B. Dasso Patro and ors. Vs. B. Tariniga Patro and anr.

.....all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the orissa state financial corporation. agreement between the orissa state financial corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the contract act, 1872 read with the provisions in the act, 1951 and its rules. on the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. thus, by virtue of the provision in section 56 read with section 64 (2) of the act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by orissa state financial corporation. by doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the orissa state financial corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. in other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the orissa state financial corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the act, 1972 or the act, 1951. [air 2002 orissa 130 overruled]. -- state financial corporations act, 1951. section 29; discharge of loan orissa forest act (14 of 1972), section 56 confiscation of vehicle - held, the authorities under section 56 of the orissa forest act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of orissa state financial corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the orissa state financial corporation and..........have been heard analogously and will be governed by this common order.2. mrs. a. k. padhi, the learned counsel for the petitioners, has raised two contentions:(1) the learned magistrate has not applied his mind judicially before passing the order under section 146(1) of the code : and(2) as the members of the second party, who are the petitioners in this court, claim possession of separate portions of the lands, one proceeding could not be drawn up legally as the petitioners would thereby be prejudiced.mr. c. v. murty, the learned counsel for the opposite parties, has, however, submitted that it is open to the learned magistrate to pass an order under section 146(1) of the code in case he is satisfied that the case is one of emergency and in a case of this nature, where the opposite parties have been claiming the whole of the lands and the petitioners have been claiming portions thereof, one proceeding would be maintainable.3. coming to the first question raised by mrs. padhi, it would be noticed from the impugned order that while dawing up the proceedings under section 145(1) of the code, the learned magistrate simultaneously passed order attaching the lands under section 145, 146(1) of the code and appointing the revenue inspector, komonda, as the receiver, without assigning any reasons. this would show that the learned magistrate had not applied his mind properly and had not exercised his discretion judicially while passing the orders under section 146(1) of the code without even recording that he had been satisfied that cases required emergent measures. i would, therefore, quash these orders passed in both the proceedings. it is open to the learned magistrate to pass an order under section 146(1) of the code in each of the proceedings in accordance with the provisions contained in section 146(1) of the code.4. i am not inclined to accept the other contention raised by mrs. padhi for the petitioners. on the principles laid down in the cases of rabindra.....