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Dhanpal Singh Vs. the State

Dhanpal Singh vs The State

Disposition Reference allowed Court Punjab and Haryana Decided Dec 08, 1969
~4 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/613682

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Citation
Court
Punjab and Haryana High Court
Judge
Decided On
Case Number
Criminal Revn. No. 1087 of 1968
Subject
Criminal
Disposition
Reference allowed

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section ...

Key legal issue
Criminal
Outcome / disposition
Reference allowed
Acts & sections
Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860 - Sections 21

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Dhanpal Singh

Advocate N.C. Jain, Adv.

Respondent

The State

Advocate H.N. Mehtani, Asst. Adv. General

Legal References

Acts
Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860 - Sections 21
Cases Referred
The Queen v. Dinanath Gangooly
Reported In
AIR1970P& H514; 1970CriLJ1568

Excerpt

.....original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single judge of a high court, no further appeal shall lie. even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under section 2(9) means a statement given by a judge on the grounds of a decree or order. thus the contention that against an order passed by a single judge in an appeal filed under section 104 c.p.c., a further appeal lies to a division bench cannot be accepted. the newly incorporated section 100a in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a single judge to a division bench notwithstanding anything contained in the letters patent. the letters patent which provides for further appeal to a division bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a single judge. it has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an appeal to the high court. it has not made any provision for filing appeal to a division bench against the judgment or decree or order of a single judge. no letters patent appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a single judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a special act. sections 100-a [as inserted by act 22 of 2002] & 104:[dr. b.s. chauhan, cj, l. mohapatra & a.s. naidu, jj] writ appeal held, a writ appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by single judge in a writ petition filed under article 226 of the constitution of india. in a writ application filed under articles 226 and 227 of constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under article 226, a writ appeal will lie. but, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a single judge in exercising powers of superintendence under article 227 of the constitution. .....or, in default of payment of fine, to further rigorous imprisonment for one month. his appeal having been dismissed by shri s. r. seth. additional sessions judge, karnal, on the 8th of october, 1968, he has come up in revision to this court. 2. the facts of this case are now admitted on all hands and are these. thepetitioner was attached as a peon to the tehsil office at karnal but was suspended from service. during the period of suspension and between the dates 19th of february, 1965, and 9th of march, 1965, he realised a sum of rs. 592.47 from five persons named qabaz, jit, thal singh, tola ram and dhani ram, all residents of village pundrak in tehsil karnal, from whom various amounts were due to the government on account of loans received by them earlier for the purchase of fertilisers. in respect of the amounts (totalling rs. 592.47) the petitioner issued receipts to the loanees abovementioned and the same are exhibits p. w. 8/f. b. d. c, and e respectively. the petitioner, however, did not deposit the money into the treasury and the embezzlement was detected when the notices were issued to the said loanees and they produced the receipts obtained by them from the petitioner before the tehsildar, karnal, whereafter the petitioner paid up the amount of rs. 592.47 to the government. 3. apart from the question of sentence the only point raised by shri n. c. jain,learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the offence involved does not fall within the ambit of section 409 of the indian penal code inasmuch as an offence of that type must be committed by a public servant which the petitioner was not during the relevant period by reason of his suspension from service. reliance is placed by him on the queen v. dinanath gangooly, (1872) 8 beng lr (app) 58 in which kemp and jackson, jj. quashed the conviction recorded against a police officer under suspension of an offence covered by s. 29 of the police act (5 of 1861) on the ground that he had ceased to be a police.....

Full Judgment

A.D. Koshal, J.

1. The petitioner was convicted by a Judicial Magistrate at Karnal of an offence under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for a year and a fine of Rs. 50/- or, in default of payment of fine, to further rigorous imprisonment for one month. His appeal having been dismissed by Shri S. R. Seth. Additional Sessions Judge, Karnal, on the 8th of October, 1968, he has come up in revision to this Court.

2. The facts of this case are now admitted on all hands and are these. Thepetitioner was attached as a peon to the Tehsil Office at Karnal but was suspended from service. During the period of suspension and between the dates 19th of February, 1965, and 9th of March, 1965, he realised a sum of Rs. 592.47 from five persons named Qabaz, Jit, Thal Singh, Tola Ram and Dhani Ram, all residents of village Pundrak in Tehsil Karnal, from whom various amounts were due to the Government on account of loans received by them earlier for the purchase of fertilisers. In respect of the amounts (totalling Rs. 592.47) the petitioner issued receipts to the loanees abovementioned and the same are Exhibits P. W. 8/F. B. D. C, and E respectively. The petitioner, however, did not deposit the money into the treasury and the embezzlement was detected when the notices were issued to the said loanees and they produced the receipts obtained by them from the petitioner before the Tehsildar, Karnal, whereafter the petitioner paid up the amount of Rs. 592.47 to the Government.

3. Apart from the question of sentence the only point raised by Shri N. C. Jain,learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the offence involved does not fall within the ambit of Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code inasmuch as an offence of that type must be committed by a public servant which the petitioner was not during the relevant period by reason of his suspension from service. Reliance is placed by him on The Queen v. Dinanath Gangooly, (1872) 8 Beng LR (App) 58 in which Kemp and Jackson, JJ. quashed the conviction recorded against a police officer under suspension of an offence covered by S. 29 of the Police Act (5 of 1861) on the ground that he had ceased to be a police officer for the purposes of the Act by reason of his suspension at the relevant point of time. Thai, case, however, is of no help to Shri Jain as it proceeded on an interpretation of Section 8 of the Police Act according to which the certificate appointing a person to the police force ceases to have effect whenever the person named therein is suspended or dismissed or otherwise removed from employment. It was in view of the clear provisions of that section that it was held that the offender could not be legally convicted under Section 29 of the Police Act. In the present case we are not at all concerned with any of the provisions of the Police Act.

The relevant provision is contained in Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code which lays down the definition of a public servant. It is conceded by Shri Jain that the petitioner, earlier to his suspension, was a public servant. He contends that it was his suspension alone which deprived him of that status. Section 21, however, does not say that suspension from office would have any such effect. On the other hand. Explanation 2 appended to the section and reading as follows:

'Wherever the words 'public servant' occur, they shall be understood of every person who is in actual possession of the situation of a public servant, whatever legal defect there may be in his right to hold that situation'

would embrace not only public servants properly so-called but also persons in the employment of the Government who carried defective appointments. The term was, therefore, meant to be used in a wide sense and I am of the opinion that a public servant under suspension would not cease to be a 'public servant' within the meaning of Section 21 of the Code. No infirmity can under the circumstances be said to attach to the conviction of the petitioner.

4. On the question of sentence I am inclined to show leniency in view of the fact that the petitioner paid up the embezzled amount to the Government although it was subsequent to the detection of the commission of the offence by him. He has already undergone about 2 3/4months' rigorous imprisonment. Accordingly I reduce the sentence to imprisonment already undergone and a fine of Rs. 500/-. The sentence in default of payment of fine shall be rigorous imprisonment for six months.

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