Full Judgment
A. Pasayat, J.
1. The judgment of the Second Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (M. D.), Sambalpur (hereinafter described as the 'Tribunal' ) refusing to grant any compensation to the appellant, also described as the claimant, is the subject-matter of assail in this appeal.
2. Claimant lodged a claim Under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (in short, the 'Act') claiming compensation of Rs. 60,000/- from the respondent, on the ground that on account of rash and negligent driving of the vehicle bearing registration No. ORP 4459, belonging to the respondent, he sustained injuries and was therefore, entitled to be compensated. According to the claimant, he was driving his motor cycle bearing registration No ORP 3394 very slowly and cautiously on the left side of the road. Suddenly the offending vehicle which was being driven at a very high speed in the most rash and negligent manner dashed against the appellant's vehicle as a result of which he was thrown out of his vehicle and sustained serious injuries. He was hospitalised for a long period for treatment. The respondent filed objecting stating that the accident did not occur in the manner as alleged by the claimant. It was urged that the accident was due to rash and negligent driving of the motor cycle by the claimant himself and therefore, question of respondent being liable to pay any compensation did not arise'.
3. The claimant examined 2 witnesses including himself, while respondent examined the driver of the vehicle. Certain documents were exhibited by the parties. While claimant relied on the expenses made by him during his hosoitalisation and proved his hospitalisatton certificate, X-Ray plates to show that he had suffered serious injuries, respondent filed certified copy of judgment rendered by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Barbil, at Champua (in short, the'Magistrate') in relation to the accident, so far as the claimant is concerned. The Tribunal came to hold that in view of the conclusions arrived at by learned Magistrate in criminal trial that the accident was due to the rash and negligent acts of the claimant, there was no scope for grant of any compensation to him, because he cannot get benefit out of his own fault.
4. Learned counsel for claimant-appellant has submitted that the Tribunal has not analysed the evidence of PW 2 in its proper perspective. In fact, no reference has been made to his evidence, which would have shown that the offending vehicle was really responsible for the accident. Alternatively, it is submitted that the question whether the offending vehicle had contributed to the accident or not' has been considared. Learned counsel for respondent however, submits that in view of the categorical conclusions of learned Magistrate in the Criminal proceeding, there is no scope-for taking a view that there was any contributory negligence by the respondent's vehicle.
5. Judgment of a Criminal Court while deciding the question of negligence or otherwise of the offending vehicle is certainty relevant and material'. It throws tight on the question whether the accident look place in the manner claimed. In the case of Nettleship v. Weston 1972 ACJ 115, Lord Denningo M. R. observed that criminal law is clear. No one would dream of throwing any doubt on it. The conviction is admissibleinoivit proceedings as peima faerie evidence of negligence. Reference was made by the teamed Judge to the decision in J. W. Stupple v. Royal Insurance Co. Ltd., (1970) 3 AH. ER 230. Where a driver is convicted in a regular trial before the Criminal Court, his. conviction becomes admissible in a civil' proceeding to prima facie show that he was culpably negligent in causing the accident. However, acquittal in a criminal case is not to be taken as prima facie evidence of non-negligence. The standard of proof is more one fous to bring home an offence. The Tribunal was therefore, justified to draw an adverse inference from the fact that the claimant himself was held to be driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner. Where an accident is due to the negligence of both parties, there will be contributory negligence on the part of both and they would each be liable to be blamed. Even where affected party is guilty of negligence, but other party by exercise of due diligence and care could have avoided collision, the other party would also be liable in an action for damages. In a case of contributory negligence, crucial question on which liability depends is whether either party could by exercising reasonable case have avoided consequences of others' negligence. Whichever party could have avoided concequenoes of others' negligence would be legally responsible for the accidem. Contributory negligence by the injured person is no defence, but in order to find out whether there was negligence at all or whether negligence was gross as to make other party liable, negligent act of the injured person has also to be taken into consideration. Therefore, finding that the injured was negligent, notwithstanding, in law a proceeding for compensation can1 be maintained? The question which required to be determined is whether the vehicle of the respondent also contributed to the collision in a negligent manner. This aspect does not appear to have been considered by the Tribunal which has placed reliance on the judgment rendered by Criminal Court to hold that since the injured was negligent, question of his getting compensation did not arise. Of course, judgment contained the conclusion that the jeep of the respondent was not at fault. But in the criminal trial, claimant was not required strictly to prove fault of another. He was to prove his own innocence, and in that view of the matter, an independent essessment ought to have been made by the Tribunal of the question whether there was contributory negligence. 1 therefore, remit the matter back to the Tribunal for determination of that question. The entitlement of the claimant would be dependent on the adjudication of that question.
The Misc. Appeal is disposed of accordingly. No costs.