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State Vs. Durjodhan Parida

State vs Durjodhan Parida

Type Court Judgment Court Orissa Decided Jul 02, 1981
~3 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/530460

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Citation
Court
Orissa High Court
Judge
Decided On
Subject
Criminal

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56 Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the ...

Key legal issue
Criminal

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

State

Respondent

Durjodhan Parida

Legal References

Reported In
52(1981)CLT214; 1981CriLJ1671

Excerpt

.....all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the orissa state financial corporation. agreement between the orissa state financial corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the contract act, 1872 read with the provisions in the act, 1951 and its rules. on the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. thus, by virtue of the provision in section 56 read with section 64 (2) of the act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by orissa state financial corporation. by doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the orissa state financial corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. in other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the orissa state financial corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the act, 1972 or the act, 1951. [air 2002 orissa 130 overruled]. -- state financial corporations act, 1951. section 29; discharge of loan orissa forest act (14 of 1972), section 56 confiscation of vehicle - held, the authorities under section 56 of the orissa forest act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of orissa state financial corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the orissa state financial corporation and..........came to hold from order of p. k. panigrahi, judl. magistrate 1st class. cuttack, d/- 20-3-1978 that the inspector's evidence could not be held to be sufficient to prove that the establishment employed 38 workmen who were engaged in the manufacture of electrical, mechanical and engineering products. he also was not prepared to accept the prosecution plea that the establishment was in existence, for more than five years by the date of visit of the inspector on 3-8-1975. he, therefore, acquitted the accused. this appeal is directed against the judgment of acquittal.3. in paragraph 10 of his judgment, the learned magistrate stated :there is yet another aspect of the prosecution case which deserves mention. according to section 468(2)(b) cr.p.c., this case is barred by limitation as the offence was detected on 8-8-1975, whereas the case was instituted on 30-7-1977. though for obtaining sanction there was practically no delay. it is admitted by the inspector (p. w. 1) :my inspection report, copies of notice etc. were placed before the regional director for sanction on 15-t5-1977. on the same day it was sanctioned.on this score against the prosecution must fail, especially when no explanation for the delay is offered.' there is no dispute that for the offence under section 14(2) of the special act, the punishment prescribed is a fine of rs. 1,000/- or six months' imprisonment. section 468 of the code of criminal procedure, 1973 prescribes :(1) except as otherwise provided elsewhere, in this code, no court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation.for the present offence, the relevant provision is sub-section (2} (b), which provides:(2) the period of limitation -shall be(a)....(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year;section 473 of the code authorises that the court may extend the period of limitation in cases where from the.....

Full Judgment

R.N. Misra, C.J.

1. This appeal at the instance of the Employees' Provident fund Commissioner is directed against the judgment of acquittal passed , by Shri P. K. Panigrahi', Judicial Magistrate First Class, Cuttack, in a case under Section 14(2) of the Employees' Provident Funds . Act.

2. Prosecution alleged that the accused-respondent, the Employer, failed to make payment of the provident fund contribution amounting to Rs. 29.50 relating to the period September, 1975 to November, 1975. The prosecution alleged that the Employer Messrs Panda Workshop employed 38 workmen while the acoused took the, plea that it had no liability under the statute as the number of workmen was less than 20.

Before the learned Magistrate, 2 witnesses were examined for the prosecution and some documents were marked as exhibits. No evidence oral or documentary'. was led by the defence. The learned Magistrate came to hold From order of P. K. Panigrahi, Judl. Magistrate 1st class. Cuttack, D/- 20-3-1978 that the Inspector's evidence could not be held to be sufficient to prove that the establishment employed 38 workmen who were engaged in the manufacture of electrical, mechanical and engineering products. He also was not prepared to accept the prosecution plea that the establishment was in existence, for more than five years by the date of visit of the Inspector on 3-8-1975. He, therefore, acquitted the accused. This appeal is directed against the judgment of acquittal.

3. In paragraph 10 of his judgment, the learned Magistrate stated :

There is yet another aspect of the prosecution case which deserves mention. According to Section 468(2)(b) Cr.P.C., this case is barred by limitation as the offence was detected on 8-8-1975, whereas the case was instituted on 30-7-1977. though for obtaining sanction there was practically no delay. It is admitted by the Inspector (P. W. 1) :My inspection report, copies of notice etc. were placed before the Regional Director for sanction on 15-t5-1977. On the same day it was sanctioned.

On this score against the prosecution must fail, especially when no explanation for the delay is offered.' There is no dispute that for the offence under Section 14(2) of the special Act, the punishment prescribed is a fine of Rs. 1,000/- or six months' imprisonment. Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 prescribes :

(1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere, in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in Sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation.

For the present offence, the relevant provision is Sub-section (2} (b), which provides:

(2) The period of limitation -shall be

(a)....

(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year;

Section 473 of the Code authorises that the Court may extend the period of limitation in cases where from the facts it is satisfied that circumstances existed to explain the delay. In the instant case, no evidence was placed before the trying magistrate of any such circumstances which would authorise jurisdiction in Section 473 of the Code to be exercised. The period of limitation for initiating the prosecution was therefore, one year. Admittedly, it has been done more than a year after the detection of the offence. Learned Standing Counsel contended that non-payment of the contribution was a recurring liability and. therefore, it was a continuing offence. ,He has not been able to support his stand. I would accordingly uphold the finding of the learned Magistrate that the prosecution is barred by limitation prescribed in Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, therefore, there is no necessity to examine the. other contentions.

The appeal fails and is dismissed.

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