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Bramhachari Martha Vs. the State

Bramhachari Martha vs The State

Disposition Petition allowed Court Orissa Decided Jul 15, 1958
~3 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/527516

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Citation
Court
Orissa High Court
Judge
Decided On
Case Number
Criminal Revn. No. 272 of 1957
Subject
Criminal
Disposition
Petition allowed

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 173(1) Proviso; [D. Biswas, Amitava Roy & I.A.Ansari, JJ] Appeal without statutory deposit but within limitation/or extended period of limitation Maintainability - Held, If the provision of a statute speaks of entertainment of appeal, it denotes that the appeal ...

Key legal issue
Criminal
Outcome / disposition
Petition allowed
Acts & sections
Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860 - Sections 378 to 379

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Bramhachari Martha

Advocate G.K. Misra and ;A. Mohapatra, Advs.

Respondent

The State

Advocate Govt. Adv.

Legal References

Acts
Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860 - Sections 378 to 379
Reported In
AIR1959Ori207; 1959CriLJ1460

Excerpt

.....without statutory deposit but within limitation/or extended period of limitation maintainability - held, if the provision of a statute speaks of entertainment of appeal, it denotes that the appeal cannot be admitted to consideration unless other requirements are complied with. the provision of sub-section (1) of section 173 permits filing of an appeal against an award within 90 days with a rider in the first proviso that such appeal filed cannot be entertained unless the statutory deposit is made. the period of limitation is applicable only to the filing of the appeal and not to the deposit to be made. it, therefore, appears that an appeal filed under section 173 cannot be entertained i.e. cannot be admitted for consideration unless the statutory deposit is made and for this purpose the court has the discretion either to grant time to make the deposit or not. no formal order condoning the delay is necessary, an order of adjournment would suffice. the provisions of limitation embodied in the substantive provision of the sub-section (1) of section 173 of the act does not extend to the provision relating to the deposit of statutory amount as embodies in the first proviso. therefore an appeal filed within the period of limitation or within the extended period of limitation, cannot be admitted for hearing on merit unless the statutory deposit is made either with the memo of appeal or on such date as may be permitted by the court. no specific order condoning any delay for the purpose of deposit under first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 173 is necessary. [new india assurance co. ltd. v md. makubur rahman, 1993 (2) glr 430 and new india assurance co. ltd. v smt rita devi, 1997(2) glt 406, approved. new india assurance co. ltd. v birendra mohan de, 1995 (2) gau lt 218 (db) and union of india v smt gita banik, 1996 (2) glt 246, are not good law]. - 5. the lower appellate court has clearly mis-directed itself......no. 444 has been recorded in the anabadi khata of the government, and the title to the same remained with the government, the main question for consideration is whether the land was in the possession of the government. doubtless, if it was mere waste land there may be no specific evidence of acts of possession but as regards mango trees it should be possible for the prosecution to show that the government exercised acts of possession by either leasing out the fruits periodically or selling the timber on some occasions in the past. in fact, the tahsildar (p. w. 1) admitted that the tope in question, from which the trees were cut, in plot no. 444, were never leased out in the past and that there were no papers in his office to show that any act of possession by way of leasing out the trees annually was ever exercised by the government.the other prosecution witnesses have not also spoken about the possession of the government. on the other hand, it is admitted that adjacent to this plot there is another plot no. 89 which was recorded in the name of the village thakurani and which was being possessed by the villagers on behalf of the deity. the petitioner's explanation, therefore, that the villagers were possessing both the plots and utilising the timber of the trees for the purpose of the deity, might possibly be true whatever may be the defect in the deity's title to the plot, in question.6. on the evidence adduced by the prosecution, therefore, the offence under section 379 i. p. c. which is an offence against possession) cannot stand.the petition is therefore allowed, the conviction and sentence are set aside and the petitioneris acquitted. the fine, if paid, shall be refunded.

Full Judgment

R.L. Narasimham, C.J.

1. This is a petition in revision against the conviction of the petitioner under Section 379 I. P. C. and the sentence of fine of Rs. 200/- passed by a First Class Magistrate of Khandpara, which were upheld on appeal by the Sessions Judge of Puri.

2. The petitioner who is a resident of village Koithapalli was charged with dishonest removal, from the possession of Government of 19 mango trees by cutting and removing the same from Anabadi plot No. 444 of the said village. Several other co-villagers were said to have assisted him in cutting and removing the 'trees, but they were acquitted by the learned Magistrate; but the petitioner was convicted and sentenced as he was said to be the ringleader.

3. The plea taken by the petitioner was that the trees were in the possession of the village Thakurani and for the purpose of that village deity the villagers, including himself, cut the trees and sold them to other parties.

4. In a dispute of this type the criminal court has to address itself solely to the question of possession. Unless the prosecution can affirmatively establish that the disputed mango trees were in the possession of Government the question of commission of an offence under Section 379 I. P. C. does not arise. But I find that the lower court has missed the point and has discussed the question as to whether the Government was the real owner of the plot. Having come to the conclusion that the Government and not the village deity was the owner of the plot he observed that the villagers hadno right to cut or sell the mango trees and that the petitioner was therefore guilty under Section 379 I. P. C.

5. The lower appellate court has clearly mis-directed itself. Even assuming that anabadi plat No. 444 has been recorded in the Anabadi Khata of the Government, and the title to the same remained with the Government, the main question for consideration is whether the land was in the possession of the Government. Doubtless, if it was mere waste land there may be no specific evidence of acts of possession but as regards mango trees it should be possible for the prosecution to show that the Government exercised acts of possession by either leasing out the fruits periodically or selling the timber on some occasions in the past. In fact, the Tahsildar (P. W. 1) admitted that the tope in question, from which the trees were cut, in plot No. 444, were never leased out in the past and That there were no papers in his office to show that any act of possession by way of leasing out the trees annually was ever exercised by the Government.

The other prosecution witnesses have not also spoken about the possession of the Government. On the other hand, it is admitted that adjacent to this plot there is another plot No. 89 which was recorded in the name of the village Thakurani and which was being possessed by the villagers on behalf of the deity. The petitioner's explanation, therefore, that the villagers were possessing both the plots and utilising the timber of the trees for the purpose of the deity, might possibly be true whatever may be the defect in the deity's title to the plot, in question.

6. On the evidence adduced by the prosecution, therefore, the offence under Section 379 I. P. C. which is an offence against possession) cannot stand.

The petition is therefore allowed, the conviction and sentence are set aside and the petitioneris acquitted. The fine, if paid, shall be refunded.

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