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Basudeb Pradhan Vs. State of Orissa

Basudeb Pradhan vs State of Orissa

Type Court Judgment Court Orissa Decided Feb 09, 1982
~4 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/530788

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Citation
Court
Orissa High Court
Judge
Decided On
Subject
Criminal

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56 Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the ...

Key legal issue
Criminal

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Basudeb Pradhan

Respondent

State of Orissa

Legal References

Cases Referred
Mulaim Singh v. State
Reported In
1983CriLJ527

Excerpt

.....all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the orissa state financial corporation. agreement between the orissa state financial corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the contract act, 1872 read with the provisions in the act, 1951 and its rules. on the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. thus, by virtue of the provision in section 56 read with section 64 (2) of the act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by orissa state financial corporation. by doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the orissa state financial corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. in other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the orissa state financial corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the act, 1972 or the act, 1951. [air 2002 orissa 130 overruled]. -- state financial corporations act, 1951. section 29; discharge of loan orissa forest act (14 of 1972), section 56 confiscation of vehicle - held, the authorities under section 56 of the orissa forest act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of orissa state financial corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the orissa state financial corporation and..........faced with the difficulties indicated by learned additional government advocate, has agreed that if i make the sentences to run concurrently, i. e. direct that the petitioner shall suffer a total period of 5 years imprisonment which is the maximum given in a single case, the petitioner would undertake to suffer the total of sentences as if they were consecutive in the event of being found involved and guilty in any heinous crime including dacoity within a period of 3 years from now, in view of this statement made at the bar, i am prepared to extend the indulgence to the petitioner of making the sentences in the three cases concurrent if the petitioner suffers a total period of 5 years' r.i, as given in sessions trial no. 23/77, he shall be deemed to have suffered the sentences in the other two cases referred to above and in the event of getting involved and being found guilty in any heinous crime including dacoity within a period of 3 years from today, the benefit extended by this order shall not be operative and, as undertaken by the petitioner's counsel, it would be open to the state to take him into custody and ask him to suffer the remaining sentence as if this order had not been made.this disposes of the miscellaneous case.

Full Judgment

ORDER

R.N. Misra. C.J.

1. The petitioner is now undergoing the sentences imposed against him in 3 independent Sessions Trials, being Sessions Trial No. 118-C of 1976, Sessions Trial No. 119-C of 1976 and Sessions Trial No. 23-C of 1977, each one for an offence punishable under Section 395, I.P.C. In the first two cases there has been imprisonment of 4 years each while in' the third one, the sentence is 5 years' R.I. The sentences at the moment are obviously consecutive. The application is for the relief of making the sentences concurrent,

2. Reliance on the side of the petitioner is placed upon the directions of this Court in Jail Criminal Misc. Case Nos. 483/79, 846/81 and 277/82 where, even in respect of an offence punishable under Section 395, I.P.C., the benefit of the sentences becoming concurrent has been extended. The learned Additional Government Advocate on the other hand, relying upon a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Mulaim Singh v. State, 1974 Cri LJ 1397, contends that a direction for making the sentences concurrent would be given only at the time when the sentences were being imposed by the trial court and cannot be made at a later stage. There is no clear restriction in the Cr. P.C. itself that a direction for making the sentences to run concurrently cannot be given in exercise of inherent powers. There have been several precedents in this Court apart from the one the petitioner has relied upon now where the revisional court while exercising revisional powers against convictions and sentences has directed the sentences to become concurrent. There have also been instances where independent miscellaneous proceedings have been entertained to extend the benefit. A direction to make consecutive sentences concurrent does not touch the merit of the matter and proceeds on the acceptance of the judgment of conviction as also the quantum of sentence. The inherent power vested in the court is obviously intended for superintending the administration of criminal justice within the jurisdiction of the court with a view to ensuring that ultimate justice is done. If the superior court is not given this power there may be cases where the same accused would suffer convictions in different courts and where judgment would be delivered by two separate courts on the same day or nearabout, it may Hot be possible for the original court dealing with the case after there have been previous convictions to take note of the sentences awarded in the other cases and modulate Us own sentence accordingly. The view taken by the Allahabad High Court that unless directions to make the sentences to run concurrently is made at the time of disposing of a case it cannot be given at a later stage does not appeal to me. At any rate, that view is not being followed in this Court. With due apologies in the circumstances, I am not able to follow the view expressed there,

3. I agree with learned Additional Government Advocate that the petitioner has been found guilty of the heinous crime of dacoity in three separate cases and within a period of two years. Ordinarily, with these three convictions, the petitioner could be taken as a seasoned dacoit and, therefore, no leniency should be shown at the Bar of Justice to him. The petitioner seems to be still in his twenties and is likely to reform if appropriate guidance is given. Counsel on his behalf, faced with the difficulties indicated by learned Additional Government Advocate, has agreed that if I make the sentences to run concurrently, i. e. direct that the petitioner shall suffer a total period of 5 years imprisonment which is the maximum given in a single case, the petitioner would undertake to suffer the total of sentences as if they were consecutive in the event of being found involved and guilty in any heinous crime including dacoity within a period of 3 years from now, In view of this statement made at the Bar, I am prepared to extend the indulgence to the petitioner of making the sentences in the three cases concurrent If the petitioner suffers a total period of 5 years' R.I, as given in Sessions Trial No. 23/77, he shall be deemed to have suffered the sentences in the other two cases referred to above and in the event of getting involved and being found guilty in any heinous crime including dacoity within a period of 3 years from today, the benefit extended by this order shall not be operative and, as undertaken by the petitioner's counsel, it would be open to the State to take him into custody and ask him to suffer the remaining sentence as if this order had not been made.

This disposes of the miscellaneous case.

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