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Mulia Kirsani Vs. the State

Mulia Kirsani vs The State

Type Court Judgment Court Orissa Decided Aug 11, 1983
~5 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/530681

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Citation
Court
Orissa High Court
Judge
Decided On
Subject
Criminal

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56 Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the ...

Key legal issue
Criminal

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Mulia Kirsani

Advocate Mr. Routray

Respondent

The State

Legal References

Cases Referred
Rana Partap v. State of Haryana.
Reported In
56(1983)CLT349; 1984CriLJ123

Excerpt

.....all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the orissa state financial corporation. agreement between the orissa state financial corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the contract act, 1872 read with the provisions in the act, 1951 and its rules. on the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. thus, by virtue of the provision in section 56 read with section 64 (2) of the act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by orissa state financial corporation. by doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the orissa state financial corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. in other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the orissa state financial corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the act, 1972 or the act, 1951. [air 2002 orissa 130 overruled]. -- state financial corporations act, 1951. section 29; discharge of loan orissa forest act (14 of 1972), section 56 confiscation of vehicle - held, the authorities under section 56 of the orissa forest act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of orissa state financial corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the orissa state financial corporation and..........to be the author of the crime. after a panchayati was held, the first information report was lodged at the police station by p.w. 1 on may 21. 1978. living as these illiterate and unsophisticated persons do in hilly tracts and in view of the fact that after the occurrence, p.w. 1 had sent information to p.w. 3 and others, some delay in lodging the first information report, in the circumstances of the case, would not affect the bona fides of the case of the prosecution.4. an order of conviction can be based on the evidence of a solitary witness if the evidence is found to be true and trustworthy and above reproach. in the instant case, the evidence of p.w. 1. besides being of that character, had found support in other evidence.5. the occurrence had not taken place in a flash. the quarrel between the appellant and the deceased had occurred in the evening. some hours thereafter, the appellant, being armed with bow and arrows, came and shot two arrows at the deceased one of which hit and killed him. as could be seen from the medical evidence, the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death although the doctor (p.w. 8) had not in terms, said so. the appellant had intended to cause the death of the deceased and had with that intention, caused an injury which had resulted in his death. the appellant had rightly been convicted of the offence of murder.6. in the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.7. before we close, we would like to observe that in a case of homicidal death the duty of the prosecutor is to bring in the evidence of the medical officer who had conducted the postmortem examination as to whether or not the injuries on the person of the deceased were anternortem in nature and sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and in addition, as to whether the injuries could be caused in the manner deposed to by the witnesses to the occurrence. we notice that in a number of cases, this is not being done although.....

Full Judgment

B.K. Behera, J.

1. The appellant stands convicted under Section 302. of the Penal Code and sentenced thereunder to undergo imprisonment for life by the judgment and order passed by the Court of Session after accepting the case of the prosecution that after a quarrel between the appellant on the one hand and the deceased on the other in the evening of May 18, 1978, the appellant, being armed with bow and arrows, came at about midnight to the outer courtyard of the house of the deceased where the deceased and P.W. 2(his widow) were sleeping and shot an arrow (M. O. II) which missed the deceased and shot another arrow (M. O. I) which hit and pierced into the abdomen resulting in his death. Of the witnesses examined for the prosecution. P.W. 1 was the sole witness to the occurrence and P.W. 2 is the widow of the deceased. While Mr. Routray appearing for the appellant, has submitted that the evidence of P.W. 1 was not true and trustworthy, it has been contended by the learned Standing Counsel that the order of conviction is well-founded.

2. It admits of no doubt from the evidence of the doctor (P.W. 8). who had conducted the autopsy, that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature and this finding of the learned Sessions Judge has not been assailed. The evidence of P.W. 2 was that there had been a quarrel between the appellant and the deceased in the evening and the appellant had admitted this in his statement. The evidence of P.W. 1 was that while he was awake at about midnight, he saw from his courtyard that the appellant came and shot two arrows, one of which missed the deceased and the other hit him. P.W. 1. a front-door neighbour of the deceased v/ho was only 15 cubits away from the place of occurrence and within a visible distance in a moonlit night was a. natural and competent witness. Besides, nothing had been shown as to why he would support the case of the prosecution and falsely rope in the appellant. He was thus an independent and disinterested witness. The evidence of P.W. 1 did find support in that of P.W. 2. the widow of the deceased, who had pulled out M.O. I which had pierced into the abdomen of her deceased husband and she had shown M. Os. I and II to P.W. 3 and others. These articles had been seized in the course of investigation and on chemical examination, blood had been detected in M.O. I although its origin could not be determined. The evidence of P.W. 1 had found support in the medical evidence, as rightly noticed by the learned Sessions Judge. P.W. 1 had not intervened when the occurrence had taken place nor was there any evidence that he had raised a cry. But different persons may react differently when they see a murderous assault and the clear and acceptable evidence of an eye-witness is not to be discarded merely because he had not intervened at the time of the occurrence. See : 1981 CriLJ733 Angad v. State of Maharashtra and : 1983 CriLJ1272 Rana Partap v. State of Haryana.

3. After the occurrence. P.W. 3 had sent information to the Ward Member Mangala Muduli Mangala (not examined) and P.W. 3 came to the village of the deceased and were informed by P.W. 1 about what he had seen naming the appellant to be the author of the crime. After a Panchayati was held, the first information report was lodged at the police station by P.W. 1 on May 21. 1978. Living as these illiterate and unsophisticated persons do in hilly tracts and in view of the fact that after the occurrence, P.W. 1 had sent information to P.W. 3 and others, some delay in lodging the first information report, in the circumstances of the case, would not affect the bona fides of the case of the prosecution.

4. An order of conviction can be based on the evidence of a solitary witness if the evidence is found to be true and trustworthy and above reproach. In the instant case, the evidence of P.W. 1. besides being of that character, had found support in other evidence.

5. The occurrence had not taken place in a flash. The quarrel between the appellant and the deceased had occurred in the evening. Some hours thereafter, the appellant, being armed with bow and arrows, came and shot two arrows at the deceased one of which hit and killed him. As could be seen from the medical evidence, the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death although the doctor (P.W. 8) had not in terms, said so. The appellant had intended to cause the death of the deceased and had with that intention, caused an injury which had resulted in his death. The appellant had rightly been convicted of the offence of murder.

6. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.

7. Before we close, we would like to observe that in a case of homicidal death the duty of the prosecutor is to bring in the evidence of the Medical Officer who had conducted the postmortem examination as to whether or not the injuries on the person of the deceased were anternortem in nature and sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and in addition, as to whether the injuries could be caused in the manner deposed to by the witnesses to the occurrence. We notice that in a number of cases, this is not being done although it must be done to get at the truth. If certain matters are not made clear in the evidence by the prosecution or the defence, the court should obtain clarification from the Medical Officer and remove the obscurities.

R.C. Patnaik, J.

8. I agree.

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