Skip to content
How to use Judgment tools
  1. Click Tools to open PDF, Print, Tag, Note, Favourite, and CiteSignal.
  2. Use Brief & Ask in the toolbar for the AI Brief and case chat.
  3. Jump to sections with the pills below the help bar.

Sauri Behera Vs. State of Orissa

Sauri Behera vs State of Orissa

Disposition Petition allowed Court Orissa Decided Oct 01, 2008
~4 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/536065

For advocates & juniors · 7-day free trial

Brief this judgment before chambers

Stop skimming 50 pages - get an 18-section AI Brief on this case, ask scoped follow-ups, and find related precedents with Semantic Search. Full trial, no card required.

  • 18-section brief - facts, issues, ratio, relief
  • Ask this case - answers cite the judgment
  • Semantic search - find precedents by meaning
  • Research drawer - sections, cites, related cases

No card required · credentials emailed · Log in if you already have an account

Citation
Court
Orissa High Court
Judge
Decided On
Subject
Criminal
Disposition
Petition allowed

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section ...

Key legal issue
Criminal
Outcome / disposition
Petition allowed

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Sauri Behera

Respondent

State of Orissa

Legal References

Reported In
2008(II)OLR831

Excerpt

.....or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single judge of a high court, no further appeal shall lie. even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under section 2(9) means a statement given by a judge on the grounds of a decree or order. thus the contention that against an order passed by a single judge in an appeal filed under section 104 c.p.c., a further appeal lies to a division bench cannot be accepted. the newly incorporated section 100a in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a single judge to a division bench notwithstanding anything contained in the letters patent. the letters patent which provides for further appeal to a division bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a single judge. it has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an appeal to the high court. it has not made any provision for filing appeal to a division bench against the judgment or decree or order of a single judge. no letters patent appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a single judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a special act. sections 100-a [as inserted by act 22 of 2002] & 104:[dr. b.s. chauhan, cj, l. mohapatra & a.s. naidu, jj] writ appeal held, a writ appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by single judge in a writ petition filed under article 226 of the constitution of india. in a writ application filed under articles 226 and 227 of constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under article 226, a writ appeal will lie. but, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a single judge in exercising powers of superintendence under article 227 of the constitution. - ..........not pronouncing the judgment against the available accused resorting to the proviso of sub-section (6) of section 353 of cr.p.c. is beyond comprehension. in any event the procedure adopted by him is not sanctioned by law and is totally unwarranted. if one of the accused is available and the judgment is ready and is in seal cover, it is his bounden duty to pronounce the same. he has no authority to stall the trial awaiting apprehension of other accused persons just so that he can have the convenience of pronouncing the judgment in presence of all the accused persons. for the shake of argument if it is assumed that the other accused persons are not apprehended for a period of say 10,15 or 20 years, then would the present accused languish in jail for such length of time without either being convicted or acquitted. the very idea of an accused languishing in jail in this manner for an indefinite period without even knowing his fate is repugnant to the concept of fair trial and is dangerous to say the least. the order is thus clearly unsustainable.4. in the result the revision is allowed. the impugned order is set aside. the trial court is directed to pronounce the judgment in the case with immediate dispatch.

Full Judgment

L.K. Mishra, J.

1. Even though the case has been listed for admission today, on the prayer and consent of learned Counsel for the parties, it is taken up for final disposal.

2. Heard learned Counsel for both sides.

The petitioner is an accused in G.R. Case No. 32 of 1991 of the Court of learned J.M.F.C, Khallikote for the offence under Sections 294/324/323/337/34 of I.P.C. On 9.4.2007 when the case was posted for judgment, the judgment could not be pronounced due to absence of all the accused persons including the present petitioner. Therefore, the judgment was kept in a sealed cover and N.B.W. was issued against the accused persons. On 27.8.2008 the present petitioner was arrested, produced before the Court and remanded to custody. A petition was filed on behalf of the petitioner under Section 353(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short 'the Cr.P.C') to pronounce the judgment. Another petition was filed to grant bail to him in the alternative. The learned Magistrate vide order dated 12.9.2008, which is impugned herein, rejected the petitions occasioning the present revision.

3. A perusal of the impugned order shows that the learned Court below did not apply his mind to the relevant provision of law nor the same was brought to his notice. The proper provision of law is the proviso to Section 353(1)(6) of the Cr.P.C. which reads as follows:

353. Judgment.-(1) xx xx xx xx

xx xx xx xx xx xx

xx xx xx xx xx xx

(6) If the accused is not in custody, he shall be required by the Court to attend to hear the judgment pronounced, except where his personal attendance during the trial has been dispensed with and the sentence is one of the fine only or he is acquitted:

Provided that, where there are more accused than one, and one or more of them do attend the Court on the date on which the judgment is to be pronounced, the Presiding Officer may, in order to avoid undue delay in the disposal of the case, pronounce the judgment notwithstanding their absence.

A close perusal of the above provision shows that the Presiding Officer may pronounce the judgment in absence of other accused persons when one of them is present in order to avoid delay notwithstanding the absence of the other accused persons. If the accused is in custody; he has to be brought up to hear the judgment pronounced as per Sub-section (5) of Section 353 of Cr.P.C. In the present case, one of the accused is available. He is also in jail, by now, for more than a month. Why the learned trial Court has not pronouncing the judgment against the available accused resorting to the proviso of Sub-section (6) of Section 353 of Cr.P.C. is beyond comprehension. In any event the procedure adopted by him is not sanctioned by law and is totally unwarranted. If one of the accused is available and the judgment is ready and is in seal cover, it is his bounden duty to pronounce the same. He has no authority to stall the trial awaiting apprehension of other accused persons just so that he can have the convenience of pronouncing the judgment in presence of all the accused persons. For the shake of argument if it is assumed that the other accused persons are not apprehended for a period of say 10,15 or 20 years, then would the present accused languish in jail for such length of time without either being convicted or acquitted. The very idea of an accused languishing in jail in this manner for an indefinite period without even knowing his fate is repugnant to the concept of fair trial and is dangerous to say the least. The order is thus clearly unsustainable.

4. In the result the revision is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The trial Court is directed to pronounce the judgment in the case with immediate dispatch.

Continue Your Research


AI Briefs · Semantic Search · Save & annotate judgments

Start your 7-day free trial