Pitambar Pradhan and ors. Vs. State

Pitambar Pradhan and ors. vs State

Type Court Judgment Court Orissa Decided Jun 23, 1969

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Citation: sooperkanoon.com/530924
Court: Orissa High Court
Judge: S. Acharya, J.
Decided On: Jun 23, 1969
Subject: Criminal

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56 Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the ...

Key legal issue: Criminal

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Pitambar Pradhan and ors.

Respondent

State

Legal References

Cases Referred: Matuki Mahton v. State
Reported In: 35(1969)CLT749; 1970CriLJ641

Excerpt

.....all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the orissa state financial corporation. agreement between the orissa state financial corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the contract act, 1872 read with the provisions in the act, 1951 and its rules. on the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. thus, by virtue of the provision in section 56 read with section 64 (2) of the act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by orissa state financial corporation. by doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the orissa state financial corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. in other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the orissa state financial corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the act, 1972 or the act, 1951. [air 2002 orissa 130 overruled]. -- state financial corporations act, 1951. section 29; discharge of loan orissa forest act (14 of 1972), section 56 confiscation of vehicle - held, the authorities under section 56 of the orissa forest act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of orissa state financial corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the orissa state financial corporation and..........into consideration extraneous matters which were not the subject-matter of the notice. there is nothing in section 117 cr. p. code to support mr. roy's contention, rather the words 'to take such further evidence as may appear necessary' in sub-section (1) of section 117 cr. p. code indicate that the magistrate may take further evidence relating to other incidents, and need not confine himself only to the subject-matter of the notice issued to the persons proceeded against. consideration of such other matters may enable the magistrate to form his opinion that it is necessary to require such delinquents to execute the bond for keeping the peace. leaving out such evidence may result in the missing of vital materials which could have properly moulded the magistrate's opinion. a similar question came up for discussion in matuki mahton v. state : air1963 pat312 , wherein it was held by kamala sahai, j. that--'... i have not the slightest doubt that the magistrate is fully entitled to consider, in an inquiry under section 117, evidence relaing to incidents which take place while the proceeding is pending or, in other words all incidents included or not included in the information originally given to the magistrate, on the basis of which he draws up a proceeding.' in this view of the matter this contention of mr. roy fails.3. it was next contended that there was no finding of overt acts against the petitioners in the long interval between 9-6-1965, the initiation of the proceeding, and 26-10-1967, the date of the order, and as such no inference could be drawn that breach of the peace was apprehended justifying a final order in the proceeding. having perused the appellate as well as the magistrate's order, i find that both the courts below have dealt with in detail the two items of station diary entries, i.e., entry no. 460 dated 26-5-64 (ex. 1) and entry no. 48 dated 3-12-64 (ex. 2), which were the subject-matter of the proceeding against the petitioners. both the.....

Full Judgment

ORDER

S. Acharya, J.

1. This revision application is against the order of the Sessions Judge, Balasore, affirming in appeal, by slightly modifying, the order of the Magistrate to furnish security under Section 118 Cr. P. C., only with respect to these four petitioners.

2. The first point urged by Mr. Roy on behalf of the petitioners was that both the courts were wrong in taking into consideration extraneous matters which were not the subject-matter of the notice. There is nothing in Section 117 Cr. P. Code to support Mr. Roy's contention, Rather the words 'to take such further evidence as may appear necessary' in Sub-section (1) of Section 117 Cr. P. Code indicate that the Magistrate may take further evidence relating to other incidents, and need not confine himself only to the subject-matter of the notice issued to the persons proceeded against. Consideration of such other matters may enable the Magistrate to form his opinion that it is necessary to require such delinquents to execute the bond for keeping the peace. Leaving out such evidence may result in the missing of vital materials which could have properly moulded the Magistrate's opinion. A similar question came up for discussion in Matuki Mahton v. State : AIR1963 Pat312 , wherein it was held by Kamala Sahai, J. that--'... I have not the slightest doubt that the Magistrate is fully entitled to consider, in an inquiry under Section 117, evidence relaing to incidents which take place while the proceeding is pending or, in other words all incidents included or not included in the information originally given to the Magistrate, on the basis of which he draws up a proceeding.' In this view of the matter this contention of Mr. Roy fails.

3. It was next contended that there was no finding of overt acts against the petitioners in the long interval between 9-6-1965, the initiation of the proceeding, and 26-10-1967, the date of the order, and as such no inference could be drawn that breach of the peace was apprehended justifying a final order in the proceeding. Having perused the appellate as well as the Magistrate's order, I find that both the courts below have dealt with in detail the two items of station diary entries, i.e., Entry No. 460 dated 26-5-64 (Ex. 1) and entry No. 48 dated 3-12-64 (Ex. 2), which were the subject-matter of the proceeding against the petitioners. Both the courts have also taken into consideration items of evidence relating to other incidents which followed thereafter. Eleven witnesses were examined in support of the proceedings and one on behalf of the petitioners. On a lengthy and proper evaluation of the evidence of these witnesses, and assessing the case against each one of the persons proceeded against, the Magistrate found that they took the law completely into their own hands for the last few years, and were committing several overt acts from time to time and were likely to commit further such acts and mischief against the 1st. party, causing breach of peace and disturbance of public tranquillity in their locality, unless they were bound down to keep peace. In appeal the learned Sessions Judge, on a re-appraisal of the evidence on record in a proper and elaborate manner, came to a definite finding that there was apprehension of breach of peace in the village unless the four petitioners were bound down, and hence he confirmed the order of the learned Magistrate only with respect to these four petitioners. In this view of the matter this contention of Mr. Roy does not in any way advance the petitioners' case.

4. Mr. Roy at last submits that these petitioners since 26-10-1967, the date on which the Magistrate passed the order, have been very careful in maintaining the peace, and there is at present no apprehension that these persons are likely to commit a breach of the peace. If that be so, while holding that the order passed against the petitioners is lawful and good, and can be given effect to even now, I may only observe that it is left to the petitioners to approach the Magistrate for a reconsideration of his order in the light of the situation and conditions existing at present, and in that case the Magistrate may suitably consider the prayer made by the petitioners. With these observations the revision petition is dismissed.

5. The records of the case be sent back immediately to the Magistrate's Court. The petitioners are hereby directed to appear before the Magistrate within 15 days of this order, and the interim bonds furnished by them in accordance with my order dated 23-1-1969 will remain effective till the date of their appearance before the said Court,

Same Parties Pitambar Pradhan and ors. vs State Same Subject Criminal Same Judge S. Acharya, J.

Criminal