Bali and ors. Vs. State

.....but within limitation/or extended period of limitation maintainability - held, if the provision of a statute speaks of entertainment of appeal, it denotes that the appeal cannot be admitted to consideration unless other requirements are complied with. the provision of sub-section (1) of section 173 permits filing of an appeal against an award within 90 days with a rider in the first proviso that such appeal filed cannot be entertained unless the statutory deposit is made. the period of limitation is applicable only to the filing of the appeal and not to the deposit to be made. it, therefore, appears that an appeal filed under section 173 cannot be entertained i.e. cannot be admitted for consideration unless the statutory deposit is made and for this purpose the court has the discretion either to grant time to make the deposit or not. no formal order condoning the delay is necessary, an order of adjournment would suffice. the provisions of limitation embodied in the substantive provision of the sub-section (1) of section 173 of the act does not extend to the provision relating to the deposit of statutory amount as embodies in the first proviso. therefore an appeal filed within the period of limitation or within the extended period of limitation, cannot be admitted for hearing on merit unless the statutory deposit is made either with the memo of appeal or on such date as may be permitted by the court. no specific order condoning any delay for the purpose of deposit under first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 173 is necessary. [new india assurance co. ltd. v md. makubur rahman, 1993 (2) glr 430 and new india assurance co. ltd. v smt rita devi, 1997(2) glt 406, approved. new india assurance co. ltd. v birendra mohan de, 1995 (2) gau lt 218 (db) and union of india v smt gita banik, 1996 (2) glt 246, are not good law]. - it is well known that from the decree of a munsif, appeal lies to the court of the district judge of the district......of the addl. munsif, kendrapara, is not subordinate to that of the addl. sub. judge, cuttack, as no appeal ordinarily lies from the decrees passed by it to the addl. sub-judge. the contention required careful examination.3. under section 476b, criminal p.c. any person against whom any civil court makes a complaint under section 476, criminal p.c. may appeal to the court to which such former court is subordinate within the meaning of section 195, sub-section (3). under that section, a court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the court to which appeal ordinarily lie from the appealable decrees of such former court. it is well known that from the decree of a munsif, appeal lies to the court of the district judge of the district. the district judge transfers such oases either to an addl district judge or to a subordinate judge.there was some controversy as to whether an addl. district judge or a sub-judge is competent to hear an appeal from the decree of a munsif making a complaint under section 476, criminal p.c. in : 1956 crilj781 , kuladip singh v. state of punjab, their lordships held that the words 'court to which appeals ordinarily lie' in sub-section (8) do not mean the court by which appeals are ordinarily heard. in that view of the matter, the district judge alone could have beard this appeal. the appeal could not have been transferred either to the addl. district judge or to the subordinate judge. the addl. subordinate judge had no jurisdiction to hear this appeal. the same view has been taken by this court in (1965) 82 cut l t 290, banamali bhadia v. jadunath pradhan.4. in the result, the appellate judgment is set aside and the case is remanded to the district judge, cuttack, who would himself hear the> appeal and go into ether questions. the revision is allowed.