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Nandakumar Sukla Vs. State

Nandakumar Sukla vs State

Type Court Judgment Court Orissa Decided Jul 27, 1950
~4 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/527453

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Citation
Court
Orissa High Court
Judge
Decided On
Case Number
Criminal Misc. No. 88 of 1950
Subject
Criminal

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 173(1) Proviso; [D. Biswas, Amitava Roy & I.A.Ansari, JJ] Appeal without statutory deposit but within limitation/or extended period of limitation Maintainability - Held, If the provision of a statute speaks of entertainment of appeal, it denotes that the appeal ...

Key legal issue
Criminal
Acts & sections
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1898 - Sections 497 and 498

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Nandakumar Sukla

Advocate S.K. Ray, Adv.

Respondent

State

Advocate Adv. General

Legal References

Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1898 - Sections 497 and 498
Reported In
AIR1952Ori219

Excerpt

.....extended period of limitation maintainability - held, if the provision of a statute speaks of entertainment of appeal, it denotes that the appeal cannot be admitted to consideration unless other requirements are complied with. the provision of sub-section (1) of section 173 permits filing of an appeal against an award within 90 days with a rider in the first proviso that such appeal filed cannot be entertained unless the statutory deposit is made. the period of limitation is applicable only to the filing of the appeal and not to the deposit to be made. it, therefore, appears that an appeal filed under section 173 cannot be entertained i.e. cannot be admitted for consideration unless the statutory deposit is made and for this purpose the court has the discretion either to grant time to make the deposit or not. no formal order condoning the delay is necessary, an order of adjournment would suffice. the provisions of limitation embodied in the substantive provision of the sub-section (1) of section 173 of the act does not extend to the provision relating to the deposit of statutory amount as embodies in the first proviso. therefore an appeal filed within the period of limitation or within the extended period of limitation, cannot be admitted for hearing on merit unless the statutory deposit is made either with the memo of appeal or on such date as may be permitted by the court. no specific order condoning any delay for the purpose of deposit under first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 173 is necessary. [new india assurance co. ltd. v md. makubur rahman, 1993 (2) glr 430 and new india assurance co. ltd. v smt rita devi, 1997(2) glt 406, approved. new india assurance co. ltd. v birendra mohan de, 1995 (2) gau lt 218 (db) and union of india v smt gita banik, 1996 (2) glt 246, are not good law]. - therefore, the court of session will be in a better position to go through the entire evidence and decide on merits whether this is a fit case for granting bail......of proceedings before the magistrate, and during his trial in the court of session when committed to that court.' apparently, in view of these observations of the high court, the committing magistrate has refused to grant bail; but in the order of commitmen he has observed:'he is remanded to jail custody pending further orders from the court of session.'3. the order of brother panigrahi, j., dated the 24th june 1950, was based on certain materials collected by the police and mentioned in the case diary and also on the evidence of some witnesses recorded by the committing magistrate. but at present, the commitment proceeding is over and all the available evidence collected by the police has already been placed before the court. therefore, the court of session will be in a better position to go through the entire evidence and decide on merits whether this is a fit case for granting bail. that court need not be in any way influenced by the observation made in the order of the high court dated 24th june 1950, regarding the petitioner's remaining in jail custody during the trial of the court of session, and should exercise its own independent judgment on the question of granting bail.4. the bail petition is rejected subject to the aforesaid observations.ray, c.j.5. i agree to the order proposed by my learned brother that the discretion of the sessions judge shall be left unfettered by the remarks of panigrahi, j.6. i have gone through that order of mr. justice panigrahi, i cannot accede to the position that in the course of police investigation, the magistrate having had the seisin of enquiry has no jurisdiction to grant bail. that observation leads to the conclusion that at that stage the police dictation shall dominate the field and that there is no authority to grant bail. this would be unduly and very riskily strengthening the hands of the police while we know they proceed leisurely and carry on investigation for months and months together and even while.....

Full Judgment

Narasimham, J.

1. This is a petition for bail on behalf of Nandakumar Sukla, who has been committed to take his trial in the Court of Session for offences under Sections 302 and 201, Indian Penal Code, by the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Puri.

2. It appears that while the commitment proceedings were pending in the Magistrate's Court,a petition was filed by the Advocate-General before the High Court for cancellation of the bail already granted to the petitioner in a previous order of the Court dated 19th January 1950. That petition was heard on 24-6-1950 by my learned brother Panigrahi, J.,' who. while cancelling the bail bond of the petitioner, observed:

'that he shall be committed to jail custody forthwith pending completion of proceedings before the Magistrate, and during his trial in the Court of Session when committed to that Court.'

Apparently, in view of these observations of the High Court, the Committing Magistrate has refused to grant bail; but in the order of commitmen he has observed:

'He is remanded to jail custody pending further orders from the Court of Session.'

3. The order of brother Panigrahi, J., dated the 24th June 1950, was based on certain materials collected by the police and mentioned in the Case Diary and also on the evidence of some witnesses recorded by the Committing Magistrate. But at present, the commitment proceeding is over and all the available evidence collected by the police has already been placed before the Court. Therefore, the Court of Session will be in a better position to go through the entire evidence and decide on merits whether this is a fit case for granting bail. That Court need not be in any way influenced by the observation made in the order of the High Court dated 24th June 1950, regarding the petitioner's remaining in jail custody during the trial of the Court of Session, and should exercise its own independent judgment on the question of granting bail.

4. The bail petition is rejected subject to the aforesaid observations.

Ray, C.J.

5. I agree to the order proposed by my learned brother that the discretion of the Sessions Judge shall be left unfettered by the remarks of Panigrahi, J.

6. I have gone through that order of Mr. Justice Panigrahi, I cannot accede to the position that in the course of police investigation, the Magistrate having had the seisin of enquiry has no Jurisdiction to grant bail. That observation leads to the conclusion that at that stage the police dictation shall dominate the field and that there is no authority to grant bail. This would be unduly and very riskily strengthening the hands of the police while we know they proceed leisurely and carry on investigation for months and months together and even while there is no evidence available they want to have the accused persons in custody. This view would be diametrically contrary to the provisions of Section 497, Criminal P.C., English practice is very misleading. In 'NARENDRA LAL v. EMPEROR', 36 Cal 166, their Lordships observed:

'In view of the express provisions contained in this Section (497), it is not open to the Courts in India to follow the principles laid down in the decisions of English Courts in determining matters of bail.'

The position that held the ground in this case at the time has since changed. The alleged conspirators have been discharged. The statement recorded in Committing Court can be used as substantive evidence.

7. In this particular case when bail was grantedto Nandakumar Sukla, he was enjoined to stayaway from, the arena of investigation and that onthe condition of forfeiting a very heavy amount ofbail. Even then if some of the prosecution witnesses have been gained over, it is for the Judgeconcerned to say how and why it happened.

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