SC).
22. Even if it be taken that the appellant was not remiss in the discharge of hermatrimonial obligations, I am still of the view that the respondent husband wasentitled to a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty. The broad admitted factsas noticed from the evidence are that the appellant left for USSR on November4, 1989 without knowledge, consent or permission of her husband. She did notwrite to him from USSR and did not bother to see him by visiting him or talkinghim on three/four occasions when she visited India while studying in the USSR.She did not even inform her husband about her visits to India. If there was noresentment or objection to her going abroad she would not have behave the wayshe has done. She even went to England during one of her visits to India. This, inmy view, clearly gives a cause to the husband to seek divorce on the ground ofcruelty. The acts of the appellant are such which would cause mental agony andtorture to the husband amounting to cruelty. She finally came to .India on August18,1990 and she came to know of the divorce petition only in December, 1990. Evenduring this period i.e., August 18, 1990 to December, 1990 she made no effort tocontact her husband either by visiting him or otherwise. From her statement andthe statement of her father, it is clear that she was not interested to see her husbandeven before the filing of the divorce petition as it had been mentioned to her duringone of her visits to India that her husband was thinking of marrying again. Herconduct during the pendency of the divorce petition also leads me to believe thatshe is not interested to settle in the matrimonial home. There is a complete neglecton her part. It is abundantly clear from what has been discussed above thatmarriage between the parties has broken down irretrievably and there is no chanceof their coming together or living together again. The inevitable conclusiontherefore, is that the husband is entitled to a decree of divorce.
23. For what has been observed hereinbefore, this appeal fails and is herebydismissed. However the parties are left to bear their own costs.